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FOREWORD
Performance benchmarking of key infrastructure industries such as the
waterfront, where government has played an important role, provides essential
information by which to judge whether services central to the well being of
Australians are being supplied efficiently.
This benchmarking study is part of a continuing program of research into the
performance of economic infrastructure industries, which was commenced by
the Bureau of Industry Economics.  It is the third Waterfront Benchmarking
report in the cycle.
The study builds on the two previous waterfront studies by providing new
insights into timeliness, reliability and the economic consequences of failure to
match levels of performance achieved overseas.  It is based on data collected
throughout 1997.
The study also provides a broad context for the Productivity Commission’s
companion study on Work Arrangements in Container Stevedoring, which
examines selected work arrangements and assesses their implications for the
performance of container stevedoring workplaces.
The study was prepared in the Economic Infrastructure Branch of the
Commission.  It could not have been undertaken without the active co-operation
of many participants in the sector, who either assisted the Commission directly
or provided detailed information to its consultant, Thompson Clarke Shipping.
We are grateful to all those who took part.
The Commission welcomes further feedback on both reports, consistent with its
objective to improve the information base on key issues affecting Australia’s
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ABARE Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACS Australian Customs Service
AQIS Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
AWB Australian Wheat Board
BCA Business Council of Australia
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BIE Bureau of Industry Economics
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IC Industry Commission
IDO Import Delivery Order
ISC Inter-State Commission
LCL Less than a Full Container Load
NRT Net Registered Tonnage
PCC Pure Car Carrier
PPA Port Pricing Additional
PSA Prices Surveillance Authority
PSC Port Services Charge
QSC Queensland Sugar Corporation
SCA Sea Cargo Automation
SIA Stevedoring Industry Award
TEU Twenty foot equivalent unit
THC Terminal Handling Charge
VANs Value Added Networks
VBS Vehicle Booking System





The waterfront is a key link in the distribution
of traded goods.  The efficiency of the
waterfront affects the competitiveness of
Australia’s trade and the welfare of all
Australians.
In value terms, approximately 70  per cent of
imports and 78  per cent of exports were
transported by sea in 1995–96.  These trade
flows amounted close to $60 billion.
Key findings
This international benchmarking study shows Australia to be under-performing on the
waterfront.
Container stevedoring charges were higher than overseas, ship loading and unloading
were slower, and services were less reliable.
Other areas of traditional break-bulk and bulk stevedoring examined also performed
relatively poorly.
Cruise ship baggage handling charges in Sydney were 5 times those in Auckland.  The
cost of provedoring was 4 times that in Miami.
Marine services and port infrastructure charges were 2 to 3 times greater in Australia,
not all of which  reflects pricing policies to recover costs.
The Port-land interface is not operating effectively.  There is a need for better co-
ordination throughout the transport chain.
Poor performance increases costs to exporters, importers and other shippers both directly
and indirectly.
Overall, there is significant scope for improvement.  In particular, higher stevedoring
productivity would improve timeliness and reliability.  However, incentives to improve
performance are muted.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Some basic terms
Shipper The consignor or consignee of sea cargo.
‘Blue water’ freight rate Charge  by  shipping  line  for  carriage  of
cargo and lifting it on and off the ship.
Bulk cargo Cargo (such as coal, ore, sand or oil) that is
carried loose and takes up the shape of the
ship’s hold.
Break-bulk cargo Non-bulk cargo that is not containerised.
Conservancy  dues Charges for services such as navigation
aids, dredging and channel markings.
Pilotage Navigation of a ship within ports and their
approaches by a licensed pilot.
Towage Tug operations assisting the movement of
ships.
Stevedoring The process of loading and unloading
ships.
Provedoring Supplying ships’ crew and passenger
provisions.
Net crane rate Hourly rate at which a single crane moves
containers while a ship is actually being
worked (net lifts per hour).
Performance is compared and
gaps identified.
This study provides information by which the
performance of Australian ports can be
compared — both with overseas ports and with
each other.  The aim is to identify and quantify
the extent of any performance deficiencies and
some of their economic effects by evaluating
the scope for improvement.  The study
approach and scope are outlined in Box 1.
Policy prescriptions to redress performance
concerns are beyond the scope of this
informational study.OVERVIEW
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Box 1 Study approach and scope
The stevedoring of containers was benchmarked at the following ports:
·  Australia: Adelaide, Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney-Port Botany;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Lyttelton;
·  Asia: Port Klang, Singapore, Nagoya and Pusan;
·  North America: Philadelphia and Los Angeles; and
·  Europe: Tilbury and Hamburg.
The general approach was to measure actual charges and service performance for
individual ships engaged in Australian liner shipping trades.  This approach differed from
that adopted in the benchmarking studies conducted by the Bureau of Industry Economics
in two respects: the use of actual rather than estimated data, and like-with-like
comparisons using a ship typical of those operating in each trade.
The break-bulk stevedoring of passenger motor vehicles, pulp and newsprint paper, timber
and hot-rolled steel coil was benchmarked.  The ports covered across this range of
commodities were:
·  Australia: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle, Port Kembla and
Devonport;
·  Europe: Amsterdam, Barking, Grangemouth and Hull;
·  North America: Philadelphia;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Tauranga; and
·  South Africa: Durban.
The cost of stevedoring bulk grain loading and bulk fertiliser unloading was examined in
the following ports:
Grain
·  Australia: Average across all grain ports; and
·  North America: New Orleans, Portland and Prince Rupert
Fertiliser
·  Australia: Adelaide, Albany, Brisbane, Geelong, Hobart, Kwinana, Newcastle,
Townsville; and
·  New Zealand: Lyttelton, Napier, Dunedin.
Pilotage, towage and mooring charges (marine charges) along with government and port
authority charges for port infrastructure, were examined for each of the ports included in
the benchmarking of container and bulk shipping stevedoring.
Cruise shipping baggage handling and provedoring charges were also benchmarked
across a range of major cruise ports in Australia and overseas.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The focus is on outcomes for
Australian shippers.
The focus of the benchmarking in this report is
on charges and level of service to ship
operators and shippers.
Indicators of labour and capital productivity are
also reported to provide insights into
differences in outcomes.  But they require
careful interpretation.
Services within port
boundaries are examined ...
The study is confined to activities within the
port precincts and at the land-side interface
where cargo is received by stevedores or
delivered to shippers.  The activities studied are
those associated with servicing container,
break-bulk, bulk and cruise ships.
... but activities beyond the
waterfront are recognised.
Waterfront services are an important part of the
chain of services used to transport goods.  A
number of land-side private and government
services are involved that also affect the overall
efficiency of the movement of sea cargo.
A breakdown of the actual total shipment cost
for an imported container shows that waterfront
charges were approximately 13 per cent of the
total charge, of which the container handling
charges represented two-thirds (see Box 2).
Waterfront services are not
homogeneous ...
The waterfront services used by shippers vary
with exports and imports, cargo type, ports and
ships.  In addition, there are differences in the
nature and extent of government involvement,
the scale of operation and the physical
environment.
... consequently, care is
required when comparing
performance.
With this diversity, it is difficult to make
robust, like-with-like comparisons.  The
Commission has endeavoured to structure its
benchmarking analysis so that comparative
performance is interpreted correctly.OVERVIEW
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Box 2 An example of the breakdown of total transport costs for
imported containerised cargo, 1997
Land side charges
21%





Note: Land-side charges include delivery order fees, AQIS fees, ACS Sea Cargo Automation fees,
Customs administrative charges, brokerage fees and transport charges.
Australian waterfront in context
Australian sea trade and
waterfront operations are
small by world standards,
which affects performance.
Australia is disadvantaged relative to many
other countries because of the ‘thinness’ of its
shipping trades.  Not only is the level of cargo
throughput lower, it is more difficult to provide
a high quality of service because demand is
more variable.  As a consequence, costs can be
expected to be higher or the level of service
lower than at the largest overseas ports, other
things being equal.
. Diseconomies also arise because of the
requirement for sufficient capacity to provide
adequate levels of service for periods of peak
demand that are more pronounced than in
overseas ports with higher levels of throughput.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Container ships make
multiple port calls in
Australia.
Container shipping services have a multi-port
pattern of operation in Australia — unlike most
of the other countries where the benchmarked
ports are located.  On most container trades,
ships call at Fremantle, Melbourne, Sydney and
Brisbane.
Disruption to a service schedule in one port can
thus have ‘knock-on’ effects.  This can cause
further problems unless shipping lines build
slack, and the attendant costs, into their service
schedules.
Shipping lines typically allow for contingency
in their Australian schedules.  For example, one
Australia–US West Coast service operator
requires an additional ship to protect its
schedule integrity against delays on the
Australian coast.
The potential for ‘knock-on’ effects underlines
the importance of eliminating delays and
improving reliability.
The scope for competition
between ports is limited.
The volume of trade to and from Australia does
not support numbers of closely located ports
with ships visiting at the levels of service
frequency required by shippers.  This
constrains competitive pressures on Australian
ports to achieve high levels of performance.
In addition, there are
contractual problems.
Shippers do not contract stevedores to load and
unload their cargo — this is done by the
shipping line.  Shipping lines seek to minimise
their cost of operation by turning ships around
as quickly as possible.  They are less concerned
about wider costs resulting from delays to the
door-to-door movement of cargo.OVERVIEW
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Government involvement
varies from country to
country.
The nature of government involvement has a
bearing on the cost of providing port
infrastructure and the efficiency of stevedores
and other waterfront participants.  Government
involvement varies from country to country in
terms of ownership, scope of activity, corporate





In Australia, all the ports benchmarked are
owned by the respective State governments and
are statutory authorities.  With some minor
exceptions, they predominantly have a landlord
role.
With the major port authorities responsible
primarily for land management and port
development issues, the more contestable
services such as towage, pilotage, mooring,
stevedoring and provedoring are provided by
private sector operators.
... whereas other countries
have adopted different
models.
Government ports overseas are typically more
vertically integrated than Australian ports,
combining landlord services with other more
contestable services.  For example, Singapore,
Auckland and Tilbury integrate cargo handling
and other waterfront services.  Some
governments have privatised their ports;
however, as in Australia, this is not the norm.
Australian port authorities
fully recover costs ...
Each of the Australian ports and the two private
overseas ports in this study (Tilbury and
Auckland) operate as fully commercial entities
and seek to recover all costs.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
xviii
... but this is not generally the
case overseas.
Most of the other overseas ports studied receive
some government support.  And the extent to
which costs are recovered by port authorities
varies widely across the ports examined.  This
means that charges for port infrastructure and
marine services do not always reflect costs.
Regulation of port authority
pricing varies widely.
Government regulation of port authority fees
and charges also varies across the benchmarked
ports.  In recognition of the limited competition
among ports in Australia, there is provision for
independent prices oversight in most
jurisdictions.
Price regulation is less of an issue for the
selected overseas ports because of greater
competition between local ports and, in some
cases, viable land-based transport alternatives.
Comparative performance
Marine services and infrastructure charges
Overall, Australian
infrastructure and marine
service charges are 2 to 3
times greater than the
overseas ports studied.
Infrastructure and marine services charges are
best compared in aggregate because charging
structures differ among ports.  The combined
charges are higher for container ships at
Australian ports than at the overseas ports (see
Figure  1).  These charges are also generally
higher for other types of ships.OVERVIEW
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Figure 1 Combined infrastructure and marine services charges per

















































































































































































































































































































Australian ports Overseas ports
Note: Combined port and maritime infrastructure and services charges includes government charges
(light dues, conservancy and oil pollution charges), port authority charges (wharfage, tonnage,
berth hire), pilotage, towage, and mooring charges.
The range of values for Australian ports reflects the variation in ship size and container
exchange among the liner shipping trades serviced by the port.
See Figure 5.11 in Chapter 5 for other details.
The share of pilotage, towage and mooring in
the combined charges varies among ships and
ports (see Figure 2).
Pilotage charges levied on container and cruise
ships were generally higher at Australian ports
than most of the overseas ports studied.  In
some cases, this reflects pilotage distance and
the extent of navigational hazards.
Towage charges were also generally higher at
Australian ports.  High towage charges reflect
low tug utilisation and the use of one more tug
per ship movement at some Australian ports.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 2 Composition of charges at Australian ports, 1997
(a) Container ship — South–East Asia trade







(b) Cruise ship — 55 000 GRT







(c) Bulk ship — 33 200 GRT









Pilotage Towage Mooring Port Authority GovernmentOVERVIEW
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Mooring charges, with the exception of those
for bulk (wheat) ships, were generally higher at
the Australian ports than overseas.  This
appears to result from the use of up to 30 per
cent more linesmen per ship in Australia than
overseas.
Australia charges directly for
conservancy and pollution
control.
Government charges (conservancy, light  dues
and oil pollution dues) are not levied explicitly
at the overseas ports studied.  Consequently,
government charges on ships calling at
Australian ports were higher than overseas —
and highest at those Australian ports charging
conservancy dues.
Australian port authority
charges are generally higher
than overseas ...
Port  authority charges (both cargo and ship-
based) levied on container ships were generally
higher than overseas.  Port authority charges
levied on bulk ships (wheat) are higher than in
Canada, but lower than in the USA (Portland
and New Orleans).
... in part, reflecting the full
cost recovery policy adopted
by Australian governments.
The relatively high port authority charges in
Australia, reflect the priority placed by owner
governments on covering all costs and ensuring
competitive neutrality.
All Australian ports are self-funding.  They pay
State and local government taxes, and make
tax-equivalent and dividend payments.  These
payments amount to around 15  per cent of total
port revenue.
In contrast, only a small number of the overseas
ports studied paid income tax, and Singapore is




charges were higher than
overseas ...
Container stevedoring charges were, for most
trades, higher at all Australian container
terminals than at any of the overseas terminals
surveyed (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 Indexed container terminal stevedoring charges per TEU































































































































































































































































































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Comparisons should only be made within liner shipping trades because performance is
significantly affected by ship size and type, and cargo composition and stow.
... and labour and capital
productivity were lower.
Net crane container handling rates (lifts per net
crane hour) are a key measure of service and
overall performance of the terminal.  On most
trades, the handling rates at Australian
terminals were generally well below those at
overseas ports for the same ships (see
Figure 4).  And, on average, container lifts per
terminal employee were significantly lower
than at overseas terminals (see Figure 5).OVERVIEW
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Figure 4 Net crane rate by port and liner shipping trade, 1997


































































































































































































































































































West-Bound North Asia South East Asia US East Coast
US West
 Coast
Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Comparisons should only be made within liner shipping trades because performance is
significantly affected by ship size and type, and cargo composition and stow.
Net crane rates are annual averages for each ship studied.
Figure 5 Container lifts per terminal employee by terminal and
liner shipping trade, 1997



















Annual container lift per employee (boxes)INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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. Further analysis suggests that the differences
could not be explained simply by scale
diseconomies.
Reliability is also relatively
poor ...
Overall, the quality of service provided at
Australian container terminals is lower than
overseas.  About one-fifth of ships surveyed
experienced a delay of more than 4 hours at
Australian ports.
Furthermore, net crane rates were found to vary
significantly among Australian ports for each
ship in the benchmarking sample.  Sydney
terminals performed particularly poorly.
... and there are delays at the
terminal land-side interface.
Road transport operators experience delays in
delivering and receiving containers, resulting in
truck queues.  These delays reflect a lack of co-
ordination of the transfer of cargo between
stevedores and land transport operators and
between other land-side activities.
Other areas of stevedoring
Australian break-bulk
stevedoring costs are higher
than in other countries.
Stevedoring charges levied on importers and
exporters of break-bulk cargo (timber, motor
vehicles, pulp and newsprint and hot rolled
coil) were up to two and a half times higher
than overseas (see Figure 6).
Cruise ship baggage handling
is the highest of the ports
studied.
Sydney had the highest baggage handling costs
of the ports surveyed — five times more
expensive than Auckland.  The cost of fully
provedoring a typical cruise ship at Sydney was
four times that at Miami and twice that at Los
Angeles.OVERVIEW
xxv
Figure 6 Ratio of stevedoring charges levied at Australian ports

















































Motor vehicles Timber Pulp and newsprint
Notes: Each data point corresponds to the ratio of charges at an Australian port compared to an
overseas port.
Stevedoring costs have been
reduced significantly for bulk
grain loading ...
The cost of stevedoring services for the
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) averaged
around 25 cents per tonne in 1996–97,
significantly lower than in late 1989, when the
cost was about 70 cents per tonne.
The average Australian cost for grain handling
is now significantly lower than typical
stevedoring costs at four major North American
grain ports — approximately half the cost at
Vancouver, Prince Rupert and New Orleans,
and one-fifth the cost at Portland.
... where substantive labour
reforms have been achieved.
The fall in the cost of stevedoring for bulk grain
in Australia came about after the AWB
assumed responsibility for stevedoring from
shipping lines, thereby gaining greater control
over the operation.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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However, charges for bulk
stevedoring of fertilisers are
higher than New Zealand.
In another traditional bulk stevedoring activity
— bulk fertiliser — New Zealand stevedoring





Since the WIRA reforms, waterfront charges
have fallen in real terms.  Productivity
measured by net crane rates also improved
initially, but over recent years the rate of
improvement has slowed.
... however, there is
significant scope to do better.
That said, the benchmarking results provide
evidence that Australia’s performance remains
well below that in the overseas ports examined
in this study.  With the exception of bulk grain,
charges were generally higher and service
performance lower than enjoyed by our trading
partners.
Productivity was also significantly below that
at most overseas ports.  Even allowing for scale
diseconomies, there is scope to do better.
Higher stevedoring productivity, by reducing
ship turnaround times, would also improve
timeliness and reliability and lower the overall





Shippers consulted in the course of the study
indicated that timeliness and reliability are also
being adversely affected by land-side activities
through:
·  documentation delays involving customs
and quarantine clearance;
·  lack of logistical planning and co-
ordination on the part of exporters and
importers;
·  AQIS, container park and warehouse
operating hours;
·  inflexibility in the transport union award;
and
·  problems associated with gaining
accessing to the vehicle booking schemes.
These sources of poor timeliness were also
identified in the 1992 Parliamentary report
‘Warehouse to Wharf’.  Yet significant
problems remain.
Some of these problems can be mitigated by
improvements to shippers’ own logistical
organisation.  However, better co-ordination
between all parties involved, including
government agencies and road transport
operators, is required.  Further uptake of
electronic commerce would help.
Gains from better performance
Poor performance results in
other costs as well as higher
charges ...
Poor waterfront performance not only results in
higher charges for shippers, the lack of
timeliness and reliability also gives rise to other
costs, including higher production, inventory
and financing costs.
The potential savings in these indirect costs can
be substantial.  For example, indicativeINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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calculations suggest that the gains to shippers
from improved performance could amount to
around $50 per TEU, equivalent to a 25 per
cent reduction in container terminal charges.
... and detracts from
Australia’s reputation as a
reliable trading nation.
Australian exporters are already disadvantaged
by their remoteness from overseas markets.
Unreliability further disadvantages them
because of the higher risk to overseas buyers of
disruptions in supply.
One significant incident involving delay can
have lasting consequences when overseas
buyers redirect their business.
Co-ordination throughout the
transport chain is required as
well as better performance in
stevedoring.
The broader implication is that performance
improvement must be directed toward better co-
ordination of waterfront interface operations
and of land-side activities, as well as better
performing stevedoring services.
The latter is the subject of the Commission’s
companion study of work arrangements in
container stevedoring.1
1 ABOUT THIS STUDY
The benchmarking undertaken in this study is aimed at measuring
the performance of key waterfront activities relative to those in other
countries.  The focus is on charges and level of service to ship
operators, exporters and importers.
Government involvement in the provision of ports is also studied to
take into account those arrangements, processes and policies that
affect the delivery of waterfront services when making performance
comparisons.  The overall effects of under-performance on importers
and exporters is also examined.
This is the third international benchmarking study of the Australian waterfront.
The two previous studies were conducted by the Bureau of Industry Economics
(BIE) and were published in 1993 and 1995.
A complementary Productivity Commission (PC) study of container stevedoring
work arrangements was conducted concurrently with this study (PC 1998).
That study examines the impact of selected work arrangements on container
stevedoring workplace performance.  The two studies were co-ordinated to
ensure that the Commission did not duplicate effort and impose an unnecessary
burden on the waterfront industries, particularly stevedores.
Performance benchmarking has been used in this study with the aim of
identifying areas where performance improvement may be possible.  It is
beyond the scope of this study to address what needs to be done to improve the
performance of the lower performing ports.
1.1 Role of waterfront benchmarking
The chief purpose of benchmarking is to identify performance gaps and areas of
potential improvement.  Benchmarking requires the measurement of
performance.  This may involve measuring the performance achieved by a better
performing business engaged in the same or similar activity, or by a business
regarded as having ‘best-practice’ performance.  In another form, the current
performance of a business can be measured against the benchmark of its past
performance to gauge whether improvement is occurring.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The term ‘benchmarking’ is also used to encompass the process of identifying
‘best practices’ — that is, finding ways of doing better.  This involves assessing
a businesses’ practice against those of other high performing businesses
engaged in the same activity (in-industry benchmarking) or against businesses
in other industries engaged in similar activities (out-of-industry benchmarking).
It is also possible to determine which practices make a significant contribution
to performance.
Benchmarking primarily addresses technical efficiency.  The best practice
identified is not necessarily economically efficient — that is, the best possible
use of resources from a community perspective.
Many industry participants are broadly aware of the nature of performance
problems and what would be ‘good practice’.  However, they are not in a
position to assess the overall magnitude of the problem and the gains that are
possible from improved performance.
Performance benchmarking has been undertaken in this study to determine how
well some parts of the Australian waterfront service industries compare in
relation to their counterparts in other countries.  The main focus of performance
comparisons are charges and service outcomes for importers and exporters.  In
addition, selected indicators of labour and capital productivity performance are
also reported.  The benchmarking is relevant to all shippers, including users of
coastal shipping.
The objective of the study is to identify and quantify the extent of any under
performance and to provide an indication of its economic impact.
1.2 Approach
The Commission’s approach in conducting this study has been to identify in the
areas covered the nature, extent and cost of poor performance for Australian
shippers.
The conceptual framework, study scope and performance indicators were
developed after consultation with shipping lines, waterfront service providers
and shippers.  The Commission also consulted widely to identify and
understand waterfront user concerns.  A list of those consulted is presented in
Appendix A.1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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Limitations of benchmarking
There are a range of factors which impact on the usefulness of benchmarking.
These include:
·  the accuracy and integrity of the data used in the analysis;
·  the difficulty in ensuring that comparisons are being made between like-
with-like situations; and
·  lower observed performance may not equate with inefficiency; for
example, higher port charges may represent an efficient full cost recovery
pricing structure.
These factors have been taken into account in the analysis and interpretation of
the indicators used in this study.  However, it is not possible to precisely
measure performance.
The need to convert charges to a common currency adds a further complication
when making international comparisons.  Fluctuations in the exchange rate
between Australian and other countries can alter the Australian dollar value of
charges between ports without any change in underlying efficiency.  Charges
are reported in Australian dollars at June 1997.  The exchange rates applying at
that time, used for conversion are presented in Appendix B.
Since June 1997 there has been considerable changes in the exchange rate
between the Australian dollar and other countries.  Australia’s ranking in the
levels of charges has not been affected by the recent changes in exchange rates.
In cases where the Australian dollar has depreciated against the foreign
currency, the change has reduced the differences in charges, but has not been
enough to increase the charges in low cost countries above those levied in
Australia.  In other cases, the Australian dollar has appreciated, thereby making
overseas charges appear lower in Australian dollar terms.
Productivity has also been examined to provide insights into differences in
outcomes.  Ideally, comprehensive indicators of productivity, such as total
factor productivity, should be used but have not been measured because of the
difficulties involved in collecting the data required.  Instead, partial productivity
measures based on comparable data have been calculated (see Appendix B).
Conceptual issues
The cost of inefficiency is usually thought of as higher than necessary charges.
For example, inefficient terminal operations result in increased terminal
charges.  However, poor service performance can also affect the efficiency ofINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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others — for example, shipping lines may have to provide additional capacity
because ships are delayed on the Australian coast.
Service performance throughout the waterfront chain affects the cost of
importing and exporting.  Poor performance adversely impacts on the
competitiveness of Australian exports.  It also increases the costs of
consumption of imported goods and the cost of manufactured products that use
imported inputs.
Outcomes for exporters and importers are not only determined by the price they
pay for services, but also depend on the cost associated with timeliness.
Timeliness is achieved when cargo is delivered and received on time.  There are
two dimensions to waterfront timeliness.  First, the overall time taken to process
cargo.  Second, the reliability — measured as variability of the time taken.
Poor timeliness and reliability create the need for larger stocks of traded goods
to be held, which affects other waterfront users and downstream businesses
generally.  Unreliability also affects the productivity of waterfront activities by
adversely impacting on capital utilisation.
The costs of poor timeliness and unreliability of waterfront services include:
·  capital costs (those costs associated with goods in transit and holding
inventories to avoid shortages);
·  costs associated with hedging on exchange rates;
·  costs associated with disruption to production (for user industries);
·  indirect production costs (those associated with adopting less than optimal
production techniques or using alternative inputs);
·  additional costs associated with contingency arrangements (alternative
transport arrangements); and
·  additional costs incurred at the port–land interface (that is, costs associated
with truck queues and so on).
Waterfront services are just part of the chain of services used to transport goods
by sea.  A large number of land-side private and government services are
involved that also affect the overall efficiency of the movement of sea cargo.
The waterfront services used by shippers vary between exports and imports,
cargo type, ports and ships.  Consequently, it is difficult to generalise about
services.  In addition, there are differences in government involvement, the scale
of operation and physical environment.
With this diversity it is difficult to find similar services to make robust like-
with-like performance comparisons.  Consequently, the benchmarking results in1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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this report have been carefully analysed and interpretations of comparative
performance qualified where appropriate.
Government involvement in the waterfront has been examined.  This was
undertaken to take into account some important elements of the operating
environment when making performance comparisons — that is, to have regard
for some of the factors that are beyond the control of the industry and to reduce
the risk of drawing inappropriate conclusions.
Scope
The scope of the study is confined to activities within the port precincts and at
the port-land interface.  The activities studied were those associated with
servicing container, break-bulk, bulk trades and cruise shipping.
Container depots (parks), and the operations of freight forwarders including
non-vessel owning common carriers (NVOCCs) are not covered.  The omission
of these port-related waterfront industries is not a reflection of their perceived
importance.  They were excluded for study manageability reasons.
Container services associated with Australia’s main shipping trades have been
studied.  The approach adopted was to select a typical ship in each trade and
collect actual charge and service information for that ship over a period of 12
months.
This approach is different from that adopted by the Bureau of Industry
Economics (BIE) for the last international benchmarking study of the waterfront
(BIE 1995a).  The BIE benchmarked container shipping operations for typical
ships and loading and unloading operations.  Hypothetical ship visits were used
to estimate the charges that would have been levied on the basis of scheduled
charges.  The ship parameters used are discussed in BIE (1995a).
The underlying reason for the difference in approach is the Commission’s
decision to benchmark actual charges and operations.  Actual charges often
differ from published charges.  The Commission’s approach involved collecting
information on the charges levied against particular ships.  It provides a broad
range of benchmarks for ships typical to Australian trades.  Examining the
performance of the principal overseas ports through which Australian imports
and exports pass, also increases the relevance of the benchmarking.
The break-bulk cargoes studied are built-up motor vehicles, hot-rolled steel coil,
pulp and paper and timber.  These commodities were chosen because of their
significance in terms of volume.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The bulk cargoes studied were wheat as an export commodity and fertiliser as
an import commodity.
Stevedoring has been benchmarked for every cargo type.  In the case of cruise
shipping, baggage handling and provedoring of supplies are covered.
The services provided to ships — such as pilotage, towage and mooring — have
been benchmarked for container and cruise ships as well as bulk ships carrying
wheat.
The selection of ports and facilities was limited to the ports that have direct
services with Australia.  This was dictated by the need to approach shipping
lines for the majority of the performance information.  However, these ports are
of particular interest because they are served by ships operating in Australian
shipping trades.
The container ports benchmarked were:
·  Australia: Adelaide, Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney-Port
Botany;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Lyttelton;
·  Asia: Port Klang, Singapore, Nagoya and Pusan;
·  North America: Philadelphia and Los Angeles; and
·  Europe: Tilbury and Hamburg.
The cruise ship ports benchmarked were:
·  Australia: Brisbane, Cairns, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Wellington;
·  Asia: Singapore;
·  North America: Los Angles and Miami; and
·  Europe: Copenhagen and Tilbury.
Government involvement, institutional settings and practices
Governments influence the operating environment and practices through their
direct involvement and the institutional settings under their control.  The
operating environment, in turn, affects incentives and performance outcomes for
individual activities and the overall performance of the system.
Government involvement was examined in the following ports:
·  Australia: Adelaide, Brisbane, Burnie, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney-
Port Botany;
·  New Zealand: Auckland;1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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·  Asia: Port Klang, Singapore and Nagoya;
·  North America: Philadelphia and Los Angeles; and
·  Europe: Tilbury and Hamburg.
Choice of indicators
BIE benchmarked performance in the 1995 study using indicators of user
satisfaction and productivity.  This study provides similar information.
However, additional indicators of reliability (user satisfaction) have been
measured and the scope of the study has been widened to increase the coverage
of activities, commodities and ports.
Wherever possible, the Commission has adopted the definitions of indicators
used by the Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) for
its Waterline publication.  This ensured comparability of performance measures
between Australian ports over time.  It also allowed the Commission to draw on
the information already collected to minimise the burden placed on industry.
User satisfaction
Charges for waterfront services are included in the overall cost of transporting
goods by sea.  They are an important, but not the sole, determinant of user
satisfaction.  Service characteristics, such as timeliness, reliability and cargo
integrity are taken into consideration when shippers (importers and exporters)
assess their satisfaction with service.
In this study, considerable effort was taken to report actual charges, rather than
scheduled or listed charges.  This was necessary because some waterfront
industry participants have sufficient market power to discriminate between
shippers and their agents in setting charges.  Scheduled charges are usually a
poor indication of actual charges.  The charges benchmarked include
government, port authority and stevedoring charges.
Charges are difficult to benchmark because of identification and comparability
problems.  There are many reasons why the costs of the services are not directly
comparable with similar services elsewhere.  Many are external factors — such
as the cost of inputs — that are outside the control of individual industry
participants.  Indeed, it may be the case that two service providers are efficient
but have different costs of production.
Timeliness of unloading and loading operations has been measured as cargo
handling rates.  The timeliness of cargo receival and dispatch is also affected by
the turnaround time for trucks at container terminals and has been examined to
identify its effect on performance.  Reliability has been measured by theINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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availability of port services and berths and the variability of port and
stevedoring services.
There are two parties involved in waterfront service activities.  The reliability of
the customer as well as the service provider affect the time taken for the service
to be completed.  The actions of the customer can affect the commencement of
the service.  Increases in the time taken to provide the service — taken together
with the delay to commencement — result in overall delays to the planned
completion of the service.




·  ship arrival at port;
·  berth availability;
·  availability of cargo for loading; and
·  stevedoring.
The chosen indicators are those currently being measured by the BTCE for
Australian ports.  The equivalent information was collected to calculate these
indicators for the nominated overseas container and cruise ports.
Productivity
Productivity has been examined using a small number of industry recognised
partial indicators.  Labour and capital productivity measures are examined
covering all of the benchmarked services.
Labour and capital utilisation have been measured also.  Stevedoring operations
require trained labour which must be available to meet variable work loads.
Consequently, labour utilisation is a significant productivity issue.  Similarly,
port operations are typically capital intensive.  However, demand — and hence
operational intensity — fluctuates and affects capital productivity.
Data collection
Thompson Clarke Shipping was engaged to collect data and information for a
large part of the study.  The consultants were engaged because of their detailed
industry knowledge and extensive overseas contacts — both of which were
essential to the data collection assignment.  The consultants task was undertaken
in two parts.  Part A of the consultancy comprised collection of data and
supplementary information for the quantification of indicators and interpretation1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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of comparisons.  Part B dealt with governance of ports authorities (and related
government involvement) and with the organisation of labour for stevedoring
operations.
The consultant was responsible for the collection of performance data for
container shipping operations and cruise shipping operations.  Information on
break-bulk and bulk stevedoring operations were collected by the Commission.
The international fieldwork was undertaken by Thompson Clarke Shipping and
its overseas affiliates (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Thompson Clarke Shipping overseas affiliates
Area Consultant
Australia and New Zealand Thompson Clarke Shipping Pty Ltd
Europe Eurolist Limited
North America Mariners Marketing Associates, Inc
Japan Japan Marine Services Ltd
Korea Hyopsung Shipping Corporation Ltd
South East Asia Piers Resources and Services Pty Ltd
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
The Commission also collected indicative cost data from a large number of
Australian importers and exporters to understand the implications of poor
performance.
Further information on the data collection methodology adopted in this study is
presented in Appendix B.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Interpretation of performance comparisons
There are many factors that affect performance including:
·  the cost of inputs;
·  the physical characteristics of the port;
·  type and size of ship;
·  cargo stow; and
·  the overall scale and nature of stevedoring operations.
Information was collected to enable the Commission to allow for these factors
in its analysis.  In particular, information was collected on capital intensity and
port characteristics.  Additional information was also collected on the
diseconomies associated with variable demand when overall throughput is
relatively small.
1.3 Report structure
The next chapter (Chapter 2) includes a description of Australia’s trade, port
and shipping arrangements, to provide the backdrop for the subsequent analysis
of Australia’s comparative performance.
Government involvement and port authority practices are described and
analysed in Chapter 3.  Further analysis is presented in Appendix C and D.  The
purpose of this analysis is to determine the efficacy of the arrangements for the
efficient provision of port facilities and an operating environment that is
conducive to efficient services.  This analysis also provides context for the
subsequent analysis of performance.
The charges and performance of services to ships is reported in Chapter  4
(marine services) and Chapter 5 (port and maritime infrastructure).  Pilotage,
towage, mooring and port infrastructure services for container, bulk grain and
cruise shipping are benchmarked.
Stevedoring services for container, break-bulk and bulk cargoes are
benchmarked in Chapters  6, 7 and 8 respectively.  The passenger baggage
handling and other services associated with cruise shipping are reported in
Chapter 9.
Interface problems at Australian terminals affect the overall performance of the
Australian waterfront.  Interface problems are identified in Chapter 10.  The
implications of these problems for waterfront performance are also discussed.
However, no international benchmark comparisons could be made.1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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Unreliability impacts on exporters and importers by giving rise to costs in
addition to direct charges.  These ‘indirect costs’ can be significant, particularly
when they affect the perceptions of overseas purchasers of Australia as a
reliable trading nation.  Examples of the costs are presented and their
implications for importers and exporters, and in aggregate are discussed in
Chapter 11.13
2 THE WATERFRONT
The waterfront is part of a complex chain with a large number of
participants, services and charging arrangements.  Competitive
disciplines are limited by a lack of inter-port competition and
constraints on entry, as well as problems resulting from incompatible
incentives generated by current contractual arrangements.
To be efficient, requires high levels of productivity in each of the
waterfront services and for the system as a whole to work seamlessly.
The key to overall performance is reliability and co-ordination, both
among waterfront services and between the waterfront and related
land-side services.
The waterfront is an essential link in the services chain for delivery of products
from manufacturers and producers to customers.  For exports, this encompasses
the movement of goods from manufacturers or producers to the wharf, and the
loading of goods onto ships.  Similarly, imports are unloaded for final delivery
to customers.
2.1 Australia’s international sea trade
In terms of volume, approximately 99 per cent of imports and 96 per cent of
exports were transported by sea in 1995–96.  In terms of value, 70 per cent of
imports and 78   per   cent of exports were transported by sea (see Figure   2.1).
Those imports and exports transported by air are generally high value to volume
goods.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 2.1 International freight by value and type of transport,
1995–96









Source: BTCE estimates based on unpublished ABS International Customs Statistics, 1995–96.
In 1995–96, Australia imported nearly 50  million tonnes of cargo and exported
over 370  million tonnes of cargo by sea.
In addition to international shipping, coastal shipping is a significant mode of
domestic transport.  It is estimated that the freight bill for coastal shipping is
about $600  million annually.1 Approximately 30  per  cent by volume of coastal
trade is liquid bulk and 60   per   cent is dry bulk, mainly mineral ores and coal.
About 3   per   cent is containerised and 6   per   cent is break-bulk and general
cargo.
The significance of waterfront costs vary according to the type of cargo
(Figure 2.2).  For imports of highly transformed goods with an average value of
$7500 per tonne waterfront costs represent, on average, 3.5   per   cent of the
import prices.  For exports of basic raw material such as ores, with an export
price of around $70   per   tonne, waterfront costs average around 4.5 per cent of
the export price.
                                            
1 BIE (Bureau of Industry Economics) 1995b, International Performance Indicators: Coastal
Shipping, Research Report 68, AGPS, Canberra.2   THE WATERFRONT
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Note:  Export prices are defined as free-on-board (fob).  They include the price the producer obtains
plus the margins (such as transport to the waterfront and the costs of waterfront services and
any taxes).
Source: Centre Of Policy Studies 1995.
Trade by cargo type
The type and volume of cargo handled at any particular port determines the type
of services and infrastructure required.  The composition of Australia’s exports
and imports by type of ship are presented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 Value of imports and exports by type of ship,
1995–96



















Source: BTCE estimates based on unpublished ABS International Customs Statistics, 1995–96.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
16
Both dry and liquid cargo accounted for about 45   per   cent of the value of
imports in 1995–96 and 75  per  cent of imports by volume.  Dry and liquid bulk
cargo exports represented 45  per  cent of total value of exports in 1995–96 and
93  per  cent of exports by volume.
Dry bulk commodities such as coal, grain, sugar and minerals generally have
dedicated terminal and port infrastructure for each type of cargo.  Similarly,
liquid bulk cargo carried in tankers requires specialised infrastructure.
Australia’s bulk export terminals are among the largest in the world.  In the case
of mined commodities, the location of the port is largely determined by the
location of the mine.  For bulk agricultural commodities such as grain and
sugar, export terminals are located at seaboard regional centres close to
production areas.
Container cargo is mainly shipped on specialised container ships, but it is also
shipped on roll-on and roll-off (ro-ro ships) and on conventional ships.  The
major container ports have specialised cranes for loading and unloading
containers from ships, and equipment for the movement of containers around
the wharf area.  About 66   per   cent of the value of sea imports were in
containers in 1995–96 or 16   per   cent by volume.  In the case of exports, 40   
per   cent of total value and 2.6   per   cent of total volume were containerised.
The combined value of containerised cargo is estimated to be approximately
$60 billion.
Australia’s container trade is small by world standards (see Table 2.1 for the
size of container trade ranked by volume for the ports benchmarked in this
study).  For example, Australia’s total container throughput is 21 per cent of the
Port of Singapore’s throughput.  Indeed, five of the benchmarked ports have a
total throughput greater than that for all Australian ports.
Break-bulk cargo is generally carried on conventional ships — some of which
have on-board cranes — and on ro-ro ships.  Break-bulk cargo imports
represent about 22  per  cent of the value of all sea imports in 1995–96 and
10  per  cent by volume.  Exports of break-bulk cargo in 1995–96 was about
5 per cent of the value of all sea exports and 3 per cent by volume.
Most break-bulk and container traffic flows through ports located close to or in
the State capital cities where the majority of goods for export are produced and
where the majority of imports for final consumption enter Australia for
distribution.2   THE WATERFRONT
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(TEUs ’000) (rank) (%)
Singapore  10 399.4 2 8.3
Pusan  3 212.6 5 2.6
Hamburg  2 725.7 7 2.2
Los Angeles  2 518.6 9 2.0
Nagoya  1 224.4 24 1.0
Port Klang   943.8 30 0.8
Melbourne   801.2 36 0.6
Sydney
a   539.0 50 0.4
Tilbury   369.2 69 0.3
Auckland   341.2 76 0.3
Brisbane   232.9 102 0.2
Fremantle   189.3 111 0.2
Lyttelton   127.9 143 0.1
Philadelphia   108.8 155 0.1
Sydney
b   100.0 166 0.1
Adelaide   66.6 196 0.1
All Australian ports  2 191.7 15
c 1.8
a Port Botany (the port benchmarked in this study).
b Port Jackson.
c Australia’s ranking as a country in the top 60 countries.
Note: The total world trade for 1994 was 124.963 600 TEUs.
Source: Container International, 1996.
Trade by commodity
The value of both import and export trade by sea was about $60  billion in
1995–96.  The commodity breakdown is presented in Figure  2.4.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Note: Other includes beverages and tobacco, animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, and
commodities not elsewhere included and transactions.
Source: BTCE estimates based on unpublished ABS International Customs Statistics, 1995–96.
The tonnage value of commodities traded vary significantly across commodity
groups.  As to be expected for the more highly transformed goods, the tonnage2   THE WATERFRONT
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values increase significantly as indicated in Figure   2.5.  Accordingly, the
impact of waterfront costs is more significant on low value goods.
Figure 2.5 Tonnage values for major commodity groups,
1995–96
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0
Crude materials
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Source: BTCE estimates based on unpublished ABS International Customs Statistics, 1995–96.
Thin trade volumes
The most significant ‘external’ factor affecting Australia’s relative waterfront
performance is the ‘thinness’ of the liner shipping trades.  Australia and New
Zealand are disadvantaged relative to many other countries in this respect.  Not
only is the level of cargo throughput lower, but it is more difficult to provide a
high quality of service, because demand is relatively more variable.  The
consequence of this is that costs can be expected to be higher or the level of
service lower in Australia and New Zealand, other things being equal.
Absence of scale economies
One of the underlying factors that explain relative performance are economies
of scale and density.  Where these exist, the cost of services decrease as relative
output increases.
The capital intensiveness of port facilities with significant fixed costs results in
average costs falling as output increases (economies of scale).  Economies of
density arise because of fluctuating demand and the requirement to provide a
fixed level of service quality.  For example, in the case of towage, the level ofINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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service is fixed by the requirement to service the largest ship in adverse weather
and the demands of ship owners who want tugs to be always available when
their ship sails.
In other waterfront services there can be both economies of scale and density.
For example, a greater number of higher capacity cranes can be used as the
volume of throughput increases in container terminals, which lowers the
average cost of capital equipment.  This is possible because idle time reduces as
the variability of demand in any given period decreases as demand and the scale
of operation increase.2
The ‘thinness’ of shipping trades also restrict stevedoring and shipping
competition; facilitate union power; and, increase the difficulty of logistical co-
ordination (see Box  2.1).  The restrictions on effective competition are
particularly significant.  Competitive disciplines are important to the
achievement of high levels of performance and investment.
Disadvantages resulting from the ‘thinness’ of trade volumes do not excuse poor
performance.  Instead, they underline the need for greater effort to ensure that
the best standards of service reliability possible are achieved by attending to
those factors that industry can influence.
Multi-port calls
A further implication of ‘thin’ shipping trades — and to some extent the
dispersion of Australia’s major ports — is that shipping lines engaged in the
liner container trades make multiple calls in Australia.  As there are economies
in ship size, it is not possible to make single port calls and operate large ships in
trades with relatively low cargo flows.  Indeed, some ships serve both Australia
and New Zealand.
Typically, ships in East–West trades call at Sydney, Melbourne, Fremantle and
occasionally, Adelaide.  In North–South trades, Brisbane, Sydney and
Melbourne might typically be served.  Elsewhere in the world, ships of
comparable size, and larger, typically visit fewer ports in each voyage.
                                            
2 This phenomena is sometimes referred to as economies of massed reserves.  The concept of
economies of massed reserves was first introduced by Robinson (1958).  In response to
uneven or stochastic demand, firms hold a proportion of total capacity in reserve to meet
peak demands.  The level of ‘idle capacity’ necessary to compensate for a given level of
variability in demand will fall (as a proportion of total capacity) as scale of the plant
increases — raising overall asset productivity (Mulligan 1983).2   THE WATERFRONT
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Box 2.1 Performance consequences of ‘thin’ shipping trades
The variability of ship arrivals and service demand is greater in ports serving ‘thin’ trades
(long, low volume routes) — a manifestation of the law of large numbers.  By world
standards Australia’s shipping trades are ‘thin’.
Relatively long delays due to the unavailability of berths occur where demand variability is
high.  The reason for higher levels of delay is that it is not financially viable to provide
sufficient capacity to meet peaks in demand, because investment in container terminals is
capital intensive and ‘lumpy’ (efficiently supplied in large quantum of capacity because of
indivisibilities).
The ‘thinness’ of the shipping trades has sustained conference arrangements and
concentration in the purchasing of stevedoring services.  This has the potential to
strengthen the market power of shipping lines and ensure that their demands are met first,
to the possible detriment of the efficiency of the overall service to shippers.
Prior to 1989, the variability in service requirements also led to industry arrangements for
stevedoring labour.  These were a response to diseconomies associated with fluctuating
demand — ensuring better overall utilisation of labour by moving labour amongst
stevedores.  Although these arrangements no longer apply in major ports, they have left a
cultural legacy of water-side labour identifying their interests more closely with their union
rather than their employer (See IC 1998).
The relative lack of competition among ports reinforces the market power of the industry
union.  This occurs because the potential for loss of employment through changes of
market share is low.
Stevedores have problems in fully utilising their labour.  The service demand for the
unloading and loading of ships is variable.  Operational difficulties also occur because
transport operators prefer to deliver and collect their cargo in normal business hours,
whereas ship’s operations are twenty-four hours — giving rise to operational difficulties.
The relatively less frequent shipping services in Australia also has implications for port–
land interface operations (see Chapter 10).
The implication of this multi-port pattern of operation is that disruption to
schedules in one port, because of unreliable port and stevedoring services —
can have ‘knock on’ effects.  The schedules of services in subsequent ports can
be disrupted, creating the potential for further delays to the ship.  This can, in
turn, cause further problems in the next port visited unless the shipping lines
build slack into their service schedule.  Moreover, the disruptions to services
may delay other ships.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The potential for ‘knock-on’ effects underlines the importance of eliminating
delays and achieving best practice in waterfront service reliability.
2.2 Industry participants
The waterfront participants involved in providing services for imports are
illustrated in Figure 2.6.























The movement of cargo across the waterfront involves a large number of
services and service providers and depends on the type of cargo involved
(container, break-bulk and bulk).
The complexity of the arrangements demands co-ordination and disciplined
service transactions.  Without co-ordination and discipline the system will not
work efficiently and unreliability will ensue.  Given the high variability of
demand in Australia, flexibility in work arrangements is also critical (IC 1998).
Shippers
There is limited capacity for shippers to have a significant influence because
many operators are involved in the movement of cargo across the waterfront and
most have little market power.
Shippers of general cargo (containerised and break-bulk) tend to be ‘atomistic’
— with many provided with a service on each ship voyage.  Consequently, they
are locked into a particular chain of service which best suits the shipping lines
they contract for the carriage of their goods.  For example, they cannot decide2   THE WATERFRONT
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from whom stevedoring services are provided, the level of services and the
prices at which those services are provided.
For bulk trades, the arrangements for shippers, providers of services and the
shipping line tend to be more integrated.
Shipping services
Nearly 100 shipping lines provide scheduled services.  In addition, a number of
companies engaged in mining, petroleum and gas production and some
manufacturers, such as BHP and Shell, have their own ships to transport their
own production.  However, the largest number of ships visiting Australia are
bulk carriers.  These ships are used for shipments of commodities such as coal,
grains, sugar, fertiliser and wood chips.
Many liner shipping services are provided under ‘conference’ and ‘rate
agreements’.  These arrangements relate to particular trades (traffic between
particular destinations) and cover such matters as ship scheduling, tariffs, and
arrangements to manage capacity and to provide regular and co-ordinated
shipping to and from Australia.
More than 25 cruise ships visited Australian ports during 1996.  The total
number of port visits by these ships exceeded 140.
Port authorities
Port Authorities in Australia and overseas are responsible for the provision and
maintenance of navigation aids, channels and wharves.  They co-ordinate the
provision of marine services and are sometimes involved in their provision.
Port authorities are also involved in port promotion and the provision of land.
Most ports are public authorities or corporations.  In recent years, many of the
port authorities have been corporatised or privatised and have divested non-core
activities.  Most authorities have adopted a landlord model — leasing facilities
to stevedoring companies and contracting out or privatising the provision of port
services such as pilotage, towage and mooring and unmooring.
Private companies under agreements with State governments, operate about 15
ports in Australia.  These ports are generally associated with petroleum and
mining activities.
Marine service
Pilotage, towage and mooring and unmooring of ships in Australia are typically
provided by private businesses.  In overseas ports, and particularly in privatised
ports, these services are provided by the port owner.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Stevedores
Stevedores unload, sort and dispatch imports and receive and load exports.
They also provide services such as power for refrigerated containers.  Typically
they are private businesses; however, in some ports these services may be
provided in part or wholly by the port owner.
Land-side service providers
Outside the waterfront, land-side services are provided by transport operators,
custom brokers and freight forwarders, who facilitate the clearance of goods
through customs and facilitate financial transactions associated with taking or
handing over possession of the cargo.  For most imported goods, clearance is
required by Australian Quarantine Service (ACS) and by the Australian
Customs Service (AQIS) (to prevent illegal imports and ensure the payment of
import duty).
Contractual arrangements
Shippers do not contract stevedores to load and unload their cargo — this is
done by the shipping line.  The indirect contractual link and incompatible
incentives can give rise to what are technically referred to as principal–agent
problems (see Box 2.2).
Shippers wish to minimise their overall transportation cost for a given quality of
service.  Shipping lines, with whom the stevedores deal, are primarily
concerned with minimising the cost of operating their ships — which are only
one component of the total transport cost.  In most cases shippers have no direct
influence in the negotiation of charges and overall service.2   THE WATERFRONT
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Box 2.2 Accountability under contracting and principal–agent
problems
The underlying principle of accountability and the key consideration of principal–agent
theory is how those whose money is used to finance an activity (the principals) are able to
control the performance of those who act on their behalf (their agents) and exercise
sanctions when necessary (Smith 1990).
Accountability problems arise where the principal and the agent do not share the same
objectives. As the level of discretion provided to the agent increases, the opportunity to
diverge from the principal’s interests increases. The challenge for the principal is to design
and implement mechanisms or incentives to induce the agent to act in the interest of the
principal, rather than pursue its own interests.
To achieve control it is necessary that:
·  for each principal–agent relationship, it is clearly established who is responsible for
different aspects of the service;
·  sufficient information is readily available so that the performance of the various
principal–agent relationships [activities] is transparent; and
·  there is the opportunity for redress where substandard performance is identified and
a capacity for that to be corrected or sanctions to be imposed.
Source: IC 1996, pp. 82-83.
Efficient contractual outcomes require:
·  clearly defined responsibilities to ensure accountability;
·  transparent transactions; and
·  redress for non-performance.
In the Australian container and some break-bulk trades, shipping lines are not
responsible for door-to-door delivery — which is commonly the case in North
America.3  Consequently, shipping lines are not responsible for ensuring the
timely availability of cargo at a warehouse and that the port–land interface
operates smoothly.
The cost of stevedoring is made transparent by some shipping lines, which
itemise the cost in their freight bills.  However, shippers are not privy to
                                            
3  When containers were first introduced shippers offered through Bills, however this approach
was rejected by shippers and consignees who preferred to make their own arrangements.
Shippers might explore using through bills as a way of overcoming problems with the
timeliness of cargo availability and operations at the port-land interface.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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contractual arrangements, particularly service aspects.4  Moreover, they do not
have information to judge performance.  Apart from the average stevedoring
charge, the only information available to them is the time taken for the ship to
depart after they deliver their cargo or the time taken to receive their cargo after
a ship arrives in port.
Shippers do not have redress for poor stevedoring performance because their
contractual arrangements are with the shipping line.  These contracts only cover
carriage of cargo.5
These contractual problems would not have any great consequence for shippers
if the incentives were compatible; that is, if the interests of the ship owner
coincided with those of shippers.  However, this is not necessarily the case.
Under traditional arrangements, the incentives on the part of the stevedore are
such that it is in their interest to satisfy the requirements of the shipping line
more diligently than those of shippers.  For example, shipping lines have the
leverage to ensure that their ships are not delayed, even if this has the
consequence of diverting resources away from services performed for the
shipper, such as container receival and dispatch.  This can result in additional
logistic and cargo costs for shippers, manifesting as truck queues.  Indeed,
stevedores may reduce the overall resources dedicated to stevedoring services
other than ship loading and unloading operations under pressure to reduce
terminal handling charges by ship owners, with the consequence of increasing
cost outcomes for shippers.
Historically, pressures from shipping lines for more efficient stevedoring
operations have  been equivocal.  Although it is in the interest of shipping lines
to ensure terminal and stevedoring charges are at a minimum, shipping lines
reputedly apply pressure to have stevedores make concessions to labour when
their ships are threatened with a delay caused by industrial problems.6
                                            
4  This is the case for containers and small lots of general cargo where the shipping company
negotiates stevedoring rates directly with the stevedoring company and these rates are
included in the freight rate.
5 This includes the lift-on lift-off ‘over the side operations’, but not wharf or terminal
activities.
6 Although not a decisive factor, this behaviour is made easier by vertical links between
shipping lines and stevedores.2   THE WATERFRONT
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2.3 Ports
About 80 commercial and semi-commercial ports are located around the
Australian coastline and on its surrounding islands (see Figure  2.7).
Approximately 98   per   cent of sea imports by value enter through the ports of
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle.  Approximately 75  per  
cent by value of these imports enter either through Sydney or Melbourne ports.
Approximately 80   per   cent by value of sea exports are shipped through the
ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle.  The flow of
sea cargo through major ports is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 Value of sea freight by major port, 1995–96
















Source: BTCE estimates based on unpublished ABS international trade statistics, 1995–96.
A number of physical, demographic and land-transport factors limit the scope
for competition between ports in Australia (see Box 2.3).  Compared with other
countries, Australia’s ports are widely separated, and its population is small and
concentrated in coastal cities.
These factors — reinforced by the ‘thinness’ of Australia’s shipping trades (as
discussed above) — inhibit competition.  There is not the volume of trade to
support numbers of closely located ports with ships visiting at the levels of
service frequency required by shippers.2   THE WATERFRONT
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Box 2.3 Physical, demographic and land-transport factors
affecting inter-port competition
For bulk cargo, particularly voluminous minerals exports, the choice of port is limited.
Either the cargo is shipped through the nearest existing port to which suitable transport is
available or which has suitable bulk loading facilities, or a ‘new’ port is developed to
handle it.  Competition is limited by the relatively high cost of land transport compared to
sea transport.
Competition is more feasible for cargo originating in, or destined for, locations midway
between two or more ports, or derived from a relatively diverse area. Some agricultural
commodities, such as grains, fall into this category.
A large proportion of general cargo, including containers, is destined for, or originates in,
Australia’s large capital cities.  Except in special cases, such as time-sensitive or high-
value cargo, the use of more distant ports is uneconomic.
The feasibility of competition between ports is also affected by cost, frequency and
reliability of land-transport links.  However, not all main ports are linked into the national
standard gauge rail network.
Another factor affecting inter-port competition is the existence of economies of scope and
density.  If the volume of trade destined for, or from, a particular port is large, it will be
relatively less costly per unit of cargo for a ship to call there.  Thus ports attracting large
shipments, such as Sydney and Melbourne, are advantaged.  A port operating on a large
scale can also provide more frequent shipping services, with bigger ships operating to a
wider range of destinations.  Sydney and Melbourne receive twice the number of
conference line visits as Brisbane and Fremantle, and some three to four times the number
of visits as Adelaide.
2.4 Charges
Waterfront charges and how these are transmitted to users differ according to
the type of trade (container, break-bulk and bulk).  There are however, some
common elements.
Generally, the ‘blue water’ freight rate quoted to a particular port or from a
particular destination includes pilotage, towage, mooring and unmooringINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
30
charges and ‘over the rail’ stevedoring costs at Australian ports.7  Notionally,
‘blue water’ shipping rates are negotiated for each shipper in each ports.  In
practice, shippers demand and generally receive the same rates as shippers in
other Australian ports.8
Waterfront charges fall into three categories — ship-based, cargo-based and
stevedoring.
Ship-based charges include those for pilotage, towage, mooring and some port
authority infrastructure.  They are generally based on the gross registered
tonnes.  These are imposed on ship owners generally via the port authority.
Governments also have statutory charges for lights and pollution control
infrastructure that are ship- and cargo-based.
Cargo-based charges are for the provision of port infrastructure that is
nominally provided for the stacking and sorting of cargo and are borne by the
shipper — either directly or passed on by the stevedore.  Generally, these
charges are becoming less prominent with port authorities shifting most of the
charges for port infrastructure onto the shipping line.
The structure of port authority charges varies considerably between
jurisdictions.  A summary of the ship- and cargo-based charges which currently
apply for major ports in Australia is provided in Table  2.2.
Stevedoring charges include those for lift-on lift-off — ‘over the rail’— which
are borne by the shipping line.  They also include charges for wharf handling
that are passed on to the shipper.  Terminal operators also charge shippers
directly for receival and dispatch services.
In addition to these waterfront charges, there are land-side charges.  These
include those associated with the charges imposed by the AQIS, ACS, customs
brokers, freight forwarders, and those costs incurred in getting exports and
imports to and from ports respectively.
The typical incidence of charges on imports is shown in Figure  2.9.  The
relative significance of these charges for containerised cargo on a per TEU basis
is presented in Figure 2.10.
                                            
7 In addition to the ‘blue-water’ freight rate discussed above, for containers the costs of re-
positioning empty containers internationally is borne by the shipping lines.
‘Over the rail’ stevedoring costs includes the cost of lifting cargo off the ships and placing
the cargo alongside the ship only.
8 These are referred to as pan-Australian rates.2   THE WATERFRONT
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Table 2.2 Port authority and related charges for major container ports,
1997























Berth hire - - Berth hire - -
Cargo-based
Wharfage Wharfage Wharfage 
c Wharfage Cargo Service
Charge
Wharfage
Harbour dues Harbour Dues - - - -
Berth charge
b - - - - Cargo Berth
Hire
a previously called State government.
b previously called berthing.
c Includes Port Cargo Access Charge.
d All mooring costs associated with ship’s initial arrival and final departure at Adelaide are
included in the Harbour Service  Charge.
- not applicable.
Source: BTCE Waterline 9, December 1996.
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Figure 2.10 Waterfront costs, December 1996







Ship based charges Cargo based charges Stevedoring
Source: BTCE Waterline 10, March 1997.
The per TEU cost of waterfront services is affected by the number of container
exchanges at each port call.  The smaller the number of TEUs exchanged the
higher the per TEU cost, because many of the charges are fixed and relate to
servicing the ship.  Consequently, the per TEU cost is larger for the smaller
ports.  This is a manifestation of economies of density and does not necessarily
reflect differences in productivity.
Stevedoring charges represented between 55 per cent and nearly 70 per cent of
waterfront charges in 1996.  Cargo-based charges accounted for 13 per cent of
total waterfront charges at the Port of Melbourne and 18 to 21 per cent for other
major ports.  At the Port of Adelaide, ship-based port charges were 26 per cent
of waterfront charges, while at other ports they varied between 10 and 18 per
cent (see Figure  2.10).
Container shipping
The principal charges, in addition to the ‘blue water’ freight charge, identified
in the shipping line’s account to shippers are :
·  Port Services Charge; and
·  Terminal Handling Charge.
These charges are specific to Australia and to in-bound conference services.
They do not necessarily apply in other circumstances.2   THE WATERFRONT
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The Port Services Charge (PSC) is made up of wharfage on full containers
charged by the port authority and the Port Pricing Additional (PPA) which arose
when the ports of Sydney, Melbourne and Fremantle, shifted a major proportion
of their costs from the shipper (importer or exporter) on to the shipowners in
1990.  In Melbourne, where a berth hire charge is imposed on the stevedoring
companies, this charge is passed on to the shipping lines along with their costs
for stevedoring by container terminal operators and is incorporated in the PSC
for that port.
In 1996 the AQIS Container Clearance Charge (CCC) for imports was included
in the PSC.  On 1 September 1996, this charge was increased from $3 per
container to $6 per TEU container (or $12 per 40 foot container).  From 1
February 1997 this charge was standardised to $10.40 per container irrespective
of size.
The PPA includes a navigational services charges, tonnage charges, wharfage
on empty containers excluding Adelaide and berth hire in Melbourne.  The PPA
is calculated by comparing costs incurred by ships at ports of Sydney,
Melbourne and Fremantle with costs in the base year of 1989.  This charge is
added to the outward or inward wharfage and the CCC to determine the PSC.
The  Terminal Handling Charge (THC) is the charge for the equivalent of
sorting and stacking in traditional stevedoring.  The historical background to the
establishment of the THC is provided in Box 2.4.
The THC is currently calculated on a weighted average basis for each port
according to:
·  ‘conference’ container flows of reefer and general 20 foot and 40 foot
containers;
·  container flows are multiplied by the respective stevedoring rate (including
the movement and storing of containers);
·  total stevedoring costs (including the movement and sorting) for all
‘Conferences’ are determined by dividing by the total container flow for
each container type; and
·  an 80 per cent rule to the above is applied to determine the THC for each
container.
Accordingly, a separate equalised THC for each port is specified for each type
of container, depending on size.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box 2.4 Terminal Handling Charge
Prior to the introduction of containers in the late 1960s, the sorting and stacking charges at
the wharfs were paid by importers.  These related to the movement of cargo from along
ships to the wharf shed where the sorting of cargo was carried out.  When containers were
introduced, the original charge for this activity was referred to as a Basic Service Rate
(BSR) and included all charges for door-to-door movement of cargo.  When stevedoring
charges increased more rapidly than could be recovered by the BSR, the Conferences
introduced the Terminal Handling Charge (THC) to extract the stevedoring component of
the BSR and commenced treating ‘blue-water’ freight and the THC as separate items.
A formula was introduced in 1986 to determine the THC.  The formula was intended to
equate the THC to 80 per cent of the costs of unloading containers off ships on to the
wharf including the movement and sorting of containers to the stage where they are ready
to be picked up from the stevedoring company for delivery to importers.
Source Liner Shipping Services.
Where there are vehicle booking systems in place, registered users are either
charged on an annual basis or on a fee-for-service basis.  These charges are
levied on those involved in the delivery and collection of containers from
container terminals.
In addition, to avoid congestion at container terminals, there is a daily charge to
shippers if containers are not removed within a specified time.
Waterfront charges make up a small proportion of importer’s and exporter’s
freight bills (see examples presented in Box 2.5).  Usually, they are less than
half of land-side charges and less than a quarter of the blue water freight charge.
The relative size of land-side charges underlines the importance of ensuring that
port–land interface operations are efficient and co-ordinated with land-side
activities.  Providing reliable waterfront services to minimise the delay to
shipping schedules is also important because of the significance of shipping line
charges.  The size of waterfront charges compared with the overall freight bill
and the value of the cargo implies that the demand for waterfront services is not
affected greatly by changes to the level of charge.2   THE WATERFRONT
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Box 2.5 Examples of shipment costs (freight bill)
City dry Country dry City reefer
Imports (fob) (%) (%) (%)
Waterfront
Port service charge 4.6 8.6
a 3.3
Terminal handling charge 8.6 - 4.7
All 13.2 8.6 8.0
Land-side
Delivery order fee 1.8 0.9 -
AQIS fee - 3.6 1.4
Sea Cargo Automation fee 0.4 0.3 1.2
Customs charge 2.6 - -
Brokerage fee 6.3 3.1 5.3
Transport charge 10.1 34.6 14.0
All 21.2 42.5 21.9
Blue water freight rate 65.5 48.5 70.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Exports (cif)
Waterfront
Port service charge 3.4 3.5 1.7
Lift-on charge - 0.5 0.4
All 3.4 4.0 2.1
Land-side
AQIS fee - - 1.2
Transport charge - 19.0 10.7
All - 19.0 11.9
Blue water freight rate 96.6 77.0 86.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Includes terminal handling charge.
Note: Example taken from record of an actual shipment, they are not to be regarded as typical.
All containers are 20 foot, except the country dry import container which are 40 foot.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on information supplied during industry consultation.
Break-bulk shipping
For break-bulk trades, the ‘blue water’ freight rate quoted to a particular port or
from a particular destination includes pilotage, towage, mooring and unmooringINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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charges and ‘over the rail’ stevedoring costs at Australian ports.  The charges
are port specific.
As with containers, when individual ‘blue water’ freight rates are negotiated,
shippers demand and generally receive the same rates as shippers in other
Australian ports.  However, there is not a formally accepted industry
arrangement.  Consequently, shipping lines are free to differentiate their rates to
reflect differences in the charges they incur at each port if they wish.
Shippers are also charged a PSC by the inbound conference shipping lines
calculated on the same basis as for containers and separately identified in the
shipping lines’ account to the shipper.
Typically, stevedores charge importers directly for wharf handling.  This charge
incorporates sorting and stacking services and loading and unloading of cargo
for dispatch and receipt.  For example, in the case of motor vehicles, the sorting
and stacking charge incorporates stevedoring from the top of the wharf ramp to
the sorting and stacking area.  Shippers of break-bulk cargo may also be charged
for storage and area hire.
Shippers are responsible for the payment of any wharfage due to the port
authority or corporation.
Bulk shipping
The arrangements for shipment of bulk commodities and materials varies
considerably.  Some companies, such as BHP and Shell, own ships and ship
their own products.  Where this is the case, they are responsible for meeting all
port services, stevedoring and port charges.
For other commodities, the shipper may be the exporter or the importer.  For
example, for wheat, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) is now selling a large
proportion of wheat exports on the basis of cost, insurance and freight (cif).
The AWB, charters a ship to undertake the voyages necessary to pick up and
deliver exports of wheat.  The AWB, in this case, is responsible for all costs
associated with loading and delivery including all port services, stevedoring and
port costs.
For imported bulk commodities such as fertiliser, similar arrangements may be
entered into as the terms of purchase may be ex-factory in the country of origin,
on wharf or free on board (fob) in the country of origin.  In this situation, the
importer is responsible for all costs associated with loading and delivery
including all port services, stevedoring and port costs.2   THE WATERFRONT
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For the examples cited above, the shipper is responsible for any other charges
incurred such as those services provided by AQIS.39
3 GOVERNMENT AND PORT MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES
Government involvement in the waterfront varies widely
internationally.  In most Australian ports, governments adopt a
landlord only role, while in other ports, they are more directly
involved in the provision of services.  Similarly, port management
practices and policies vary both among Australian ports and
between the Australian and overseas ports.
These differences impact on many aspects of waterfront performance
and can have significant implications for benchmark comparisons.
Government involvement in the waterfront and the policies and practices of port
authorities have significant implications for benchmark comparisons.  An
understanding of these institutional arrangements is important because they
impact on waterfront performance measures.  Indeed, for some performance
measures, a knowledge of institutional arrangements can help explain observed
differences.
The interaction of different levels of government involvement and various
polices and practices increases the range of influences affecting benchmarks of
port performance.  Hence, interpreting the relative performance of several ports
is much more complex than making simple comparisons of measures such as
port authority charges or crane rates.
3.1 Government involvement
The degree of government involvement in the waterfront in Australia and
overseas is outlined in this section.  A more detailed treatment is provided in
Appendix C.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Ownership of ports
The majority of ports benchmarked in this study are government owned.  The
precise form of government ownership varies between the various ports.  All
five Australian ports included in the study are owned by their relevant State
government.  Of the overseas ports:
·  Los Angeles and Hamburg are owned by their city government;
·  Nagoya is jointly owned by the city government and the Prefecture
adjacent to the port;
·  Port Klang and Singapore are owned by the central government; and
·  Philadelphia is jointly owned by the two neighbouring State governments.
Two other ports included in this study are partly, or wholly, privately owned.
The Port of Auckland is a publicly listed company, however 80 per cent of the
stock is held in a community based trust.  The port of Tilbury is a privately
owned subsidiary of Forth Ports Plc.
The commercial organisation of the government-owned ports varies widely.
Hamburg and Los Angeles, are run as government departments.  The remaining
ports, including all of the Australian ports (except Fremantle) in this study,
operate as statutory corporations.  Fremantle operates as a statutory authority.
Institutional arrangements
The ports also differ widely in terms of the services offered to port users and
customers.
Australian governments have predominantly adopted a ‘landlord model’ of port
operation.  The landlord model is characterised by the port authority supplying
core services only, with the more contestable waterfront services such as
stevedoring being supplied by private businesses.  The exception in this study is
Fremantle, which offers some non-core services such as pilotage.
Among the overseas ports only Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Port Klang have
adopted the landlord model.  The other overseas ports included in the study are
vertically integrated to varying degrees and provide a range of core, cargo and
other services.
Both Auckland and Singapore offer a range of waterfront services including
pilotage, towage, stevedoring and general port operations.  The two private
ports are ‘mixed ports’ in that they offer cargo handling services in competition
with other private stevedores and terminal operators.  In the Port of Hamburg,3   GOVERNMENT AND PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
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the City State that owns the port also owns the largest container terminal
operation at the port.  Other container handling capacity is provided by private
operators.
Port authority objectives and governance
Governance refers to the systems and arrangements established to direct and
control organisations.  A range of governance arrangements may be put in place
to control ports and these arrangements may influence the choice and
achievement of port objectives.
The Australian ports generally operate as corporatised statutory authorities or as
commercialised statutory authorities.  Port objectives are generally set out,
albeit in general terms, in each authority’s enabling legislation.  A board is
generally appointed to oversee the operation of the authority with responsibility
for determining commercial strategy and for the day-to-day operation of the
port.
Although port authorities in Australia are largely autonomous, they may be
required to follow publicly announced ministerial directives relating to their
operations.  The use of such directives ensures transparency of government
action when the ports are required to pursue a variety of goals on behalf of the
public.
In some overseas ports included in the study, port managers have significantly
less autonomy.  In Hamburg and Los Angeles, for example, the relevant
government has considerable powers to direct the day-to-day activities of the
port.  In Port Klang, the Maritime Division of the Ministry of Transport is
required to review all major policy issues.
Only the private ports are free from direct government involvement in their
operations.  However, the ports are still bound by legislation affecting the
operation of any private company, including in the case of ports, marine safety
regulations.
The degree of government involvement in determining port authority objectives
and governance arrangements has implications for benchmark comparisons.
Higher government involvement increases the possibility that port authorities
may be required to undertake activities which are not commercially viable, but
are justified on other grounds.  Pursuit of non-commercial objectives may result
in the cost of services being higher than otherwise would be the case.  In other
cases, charges may be lower when services are provided at subsidised cost.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Financial arrangements
The sources of finance and taxation arrangements under which the ports
included in this study operate vary widely.  The variation between ports may
influence performance measures, such as charges, included in this
benchmarking study.
Sources of finance
The extent of government financial contributions and the degree of port
authority control over financial arrangements varies considerably among the
ports benchmarked.  The ports range from Tilbury, which operates in a private
commercial manner with no government intervention in its financial affairs, to
those such as Hamburg, which operate as government departments.
The corporatised ports lie between these extremes.  Corporatised entities,
despite their operating autonomy, tend to be subject to government directions on
capital raising, investment and payment of dividends.
The degree of government funding or assistance varies widely among the
various ports.  Tilbury receives no government contribution and nor do the
publicly owned ports of Singapore and Port Klang.  Los Angeles receives some
support for dredging via the US Corps of Engineers when the work is
considered of national strategic interest.  The ports of Hamburg, Nagoya and
Philadelphia receive direct government funding to at least cover operational
deficits.
Ports which have access to government financial support, through for example
capital grants or loans at concessional interest rates, do not need to recover the
full cost of providing services through charges on users.  Their charges will,
other things being equal, be lower than for ports which do not receive such
support.  When port authorities are able to access loans at concessional interest
rates additional costs may arise, however because the lower interest rates may
distort the investment decision and lead to inappropriate investment decisions.
Taxation and dividends
The Australian ports are required to pay State taxes and most are, or will be,
making tax-equivalent payments to the relevant State government as if they
were paying Commonwealth income and sales tax.  These tax-equivalent
payments are justified on the grounds of competitive neutrality.  They are
intended to make government authorities operate under comparable taxation
arrangements to those applying to private sector firms.3   GOVERNMENT AND PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
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Only some overseas ports pay income tax and none are required to make tax-
equivalent payments.  Tilbury, Auckland (the two privately owned ports) and
Port Klang are the only ports to pay income tax.
Australian ports are also required to pay a dividend to their State government.
This dividend is usually justified as a return on shareholder equity.  The
dividend payment is influenced by the valuation of the port’s assets.  (The issue
of asset valuation is discussed later in this chapter).  Of the publicly owned
overseas ports, only Singapore is required to make dividend payments to the
government.
The financial cost of taxation and dividend payments will be reflected, other
things being equal, in higher charges on users.  Australian port authority charges
will be higher than those of overseas ports because of the requirement to pay tax
equivalence and dividend payments which are not levied to the same degree in
other ports.
Regulation and competition
The regulation of waterfront activities in Australia is generally carried out by
independent departments or agencies rather than by the port authorities
themselves.  The separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities is
justified on the grounds of avoiding potential conflicts of interest which may
arise if regulating activities in which the port authority is involved.  Malaysia
(where Port Klang is located) and Singapore have also moved to separate the
regulatory and operational responsibilities of port authorities.
Nagoya and Port Klang authorities have responsibility for the regulation of
waterfront services.  For example, in Nagoya, fees and charges must be
reviewed by the local Port and Harbour Council and finally authorised by the
Port Assembly.  In Hamburg the port authority is responsible for the regulation
of traffic and the movement of dangerous goods.
Price and competition regulation
The Australian ports appear to be subject to closer price and competition
regulation than the overseas ports.
The Competition Principles Agreement entered into by the States, Territories
and the Commonwealth removes the exemption previously enjoyed by port
authorities (and other government trading enterprises) from the provisions of the
Trade Practices Act 1974.  This ensures that port authorities and other
government trading enterprises are now subject to the same general anti-
competitive legislation as private companies.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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In addition, most Australian States have also established independent prices
oversight bodies.  In all cases, a specific port must be ‘declared’ by the relevant
minister before its pricing can be subjected to investigation.  Details of the
specific arrangements vary between States.
Thus far, only the Victorian port industry has been ‘declared’ to be a regulated
industry under the Office of Regulator General Act 1994.  In other States formal
declaration has not occurred.  In NSW, the Sydney Port Corporation’s fees are
approved by the portfolio Minister, but the Independent Price and Regulatory
Tribunal (IPART) has the power to set maximum prices.  In Queensland, the
Port of Brisbane has not been declared a ‘government monopoly business
activity’ and is therefore not subject to the Queensland Competition Authority.
On the basis of the information available to the Commission, the overseas ports
do not appear to be subject to close regulatory oversight.  Although the publicly
owned ports are subject to pricing approval processes, these are not through
arms-length independent pricing agencies.  However, port authorities overseas
are generally subject to their country’s general trade practices or anti-trust
legislation.  One reason for the lack of close regulation is that many overseas
ports operate in environments with stronger inter-port competition than exists
among Australian ports.
Safety, quarantine and environmental regulation
Safety, quarantine and environment regulations are enforced at all the ports
included in this study.  Among the Australian ports, safety and environmental
regulation is the responsibility of the Commonwealth and relevant State
governments.  Similar arrangements tend to apply in the majority of overseas
ports.  However, there are exceptions, for example, in Hamburg and Nagoya
responsibility for safety regulation lies with a dedicated organisation.
Environmental regulation is the statutory responsibility of the ports of Tilbury
and Nagoya.
In Australia quarantine is the responsibility of the Australian Quarantine and
Inspection Service (AQIS).  Similar organisations exist in the countries whose
ports are benchmarked.
3.2 Port management practices and policies
In addition to differences in government involvement in port operations, the
management practices and polices of the port authorities themselves differ
widely.  Differences are evident not only between the Australian and overseas3   GOVERNMENT AND PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
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ports but also among the various Australian ports.  Detailed information on port
management practices and policies is contained in Appendix D.
Infrastructure provision and investment
Capital investment may influence measures of performance, such as ship
turnaround times, included in this benchmarking study.  However the cost of
this investment must be recovered and so may influence port authority charges.
Similarly asset valuation methods may influence port authority charges.
Investment assessment
Two broad approaches are adopted by the ports included in this study to assess
new investment projects.  Some ports set an objective hurdle rate-of-return
which must be exceeded for the project to proceed.  Other ports adopt a wider
range of social, economic and financial criteria when assessing competing
investment projects.
The details of specific arrangements vary between ports, but in general, the
Australian ports tend to adopt the rate-of-return approach to assessing
investment projects.  The overseas ports of Los Angeles, Auckland and Tilbury
also adopt an objective rate-of-return method to determine investment projects.
In contrast, the ports of Hamburg, Nagoya, Port Klang and Singapore adopt
wider social, economic and financial criteria when deciding whether to
undertake a particular investment project.  For example, in Hamburg, new
investment projects are determined on the basis of port capacity, cargo and
service demand and safety considerations.
When wider social and economic criteria are used to evaluate investment
proposals, there is scope for investment to occur when the cost of that
investment will not be fully recovered from user charges.  Australian ports tend
to adopt the rate-of-return approach and recover the cost of investment through
user charges.  As a result, Australian charges are likely to be higher than those
levied in ports which do not recover investment costs through user charges.
Valuation of assets
The approach taken to value port authority assets will impact directly on the
costs to be recovered through charges.  The port authorities in Australia and
overseas adopt one of two broad approaches to asset valuation — the historical
cost approach and the economic or fair market value approach.  The method
adopted is important because the different approaches to asset valuation may
give a different valuation for the same set of assets.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The historical cost approach which involves valuing assets on the basis of their
original cost less depreciation is not adopted by Australian ports.  However, this
approach is adopted by the overseas ports of Hamburg, Nagoya, Philadelphia,
Singapore and Port Klang.
The current or fair market value approach is adopted by some Australian and
overseas ports, including Brisbane and Sydney as well as Los Angeles, Tilbury
and Auckland.
Leasing arrangements
The right to use the physical assets of a port are conferred by the lease
agreement.  The nature of the lease, and in particular the period for which it is
awarded, can have major implications for the nature of competition on the
waterfront.
Competitive tendering
Most of the ports included in this study generally do not call for competitive
tenders when allocating leases.  Leases are typically negotiated on a bilateral
basis between the port authority and the lease holder.  In these negotiations
price is not always the only criterion used to select lessees.  For example, in
Hamburg the selection of a lessee is based on a combination of commercial,
value adding and qualitative criteria.
Competitive tendering is adopted, at least part of the time, in some ports.
Sydney and Melbourne use competitive tendering to allocate some leases, but
bilateral negotiations may also be adopted, depending on the circumstances of
each case.  Among the overseas ports, Nagoya and Port Klang use a competitive
tendering process to allocate leases.
Lease terms and conditions
Among both the Australian and overseas ports included in this study, leases may
be awarded for substantial periods.  Typical maximum lease periods being
offered in Australia are 21 years.  However, in some cases longer leases may be
granted with the relevant minister’s approval.  Among the overseas ports, lease
periods of up to 30 years are offered in Hamburg and Nagoya.
Long-term leases may facilitate higher stevedoring charges by conferring market
power, especially if there is no effective competitive selection process at the end
of the lease period.3   GOVERNMENT AND PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
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Competitive tendering and contracting out
The degree of competition in the provision of waterfront services is also
affected by the extent and nature of any competitive tendering and contracting
of service provision.  A clear difference of approach can be identified between
the largely landlord Australian ports and the more mixed models at overseas
ports.
Contracting out
The extent of contracting out depends, to some extent, upon the operational
model of the port authority.  The Australian port authorities which have adopted
the landlord model for their operations undertake very little contracting out of
services.  But when it occurs it is generally on the basis of commercial criteria.
Among overseas ports the experience is more varied.  Hamburg and Tilbury
engage in widespread contracting out of service provision to the private sector.
Significant contracting out also occurs in the ports of Nagoya, Port Klang and
Los Angeles.  However, Singapore contracts out very little.
Competitive tendering
Where tendering occurs, different methods may be adopted to award the
contract to the successful contractor.  These vary from full competitive
tendering to direct negotiation with preferred contractors.  The method by
which the successful contractor is chosen has implications for the incentives
generated to ensure improved performance.
The full range of methods of allocating tenders are exhibited by the ports
included in the study.  Los Angeles adopts a system of competitive bidding for
tenders, as do Tilbury and Port Klang.  Singapore adopts a more limited
competitive tendering approach by inviting selected suppliers to tender.  While
Nagoya and Hamburg adopt direct negotiation with suppliers rather than public
tender to allocate contracts.
Failure to competitively contract out (where appropriate) may result in higher
charges for services because the services may not be being supplied by the
lowest cost service provider.
Pricing practices
The pricing practices adopted by the port authorities will directly impact on the
charges included in this benchmarking study.  The degree to which the port
authorities decide to recover the full cost of supplying services and the extent of
price discrimination are central issues.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
48
Pricing to recover costs
The extent to which prices are intended to recover the full cost of supplying
services will have a major impact on port authority pricing levels and structures.
Adelaide, Brisbane and Melbourne aim to recover all costs and overheads
through charges.  In contrast, other ports may not place as high a priority on full
cost recovery via user charges.
Among the overseas ports there is a similar distinction between those port
authorities which aim to recover costs through charges and those which use
their charging structure to pursue other objectives.  Some of the overseas ports
fully recover costs through charges.  In the case of the private ports of Tilbury
and Auckland, prices are determined according to market forces and with no
direct government involvement.
In other overseas ports, charges are based on criteria other than full cost
recovery.  For example, in Hamburg, harbour dues are determined on the basis
of budgetary needs by the Ministry of Economic Development, not on the basis
of cost.  In addition, Nagoya and Philadelphia do not base charges on the cost of
service provision.
Price discrimination
Port authorities may charge users different prices for the same service or
facility.  Price discrimination is likely to be widespread amongst the ports
included in this study.  This is inferred from the ability of port authorities in
many ports, both in Australia and overseas, to negotiate prices with individual
customers.  It is difficult to obtain direct evidence of the extent to which port
authorities engage in price discrimination because such information is
commercially sensitive.49
4 MARINE SERVICES
Service providers levy charges on ship operators to recover the costs
of providing pilotage, towage and mooring services.
Pilotage and mooring charges at Australian ports are relatively high
for container and cruise ships, but low for bulk ships.  Towage for all
classes of ships (container, bulk and cruise) are high by
international standards.
Differences in charges reflect a range of factors including
throughput, the scope for competition, tug and pilot utilisation, the
number of tugs used per ship movement and the number of linesman
used in the case of mooring and unmooring.
Ships usually require assistance to enter and leave a harbour, berth and to move
around within a harbour.  These marine services — pilotage, towage and
mooring — can either be provided by a port authority or by independent private
providers.
Performance information for this study was collected on a shipping trade basis
for container ships and for two ship sizes for cruise and bulk (wheat) ships.  For
a discussion of the methodology employed in collecting the information
see Chapter 1 and Appendix B.
4.1 Pilotage
Pilots ensure the safe passage and manoeuvring of ships in a port and its
approaches.  Pilot services can be provided either by port authorities or by
independent entities.  Pilotage charges are levied on ship operators.
Pilotage is compulsory in most ports, but exemptions can be made
(see Box 4.1).
The significance of pilotage as a share of combined port and maritime
infrastructure and marine services charges varies between ships and ports
(see Figure 4.1).1  For example, pilotage as a share of combined charges levied
                                            
1 Combined port and maritime and infrastructure and marine services charges include,
government, port authority, pilotage, towage and mooring charges.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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on bulk (wheat) ships ranges from 10  per  cent at the port of Albany to
2 per cent at Adelaide and Port Lincoln.  Pilotage levied on container and cruise
ships ranges from 4 per cent at the Port of Fremantle to 12 per cent at the Port
of Brisbane (container ships) and 21 per cent at the Port of Melbourne (cruise
ships).
Box 4.1 Pilotage at Australian and overseas ports
In Australia, State government legislation makes pilotage compulsory in most ports — for
reasons relating both to the safety of ships entering and leaving a port and to the protection
of port infrastructure.  State legislation also provides for exemptions, the appointment and
licensing of pilots and the regulation of charges.  Pilotage is also compulsory at most
overseas ports with exemptions available under certain conditions.  Of the ports included
in the benchmarking study, only Copenhagen does not have compulsory pilotage.
Exemptions are typically made on the basis of ship length or tonnage, category of ship
(naval or non-commercial ships) and on whether the ship master holds an exemption
certificate.  Exemption certificates are awarded once prescribed criteria relating to
technical qualifications (master’s certificates of competency), qualifying numbers of
voyages into and out of a port within a prescribed period, and a satisfactory standard of
examination has been met.
Pilotage services are provided by private operators at the ports of Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane and Fremantle and by port authorities at the ports of Adelaide and Burnie.
Pilotage is provided by the port authority at the ports of Singapore and Auckland and by
private operators at Port Klang.
Pilotage charges are generally levied on the basis of the GRT of the ship and depend on the
distance of pilotage and the extent of navigation hazards associated with a particular port.
Pilotage charges can also be levied on a per service basis, as occurs at the ports of
Fremantle and Hamburg, where a fixed charge is levied for each service.  There may also
be charges associated with the cancellation or detention of a pilot.
In most cases, the structure and level of charges are set out in charge schedules.  Actual
charges might vary from scheduled charges because of agreements between ship operators,
ports authorities and other service providers.4   MARINE SERVICES
51
Figure 4.1 Composition of charges at Australian ports, 1997
(a) Container ship — South–East Asia trade







(b) Cruise ship — 55 000 GRT







(c) Bulk ship — 33 200 GRT









Pilotage Towage Mooring Port Authority Government
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) and Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Pilotage charges on container and cruise ships at the Australian ports included
in the study have fallen, in real terms, over the last four years.  For example, at
the ports of Fremantle and Sydney pilotage levied on container ships fell
17.3 per cent and 16.5 per cent and pilotage levied on cruise ships fell 15.6 and
14.8 per cent (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Table 4.1 Change in marine services charges — container ships, 1994
to 1996
Pilotage Towage Mooring
Port 1994–95 1995–96 1994–96 1994–95 1995–96 1994–96 1994–95 1995–96 1994–96
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Sydney -3.5 -13.5 -16.5 -4.1 -4.4 -8.3 -31.7 -5.0 -35.2
Melbourne -2.6 -3.6 -6.1 -2.6 -3.6 -6.1 18.3 -3.8 13.9
Brisbane -3.6 -3.7 -7.1 -6.5 -3.6 -9.9 38.2 -3.7 33.1
Adelaide -2.9 -3.8 -6.6 -3.0 -3.7 -6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fremantle -3.4 -14.4 -17.3 -4.4 -5.3 -9.4 -3.6 -24.5 -27.2
Note: Calculated in real terms by deflating charges by the appropriate capital city CPI.
Changes in towage charges will not only reflect changes in price but also changes in the services
provided.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on BTCE Waterline (various issues).
Table 4.2 Change in marine services charges — cruise ships, 1994 to
1997
Port Pilotage Towage Mooring
(%) (%) (%)
Sydney -14.8 -6.1 -7.8
Melbourne -12.3 -29.2 12.3
Brisbane -5.5 10.8 69.8
Fremantle -15.6 -10.5 -25.7
Cairns -5.7 -40.6 -32.5
Note: Based on charges levied on a 19 000 GRT ship.
Calculated in real terms by deflating charges by the appropriate capital city CPI.
Changes in towage charges will not only reflect changes in price but also changes in the services
provided.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (1994) and Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4   MARINE SERVICES
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Comparisons of pilotage charges
The relativities of nominal pilotage charges vary with the class of ship.  Pilotage
charges for bulk (wheat) ships at Australian ports are low by international
standards (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Pilotage charges — bulk ships, 1996–97













16 500 GRT 33 200 GRT
Note: Pilotage charges at the ports of Portland and New Orleans include bar and river pilotage.
Source: Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).
Pilotage charges for container and cruise ships at Australian ports were higher
than those in some overseas ports.  For example, pilotage charges for container
ships at the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane, while generally lower than at
Hamburg, Tilbury and Philadelphia, were higher than at the other overseas ports
studied (see Figure 4.3).
Pilotage charges on cruise ships at the Port of Fremantle, while low compared
to other Australian ports, were still higher than pilotage levied at the Port of
Singapore.  Pilotage charges at the ports of Brisbane and Sydney were generally
the highest of the Australian ports.  Pilotage charges at the ports of Melbourne
and Brisbane were more than seven times those at the Port of Singapore in the
case of the 19 000 GRT ship.  At the Port of Sydney, pilotage charges were
almost nine times those at the Port of Singapore in the case of the 55 000 GRT
ship (see Figure 4.4).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
54
Figure 4.3 Pilotage charges — container ships (all trades),
1997

















Note: Pilotage levies vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for ships of
different sizes on different trades.  For example, the pilotage charge for the smallest ship in
the sample at Melbourne was about $2 900 while the pilotage for the largest ship was just
over $8 000.  Most overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are
therefore point estimates.  For example, pilotage at Port Klang was about $630.
River and sea pilotage are required at the ports of Tilbury and Hamburg.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Factors explaining differences in charges
There are a number of factors which can influence pilotage charges, including
pilotage distance and the extent of navigation hazards, pilot utilisation, the
number of vessel calls, the level of pilot wages and the scope for competition
within a port.
Pilotage distance and navigation hazards
At those ports with lengthy and difficult approaches — the ports of Hamburg,
Tilbury, Philadelphia, Melbourne and Brisbane — charges might be expected to
be higher.  Shorter pilotage distance at ports such as Fremantle, Adelaide and
Auckland tend to have lower charges.  It is unlikely that pilotage distance and
navigation hazards explain the relatively high pilotage charges at the port of
Sydney.4   MARINE SERVICES
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Pilotage per mile provides an alternative way of comparing pilotage charges
across ports — accounting for pilotage distance, but not for the extent of
navigation hazards.  Smaller ports such as Fremantle and Adelaide have
significantly higher per mile pilotage than the larger ports, such as Melbourne
and Brisbane (see Table 4.3).
Figure 4.4 Pilotage charges — cruise ships, 1996–97













19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
a
b
a Pilotage charges are not available.  They are included with towage and mooring charges.
b Pilotage not compulsory.
Note: Pilotage charges at the Port of Tilbury include river and sea pilotage.
At the Port of Brisbane small ships berth at Sugar Wharf and larger ships berth at Fisherman
Islands, and so charges may be levied at different rates.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Total pilotage charges for the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane were up to four
times higher than at the Port of Pusan (see  Table  4A.1 in Attachment 4A).
However, the Port of Pusan has higher pilotage per mile than both Brisbane and
Melbourne.  Furthermore, pilotage per mile at the ports of Brisbane and
Melbourne is not significantly higher than at the Port of Singapore.  Pilotage per
mile at the Port of Sydney, however, is significantly higher than would be
expected given the required pilotage distance and the number of ship calls to the
port (see Table 4.3).
Sufficient resources must be in place to meet demand for pilotage services in
peak periods — there are economies of density in provision of pilotage services.
Also adequate resources are required to provide pilotage services to the largest
ship in the worst weather conditions.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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To some extent it is difficult to predict the actual time of ship arrivals and what
weather conditions will prevail.  Consequently, there will be times when
resources are lying idle, and this is obviously more likely at ports with a low
number of ship calls.  A high number of ship calls could help to explain lower
pilotage charges at the ports of Singapore, Port Klang and Pusan
(see Table 4.3).













(miles) ($) (No.) (No.) (No.) ($A)
Hamburg 81
a 229 381
b 13 340 43
c 91 000
Philadelphia 84 62 65 2 560 39 250 000
Tilbury 58
d 225 100
e 2 291 171
f 87 000
Brisbane 49 129
g 22 1 804 82 130 000
h
Melbourne 45 118
g 29 2 872 99 140 000
h
Nagoya 42 340 135 9 244 68 235 000
Sydney 12 343
g 16 2 166 135 82 000 junior
93 000 senior
Port Klang 12 54 45 4 476 99 27 920 junior
59 840 senior
Lyttelton 7 49 5 1 600 320 multi-skilled
Singapore 7 112 136 117 723 866 28 000 junior
78 500 senior
Fremantle 5 550
g 11 1 786 162 100 000
Los Angeles 5 556 16 2 634 165 151 000
Pusan 4 to 5 281 28 33 409 1 193 162 000
Adelaide 3 to 4 569
g 5 1 357 271 100 000
i
Auckland 1.5 55 8 2 291 286 multi-skilled
a Includes river and harbour pilotage.
b Includes 311 river and 70 harbour pilots.
c Ship calls per river pilot.
d Includes sea and river pilotage.
e Includes 83 sea and 17 river pilots.
f Ship calls per sea pilot.
g Based on average pilotage charges for the trades included in the study.
h Remuneration package.
I Less shared expenses to pilot’s association for administration costs.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4   MARINE SERVICES
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Pilot utilisation
Pilot productivity or utilisation can be measured by the ratio of the number of
pilots to the number of piloted ships and may help explain differences in
charges.  However, because it is not a measure of output — safe navigation —
nor takes into account the skill required, this measure is not ideal.  Moreover,
pilots may provide a number of different services to a ship, including guiding
the ship to enter and leave the harbour and move the ship within the harbour if
necessary.
Ship calls
Moreover, a low ship call per pilot ratio may not necessarily imply low pilot
productivity.  At small ports the number of ship calls per pilot must necessarily
be lower relative to larger ports if the same level of services is to be provided
with fluctuating demand for pilotage services.  Furthermore, the time involved
in providing pilotage services will vary with the length of pilotage and travelling
time to and from the ship and this will also influence the ship call per pilot ratio.
The ratio of ship calls per pilot at Australian ports is generally lower than at
overseas ports.  Ship calls per pilot at the ports of Singapore and Pusan (low
cost ports) is high reflecting the combination of a short pilotage distance and a
high number of annual ship calls.  Low pilot utilisation at the ports of
Melbourne, and Brisbane (high cost ports) possibly reflect long pilotage
distance.  Low pilot utilisation at the ports of Fremantle and Adelaide possibly
reflect the low number of ship calls to these ports (see Table 4.3).
It is not clear that the relatively high pilotage charges at Australian ports are the
result of low pilot productivity.  Any reduction in pilot numbers may result in
delays and a deterioration of service quality, which is likely to be unacceptable
to ship operators.
Level of pilot wages
Another factor which might explain the difference in charges across ports is the
level of pilot wages (see Table 4.3).  However, it is difficult to draw any strong
conclusions solely on the basis of pilot wages without a clear understanding of
the environment within which wages are determined.  In addition, other aspects
of pilot remuneration, such as leave and superannuation arrangements impact on
the cost of supplying these services.  Furthermore, the pilot skills required have
different emphasis from port to port, but all require a degree of expertise in
confined water navigation and ship handling.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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A lack of effective inter-and intra-port competition might also help to explain
higher charges in Australia.  Providers of pilotage services are not exposed to
competitive pressures.
Timeliness of pilotage services
Thompson Clarke Shipping, in consultation with the BTCE, collected some
information on the timeliness of pilotage services provided to container ships.
Timeliness was assessed in terms of the percentage of ship movements where
the pilot boarded the ship within plus or minus an hour of ship movement time,
advised by the shipping agent six hours previously.
The limited information obtained does not allow strong conclusions to be made.
However, in Australian and most overseas ports, 100 per cent of services were
provided within that range.  There were two exceptions — 95  per  cent of
pilotage services were provided within the above range at the ports of Hamburg
and Singapore.
Summing up
The significance of pilotage as a share of total port and maritime infrastructure
and marine services charges varies between ships and ports.  Although pilotage
charges on container and cruise ships have fallen over the last four years,
pilotage charges at most Australian ports are high compared to overseas ports.
The difference in charges is likely to reflect pilotage distance, difficulty of
approach, trade volume, service requirements and inter-port competition.  For
example, pilotage distance and difficulty of approach might explain high
pilotage charges at Brisbane and Melbourne but not Sydney.  The comparatively
low ratio of ship calls at most Australian ports and the requirement for a regular
service might also explain high pilotage charges at some Australian ports.  The
interaction of these factors makes it difficult to conclude whether there is scope
for pilotage charges at Australian ports to fall.
4.2 Towage
Harbour towage involves tugs assisting ocean-going ships to berth and depart a
port, or move between berths within a port.  Tugs assist ships to manoeuvre
through navigation channels, to berth and turn in swinging basins prior to
berthing or sailing (see Box 4.2).  Towage charges are levied on ship operators.4   MARINE SERVICES
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Box 4.2 Towage operations
Towage services contribute to the safe handling of ships and are an important element of
the efficient operation in ports.  In addition to assisting the ship under tow, towage services
protect other ships and port facilities from damage.
Pilots determine the number of tugs required for a particular ship manoeuvre, on the basis
of guidelines set by pilots, or port authorities in conjunction with pilots.  Guidelines are
primarily implemented to ensure safety within the port.  There are a range of complex
factors that determine the number of tugs required for a particular ship movement:
·  ship characteristics such as size, type of rudder, propulsion system, power and
reliability of thrusters and sensitivity to weather conditions;
·  human factors including training and experience of ship’s master, the pilot and the
tug master(s) and familiarity of the ship’s master with the port;
·  port characteristics such as the size and depth of navigation channels, swinging
basins and berths;
·  variable factors including weather and sea conditions tides and other traffic in the
port and whether adjacent berths are clear; and
·  tug characteristics such as bollard pull, manoeuvrability and line handling
equipment.
Guidelines typically specify the number of tugs to be used for ships of certain lengths and
tonnages and for a range of manoeuvres such as entering and berthing, switching berths
while in port and departure from the port.  Typically, they do not specify the particular
tugs in the port’s tug fleet to be used.  Towage operators allocate tugs to be used for each
ship to rotate their fleet and provide an even number of jobs for each tug.  Although
towage operators have no direct role in determining the number of tugs used for individual
ship movements, their decisions in areas such as tug characteristics and operating
procedures have an indirect impact on the number of tugs used.
Towage services are provided by private operators at each of the five Australian
ports included in the study and at Port Klang.  Towage services are provided by
port authorities at the Ports of Auckland and Singapore.
At Australian ports, charges for towage services are specified in schedules
published by harbour towage operators.  Schedules differ among ports, but
contain a number of common elements.  The structure generally comprises a
basic towage charge based on the GRT and the number of tugs required plus
additional charges.  Additional charges might include cancellation and deferral
fees, waiting time and tow lines.  Total towage charges will be determined by
the number of tugs used plus any additional charges.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The significance of towage charges varies on both a ship-to-ship and a port-to-
port basis.  For example, towage charges levied on the 33 200 GRT (bulk) ship
range from 21 per cent of combined charges at the Port of Geelong to 12 and
11 per cent at the ports of Adelaide and Albany (see Figure 4.1).
In some cases, towage charges represent a significant share of combined port
and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges levied on both
container and cruise ships calling at Australian ports.  For example, in the case
of container ships, towage charges represent 33 per cent of combined charges at
the Port of Fremantle and 37  per  cent of combined charges at the Port of
Brisbane (see Figure 4.1).
Over the last four years, towage charges levied on container and cruise ships
have fallen in real terms at the Australian ports included in the study, with the
exception of Brisbane (cruise ships).2  For example, between 1994 and 1996,
towage charges levied on container ships fell 9.9 per cent and 9.4 per cent at the
ports of Brisbane and Fremantle respectively (see Table 4.1).  There were also
significant falls in towage charges levied on cruise ships — 40.6 per cent and
29.2 per cent at the ports of Cairns and Melbourne respectively (see Table 4.2).
Changes in towage charges over time can either reflect a change in the per tug
charge or a change in the number of tugs used to assist the ship.
Comparisons of towage charges
Towage charges levied on all classes of ships were generally higher at
Australian ports than at the overseas ports included in the study.  For example,
towage charges on bulk (wheat) ships at the ports of Geraldton, Port Kembla
and Port Lincoln, were more than three times as expensive as at the Port of
Vancouver (see Figure 4.5).
Towage charges for container ships were highest at the ports of Adelaide and
Fremantle.  Towage charges at the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane, while low
by Australian standards, were still significantly higher than at the ports of
Pusan, Singapore and Port Klang (see Figure 4.6).
                                            
2 Between 1994 and 1997 towage charges levied on cruise ships at the Port of Brisbane
increased by 10.8 per cent.4   MARINE SERVICES
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Figure 4.5 Towage charges — bulk ships, 1996–97













16 500 GRT 33 200 GRT
Source: Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).
Figure 4.6 Towage charges — container ships (all trades), 1997

















Note: Towage levies vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for ships of
different sizes on different trades.  For example, the towage charge for the smallest ship in the
sample at Melbourne was about $4 300 while the towage for the largest ship was just over
$12 400.  Most overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are therefore
point estimates.  For example, pilotage at Port Klang was about $2 800.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Towage charges at the ports of Fremantle, Brisbane and Sydney were more than
three times higher than at the ports of Copenhagen, Los Angeles and Tilbury for
the same sized cruse ships.  Of the Australian ports, towage was lowest at the
Port of Cairns — still twice as expensive as at the ports of Tilbury, Los Angeles
and Copenhagen (see Figure 4.7).
Factors explaining differences in charges
There are a number of factors that influence the level of towage charges,
including navigation distance and hazards, the degree of competition facing
towage operators, tug utilisation, the number of ship calls and crew size and
wages.
Harbour conditions
The harbour towage requirements of individual ports reflect the impact of the
physical characteristics of the port, weather conditions, the size and design of
ships handled and the needs of shipping lines.  Towage charges will be high at
ports with difficult approaches.  For example, the relatively difficult approach at
the Port of Melbourne means that more tugs might be required to berth a ship
than at ports with easier access (for example, the Port of Auckland).
Figure 4.7 Towage charges — cruise ships, 1996–97













19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
a
Note: At the Port of Brisbane small ships berth at Sugar Wharf and larger ships berth at Fisherman
Islands, and so charges may be levied at different rates.
a Towage charges are not available.  They are included with pilotage and mooring charges.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4   MARINE SERVICES
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Competition
Competition in the Australian harbour towage market is generally weak.  It is
accepted that there is little scope for direct competition between operators of
harbour towage services in Australian ports (see Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (1995) and Industry Commission (1993).  Towage
services at individual ports are generally provided by a single operator and
towage is considered to be a natural monopoly in the majority of Australian
ports.
The scope for potential competition is also limited as a result of high barriers to
entry.  These result from high capital costs of entry and associated high sunk
costs (the second hand market for tugs in Australia is ‘thin’).3  In addition, the
towage industry is characterised by economies of scale and vertical integration.
For example, several towage operators have vertical links with shipping lines
and agents, and providers of mooring services.
The lack of effective competition at the port level and the limited scope for
potential competition could contribute to higher charges at Australian ports.
Tug numbers and productivity
The number of tugs per ship movement serves as a partial indicator of tug
utilisation and productivity (see  Table  4.4).  The factors affecting the
productivity of pilots will also have an influence on the productivity of tugs
(see Section 4.1).  Any measure of tug productivity will reflect both the mix of
traffic and the extent of the navigation hazards associated with a particular port.
Tug utilisation is generally measured by the ratio of the number of ship calls to
the number of tugs.  As a measure of capital productivity, tug utilisation may
help explain differences in charges.  Low towage charges at the ports of
Singapore and Pusan are likely to reflect high ship calls per tug ratio
(see Table 4.4).
Low rates of tug utilisation typically arise because of the need to have sufficient
tugs in place to ensure adequate service quality (in terms of waiting times).  In
off-peak periods there will be an excess of tugs.  Reductions in tug numbers to
improve overall tug utilisation and lower towage charges could result in longer
ship delays during peak periods — generally unacceptable to shipping lines.
                                            
3 The ACCC (1995, p. 43) concluded that it was unlikely that entry costs incurred by a new
entrant could be recouped if the operator left the market because of limited opportunities in
the second hand market in Australia.  Opportunities to dispose of tugs overseas might also
be limited because of international variations in tug specifications.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (ratio)
Pusan 22 33 409 1519 4 1.25
Singapore 21 117 723 5606 4 4 masters
4 engineers
10 crew
Hamburg 21 13 340 635 3 or 4 3.5
Nagoya 21 9 244 440 5 1.45
Los Angeles 16 2 634 165 3 2
Port Klang 14 4 476 320 5 3.75 masters
4.4 engineers
3.4 crew
Philadelphia 11 2 560 233 4 1
Tilbury 10 2 291 1 418 5 3.14
Sydney 8 2 166 271 4 2.4
Melbourne 5 2 872 574 4 2.4
Brisbane 5 1 804 361 4 2
Auckland 5 2 291 458 4 na
Adelaide 4 1 357 339 4 1.5
Fremantle 3 1 786 595 4 2.7
Lyttelton 2 1 600 320 4 na
Note: The crew berth ratio provides a measure of the number of crews per tug.
na Not available.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Moreover, if additional tugs cannot be obtained from a nearby port to deal with
large ships and the largest ships account for a small proportion of total ship
calls, their requirements may contribute to low tug utilisation.
The number of tugs used per ship movement may also indicate over-servicing
and unnecessarily high towage charges.  The number of tugs per ship movement
will, to some extent, be determined by the extent of the navigation hazards and
the weather conditions at the time.
The number of tugs used per ship movement at Australian ports is generally
comparable with overseas ports on the Europe and New Zealand trades.  In
most cases, more tugs are used per ship movement at Australian ports on the
North American and Asian trades (see Table 4.5).4   MARINE SERVICES
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The use of more tugs per ship movement, in part, explains higher towage
charges at some Australian ports.  As the primary task of tugs is to ensure the
safe passage of ships into an out of port, it is not clear whether more tugs per
ship movement reflect over-servicing or the desire to ensure safe passage.
Another factor which might explain the difference in charges across ports is tug
crew size and wages.  Australian tug crew wages do not appear to be
significantly higher than those at some overseas ports (see Table 4.6).
The tug crew to berth ratio measures the number of crews per tug.  Tug crews at
the Australian ports are generally comparable with tug crew sizes at overseas
ports and in some cases are lower.  Crew to berth ratios at Australian ports are
generally comparable with crew to berth ratios at overseas ports (see Table 4.4).

















Fremantle 1 in/1 out 2 in/2 out nr nr nr 2 in/2 out nr
Melbourne 1 in/1 out 2 in/2 out 3 in/2 out 3 in/2 out 3 in/1 out 2 in/1 out 1 in/ 1 out
Adelaide nr 2 in/3 out nr nr 3 in/2 out 2 in/1 out nr
Sydney 1 in/1 out 2 in/3 out 3 in/2 out 3 in/2 out 2 in/1 out 3 in/ 2
out
1 in/1 out
Brisbane nr nr nr 2 in/1 out nr 2 in/ 2
out
nr
Tilbury 1 in/1 out 3 in/1 out nr nr nr nr nr
Hamburg 1 in/1 out 3 in/ 2 out nr nr nr nr nr
Los Angeles nr nr 2 in/1 out nr nr nr nr
Philadelphia nr nr nr 1 in/1 out nr nr nr
Pusan nr nr nr nr 1 in/ 1 out nr nr
Nagoya nr nr nr nr 1 or 2 nr nr
Port Klang nr nr nr nr nr 2 nr
Singapore nr nr nr nr nr 2
a nr
Auckland nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 in/1 out
Lyttelton nr nr nr nr nr nr 1 in/1 out
a One (1) if bow thrusters operational.
nr Not relevant.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Tugs at Australian ports are also used for deep-sea and salvage operations.  As a
result, larger and more powerful tugs are required than would be the case if tugs
were only used for harbour towage.  This may contribute to higher towage
charges at some Australian ports.
Timeliness of towage services
Charges are only one factor that users of towage services consider to be
important.  Ship operators also want a timely and reliable service.
Thompson Clarke Shipping, in consultation with the BTCE, collected
information on the timeliness of tug services provided to container ships.
Timeliness was assessed in terms of the percentage of ship movements, where
tugs were in attendance within an hour either side of ship movement time,
advised by the shipping agent six hours previously.
Table 4.6 Tug crew wages at selected ports, 1997
Port Master Engineer Crew On-costs
($) ($) ($) (%)
Sydney 75 000 to 85 000 75 000 to 85 000 48 000 to 54 000 30 to 35
Melbourne 100 000 100 000 62 500 30
Brisbane 82 000 82 000 55 500 30
Adelaide 75 000 to 85 000 75 000 to 85 000 48 000 to 54 000 30 to 35
Fremantle 75 000 to 85 000 75 000 to 85 000 48 000 to 54 000 30 to 35
Auckland na na na na
Lyttelton na na na na
Philadelphia na na na na
Singapore 44 860 44 860 16 822 na
Los Angeles na na na na
Port Klang 28 723 26 170 10 851 12
a
Tilbury 69 000 69 000 39 000 30
Hamburg 73 282 73 282 64 122 na
Pusan 41 291 39 790 27 027 na
Nagoya 129 412 129 412 100 000 30 to 40
a Minimum.
na Not available.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4   MARINE SERVICES
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In all cases, with the exception of Melbourne, 100 per cent of towage services at
the Australian ports included in the study were provided within the above
range.4
In most cases, 100 per cent of towage services at the overseas ports in the study
were also provided within the above range.  In particular, in the North Asia
trade, 90 per cent of towage services were provided within the above range at
the ports of Melbourne and Pusan respectively.  On the South–East Asia trade,
95 per cent of towage services were provided within the above range at the Port
of Singapore.
Summing up
The significance of towage charges varies both on the basis of ship type and
port.  Over the last four years, towage charges levied on container and cruise
ships have fallen at most of the Australian ports included in the study.
However, towage charges at most Australian ports are still high compared to the
overseas ports included in the study.
Higher charges reflect a number of factors including trade volume, service
requirements, limitations on competition and the number of tugs used per ship
movement.  Competition in the Australian towage market is generally weak,
with towage services at individual ports being provided by a single operator in
most cases.  The scope for potential competition is also limited.
Low rates of tug utilisation and the comparatively high number of tugs used per
ship movement, might help explain high towage charges at some Australian
ports.  However, it is likely that any reductions in tug numbers at Australian
ports would result in a more infrequent service.
It is thus not clear whether there is scope for towage charges at Australian ports
to fall.
4.3 Mooring and unmooring
Linesmen are used for tying up and letting go of the ship, heaving the line from
the ship to the wharf and tying the lines to bollards — sometimes assisted by
                                            
4 At the Port of Melbourne (North Asia trade), 97 per cent of towage services were provided
within an hour of ship movement time as advised by the shipping agent.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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mooring launches.  The number of linesmen used depends on the size of the
ship and the type of line the ship carries.5  It will vary from ship to ship.
Mooring and unmooring services are provided by port authorities at the ports of
Adelaide and Fremantle and by private operators at the ports of Brisbane,
Sydney and Melbourne.6  Charges for mooring and unmooring are based on the
number of staff and time taken to handle the ship at the Port of Brisbane, the
GRT of the ship at the Port of Sydney, ship length at the Port of Melbourne, and
a flat rate per service at the Port of Fremantle.  The charge for mooring and
unmooring services at the ports of Adelaide, Singapore, Auckland and Lyttelton
is incorporated in other port authority charges.
Mooring charges are generally not a significant component of combined port
and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges levied on all classes of
ship (container, bulk and cruise).  For example, mooring as a share of combined
charges levied on bulk ships ranges from 5 per cent at Port Kembla to 1 per cent
at the Port of Geraldton (see Figure 4.1).
In the case of container ships, mooring at Australian ports represents 2 per cent
of combined charges.  In the case of the 55 000 GRT ship, mooring as a share
of combined charges ranges from 6  per  cent at the ports of Melbourne and
Sydney to 2 per cent at the ports of Cairns and Fremantle.
Between 1994 and 1996, mooring charges levied on container ships increased in
real terms at the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane and fell at the ports of
Sydney and Fremantle (see Table 4.1).
Between 1994 and 1997 mooring levied on cruise ships fell in real terms at the
ports of Sydney, Fremantle and Cairns.  Mooring charges increased in real
terms at the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane (see Table 4.2).
Comparisons of mooring charges
For the study sample, mooring charges for bulk (wheat) ships at Australian ports
were generally lower than at overseas ports (see Figure 4.7).  However, mooring
charges for container and cruise ships at Australian ports were generally high by
international standards.
                                            
5 The type of line can affect the number of men required, polypropylene line is lighter than
rope which is lighter than wire.
6 Mooring and unmooring services, at the Port of Melbourne, were previously provided by
Melbourne Port Services a subsidiary of the Melbourne Port Corporation.  Melbourne Port
Services was privatised in 1997.4   MARINE SERVICES
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a Mooring is included in port authority charges.
Note: There is no explicit mooring charge levied at the ports of Adelaide and Port Lincoln.
Source: Asiaworld shipping (consultant).
Of the Australian ports, mooring charges for container ships were highest at the
ports of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.  Mooring charges at the Port of
Fremantle, although low by Australian standards, were still up to six times
higher than at Port Klang (see Figure 4.8).
Mooring charges for cruise ships were highest at the port of Sydney and lowest
at the Port of Cairns.  Mooring at the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane were
more than twice as high as at the Port of Cairns (see Figure 4.9).
Factors explaining difference in charges
A significant determinant of mooring charges is the number of linesmen used on
each ship — the number of linesmen required increases with the size of the
ship.  More linesmen per ship were used at the Port of Sydney than at most of
the other Australians ports and most of the overseas ports included in the study
(see Table 4.7).  This may help explain why mooring charges were higher at the
Port of Sydney than at other Australian ports and most overseas ports.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Note: Mooring levies vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for ships of
different sizes on different trades.  For example, the mooring charges for the smallest ship in
the sample at Melbourne was about $1 000 while the mooring for the largest ship was just
over $2 800.  Most overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are
therefore point estimates.  For example, mooring at Port Klang was about $200.
na Not applicable.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
The decision as to how many linesman to use is made by the service provider.
Shipping lines have an indirect influence over the number of linesmen used per
ship, because the decision is also influenced by the type of lines used.
Summing up
Mooring charges are generally not a significant component of total charges.
Over the last four years, mooring charges have increased in real terms at some
of the Australian ports in the study and decreased at others.
Mooring charges at most of the Australian ports in the study were high
compared to the overseas ports.  A significant determinant of mooring charges
is the number of linesmen used on each ship.  Consequently, there may be scope
for mooring charges to fall at some Australian ports in the study if the number
of linesman used could be reduced to similar levels used at overseas ports.4   MARINE SERVICES
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55 000 GRT 19 000 GRT
a
b
a Mooring charges not available.  Included in pilotage and towage charges.
b Mooring charges are not levied.
Note: At the Port of Brisbane small ships berth at Sugar Wharf and large ships berth at Fisherman
Islands, and so charges may be levied at different rates.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).72













East Asia New Zealand 19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
Fremantle 6 in 6 out 8 nr nr nr 7 nr 6 6
Melbourne 6 to 8 8 6 to 8 6 to 8 6 to 8 6 4 to 5 7 9
Adelaide nr 8 nr nr 1 gang in
1 gang out
8n rn rn r
Sydney 10 in 8 out 10 in 8 out 10 in 6 out 10 in 6 out 1 gang in
1 gang out
10 in 8 out 5 8 12 in 10 out
Brisbane nr nr nr 8 na 6 in 4 out nr 8 8
Cairns nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 6 6
Tilbury 8 8 nr nr nr nr nr 6 8 to 9
Hamburg 4 2 to 4 nr nr nr nr nr
Los Angeles nr nr 6 in 4 out nr nr nr nr 6 in 4 out 8 in 6 out
Philadelphia nr nr nr 4 nr nr nr nr nr
Miami nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 4 4
Pusan nr nr nr nr 2 nr nr nr nr
Nagoya nr nr nr nr 2 nr nr nr nr
Port Klang nr nr nr nr nr 6 nr nr nr
Singapore nr nr nr nr nr 5 nr 4 4
Auckland nr nr nr nr nr nr 4 2 2
Lyttelton nr nr nr nr nr nr 4 nr nr
Copenhagen nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 2 2 to 4
nr not relevant.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4 MARINE SERVICES
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Attachment 4A — Data
Table 4A.1 Pilotage charges — container ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 3 390 - - 3 390 2 860 - -
Brisbane - - - 7 420 7 238 3 500 -
Fremantle 4 400 2 200 - - 2 200 - -
Melbourne 7 217 6 786 3 180 8 031 6 799 2 905 2 905
Sydney 5 120 5 120 1 420 5 120 5 120 3 731 3 731
Overseas
Auckland - - 630 - - - -
Hamburg 18 533 18 533 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 2 781
Lyttelton - - 343 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 14 270 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 5 211 -
Port Klang - - - - 652 - -
Pusan - - - 1 405 - - -
Singapore - - - - 785 - -
Tilbury 13 028 13 028 - - - - -
Note: River and sea pilotage are required at the ports of Tilbury and Hamburg.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table 4A.2 Towage charges — container ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 20 650 - - 15 840 11 160 - -
Auckland - - 1 620 - - - -
Brisbane - - - 9 360 13 080 2 880 -
Fremantle 17 880 8 390 - - 16 160 - -
Hamburg 28 260 9 420 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 4 584
Lyttelton - - 2130 - - - -
Melbourne 10 740 5 240 4 270 7 860 7 860 12 400 12 400
Overseas
Nagoya - - - 9 071 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 1 767 -
Port Klang - - - - 2872 - -
Pusan - - - 1 448 - - -
Singapore - - - - 3 140 - -
Sydney 14 734 5 198 2 514 7 797 10 396 12 215 12 215
Tilbury 15 630 6 087 - - - - -
Note:
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).4   MARINE SERVICES
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Table 4A.3 Mooring charges — container ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 0 - - 0 0 - -
Auckland - - na - - - -
Brisbane - - - 1 602 1 261 1 436 -
Fremantle 1 600 1 284 - - 1 100 - -
Hamburg 3 019 2 672 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 2 789
Lyttelton - - na - - - -
Melbourne 2 320 2 850 na 1 070 1 720 1 780 1 780
Overseas
Nagoya - - - 2 193 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 220 -
Port Klang - - - - 200 - -
Pusan - - - 627 - - -
Singapore - - - - 0 - -
Sydney 4 382 3 197 na 4 548 1440 1 546 1 546
Tilbury 1 196 1 087 - - - - -
na: Separate mooring charges not available for ports of Melbourne and Sydney for the New Zealand 
trade.  There is no explicit mooring charge at the ports of Auckland, and Lyttelton.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).77
5 PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
Port authorities and governments levy charges to recover the costs
of providing port infrastructure such as berths, navigational aids
and channels.  Accurate inter-port comparisons of individual
charges are difficult to construct because of differences in
terminology and charge structure.
Port and maritime infrastructure charges were generally higher in
Australia than overseas.  This mainly reflects Australian
governments’ application of a ‘user-pays’ approach to infrastructure
provision on efficiency grounds.  A range of other factors, including
port- and trade-specific characteristics, such as trade volume, are
relevant when making comparisons.
Governments and port authorities levy a range of charges for the provision of
port and maritime infrastructure.  Some governments provide navigational aids
and pollution control infrastructure outside port boundaries.  Port authorities
typically levy charges for navigational aids, berths, channels and storage areas
within port boundaries.
Port and maritime infrastructure charges levied by governments and port
authorities on container ships, cruise and bulk (wheat) ships, are benchmarked
in this chapter.  Charges were collected on a shipping trade basis for container
ships and two sizes of cruise and bulk (wheat) ships (see Appendix B).
Payments made by stevedoring companies to port authorities under leasing
arrangements are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Care needs to be exercised when making comparisons across ports to ensure
that the impact of institutional arrangements are considered.  The level of
charges at ports will in part reflect the nature of government involvement and
port management practices and policies (see  Chapter  3 and Appendices  C
and  D).  Without an understanding of the institutional framework in which
charges are set, it is difficult to interpret differences in charges across ports.
Lower charges are not necessarily synonymous with efficiency.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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5.1 Government charges
Charges are levied by governments for the provision of navigational aids and
marine pollution infrastructure.  These statutory charges include conservancy
dues, light dues, and oil pollution charges:
·  Conservancy dues — charges to meet the cost of providing navigational
aids outside port precincts.  In Australia, conservancy dues are levied at
the ports of Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle.1  Although conservancy is
included in the stevedoring charge at the port of Tilbury, Port Klang is the
only overseas port to explicitly levy conservancy dues.
·  Light  dues — charges to meet the cost of providing light houses and
navigational aids.  In Australia, light dues are levied by the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), a Commonwealth Government
agency.  Overseas, light dues are also levied at the ports of Tilbury, Port
Klang, Los Angeles, Auckland and Lyttelton.
·  Oil pollution — charges to meet the cost of infrastructure required to be
available in the case of marine oil pollution.  In Australia, a marine oil
pollution levy is levied against commercial shipping by the AMSA.  None
of the overseas ports included in the study levy a marine oil pollution levy.
Government charges at Australian ports are generally based on ship size and
length, and can generally be spread across a number of calls, for ships on
regular schedules (see Box 5.1).  In most cases, the structure and level of
charges are set out in port authority handbooks and charge schedules.
The overall significance of government charges faced by shipping lines at
Australian ports varies depending on the type of ship and cargo.  This is, in part,
a result of the fixed rate system of government charges, which discriminates
against ships which call irregularly.  For example, charges faced by cruise ships
which may be visiting only one port for a single day within the period for which
the charge applies, are disproportionate when compared with container ships
which may be high-frequency users, providing a regular service.
The impact of government charges at Australian ports is greatest for cruise ships
and least for container ships.  For a 55 000 GRT cruise ship, government
charges account for between 22 and 54 per cent of combined port and maritime
infrastructure and marine services charges — compared with between 11 and
                                            
1 Conservancy dues are levied by State governments in Queensland and Western Australia.  In
South Australia, the conservancy charge is known as a navigation service charge and is
levied by the port authority.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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20  per  cent for a 33  200 GRT bulk (wheat) ship.2  In contrast, government
charges represent less than 8 per cent of combined charges for container ships
(see Figure 5.1).
Box 5.1 Structure of government charges
Conservancy dues
Conservancy dues at the ports of Brisbane and Fremantle are based on the gross registered
tonnage (GRT) of the ship and are valid for 2 months.  At the Port of Adelaide, the charge
includes a fixed charge per visit plus a variable charge based on the GRT of the ship, with
a 25 per cent reduction for each additional visit within a 6 month period.  Consequently,
the per call charge for a ship will be lower the more times it enters a State’s waters within
the specified period.
Light dues
Light dues are usually levied on the net registered tonnage (NRT) of a ship.  In Australia,
light dues are levied by the AMSA in the form of a marine navigation levy.3  The marine
navigation levy is payable on arrival at an Australian port and a certificate valid for three
months is issued on payment.  Only ships with a length of 24 metres or greater are obliged
to pay the marine navigation levy.  AMSA also levy a marine navigation (regulatory
functions) levy to finance such regulatory functions as assessing the seaworthiness of
Australian ships and the random inspection of foreign ships to ensure compliance with
international regulations.  The payment of this levy is calculated on an identical basis to
the marine navigation levy.  Again, the per ship call charge for a ship will fall the more
times it enters Australian waters within the three month period over which the charge is
valid.
Oil pollution charges
In Australia, the marine oil pollution levy administered by the AMSA is based on the NRT
of a ship.  It applies to ships which are more than 24 metres in length and have on board
more than 10 tonnes of oil in bulk as fuel or cargo.
There was a significant decline (in real terms) of government charges at all the
Australian ports in the study between 1994 and 1997.  For example, government
charges at the Port of Melbourne fell 76.5 per cent over this period, reflecting
the abolition of State-based conservancy dues at this port.
                                            
2 Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges include government,
port authority, pilotage, towage, and mooring charges.
3 AMSA’s marine navigation levy fell for ships over 20  000 tons from 1 July 1997.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 5.1 Share of port and maritime infrastructure and marine
services charges at Australian ports, 1997
(a) Container ship — South–East Asia trade







(b) Cruise ship — 55 000 GRT







(c) Bulk ship — 33 200 GRT









Pilotage Towage Mooring Port Authority Government
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) and Asiaworld Shipping (consultant)5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Similarly, government charges at the ports of Brisbane and Cairns fell
19.7 per cent over this period (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Change in government and port authority charges — cruise
shipping, 1994 to 1997







Note: Based on charges levied on a 19000 GRT ship.
Calculated in real terms by deflating charges by the appropriate capital city CPI.
na Not available.
Source: 1994 charges from Thompson Clarke Shipping 1994 and 1997 charges from Thompson Clarke
Shipping.
Comparisons of government charges
Government charges levied on all classes of ship (container, cruise and bulk)
were generally higher at Australian ports than the overseas ports in the sample.
For example, only Tilbury — which charges significant light dues — has higher
government charges for 55 000 GRT cruise ships (see Figure 5.4).4
Government charges for bulk (wheat) and container ships exhibited similar
patterns (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
Factors explaining differences in charges
A significant difference in the structure of government charges between the
relatively low cost overseas ports and the higher priced Australian ports is
conservancy charges.  Many of the overseas ports in the sample do not levy
infrastructure charges.  For example, the lowest cost ports in the container ship
sample — Hamburg, Philadelphia, Nagoya and Singapore — have no
government infrastructure charges.
                                            
4 Los Angeles also has high government charges for 1900 GRT cruise ships, and also charges
significant light dues.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 5.2 Government charges — bulk ships, 1996–97













16 500 GRT 33 200 GRT
na
na
Note: Government charges include conservancy, light dues and oil pollution charges.  Government
charges at the Australian ports are based on a single call.  Government charges at Vancouver
and Prince Rupert are levied to finance services provided by the Canadian coast guard.
na Not applicable.
Source: Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).
Figure 5.4 Government charges — cruise ships, 1996–97













19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
na
Note: Government charges include conservancy, light dues and oil pollution charges. Charges are
based on a single call.  Government charges levied at Los Angeles and Miami include
Agriculture and Customs fees payable on the first 15 calls.  US Flag ships calling at Los
Angeles and Miami, are exempt from light dues.
na Not applicable.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Most overseas governments do not explicitly charge ship operators to finance
navigational aids and marine pollution — preferring to finance these through
other means.  This is also in contrast with Australian governments, whose
approach allows a closer alignment of the costs and charges of the provision of
such infrastructure.
Figure 5.3 Government charges — container ships (all trades),
1997



















Note: Government charges include conservancy, light dues and oil pollution charges.  Charges valid
for a number of months have been averaged over the number of ship calls made over the year.
Government charges vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for ships
of different sizes on different trades.  For example, government charges for the smallest ship
in the sample at Melbourne were about $140 and just over $3 500 for the largest ship.  Most
overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are therefore point estimates.
For example, government charges at Los Angeles were about $630.
Conservancy charges at Tilbury are recovered in the container handling charge.  Government
charges at Hamburg include a State levy to finance life boats and a seamen’s mission.
na Not applicable.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Summing up
Charges are levied by governments for the provision of navigational aids and
marine pollution infrastructure.  The overall significance of government charges
at Australian ports varies depending on the type of ship and cargo.  This partly
reflects the fixed rate system of government charges, that discriminates against
ships calling irregularly.
There was a significant decline (in real terms) of government charges at each of
the Australian ports between 1994 and 1997.  However, government chargesINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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levied on all classes of ship were generally higher than at the overseas ports in
the sample.  Many overseas governments do not charge directly ship operators,
preferring to finance navigation infrastructure and oil pollution control through
other means.
5.2 Port authority charges
Charges are levied by port authorities for the provision of navigational aids,
berths, channels and storage areas within port boundaries.  Typically, the
structure and level of charges are set out in port authority handbooks and charge
schedules.  However, there may be some cases where the actual charges paid by
users of port and maritime infrastructure might vary from scheduled charges
because of agreements between ship operators and port authorities or owners.
The main charges levied by port authorities are tonnage, berth  hire and
wharfage:
·  Tonnage — charges levied on ship operators to recover the cost of
dredging and the provision of navigational aids.  All Australian and most
overseas ports in the study have some form of tonnage charge.  Dockage is
levied at the ports of New Orleans and Portland (USA).5
·  Berth hire — charges levied on ship operators to recover the cost of
providing wharf infrastructure.  In Australia, berth hire is levied at the
ports of Melbourne and Sydney (on cruise ships).  Some overseas ports in
the study have a form of berth hire charge.
·  Wharfage — charges levied on cargo owners to recover part of the cost of
providing port infrastructure and facilities.  All Australian and overseas
ports in the study have some form of wharfage.6  However, individual
ports exempt some classes of ship.7
                                            
5 Dockage is levied by each facility operator for the use, maintenance and up-keep of the dock
and is normally levied on the ship operator.
6 At the Port of Adelaide, wharfage is referred to as a cargo service charge.
7 Wharfage is levied on container ships by all the ports in Australia.  The port authorities of
Nagoya and Hamburg do not levy wharfage on container cargo.  Wharfage is included in
container handling charges at the ports of Singapore, Port Klang, Philadelphia and Tilbury.
Wharfage is not levied on cruise ships entering any of the Australian ports, with the
exception of the Port of Cairns.  Wharfage is also levied on cruise ships in the ports of
Singapore, Tilbury, Los Angeles and Miami.  With the exception of the ports of Vancouver
and Prince Rupert, all the ports in the study levy wharfage on bulk cargo.  (A service and
facility charge is levied on bulk cargo owners using the Port of Portland in the USA.  It is5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Most port authority ship-based charges are levied on the basis of the size of the
ship.  Cargo-based charges such as wharfage are levied on the basis of the unit
of cargo being carried, for example on a per TEU basis in the case of container
cargo or on a per tonne basis in the case of bulk cargo (see Box 5.2).  Unless
both cargo and ship-based charges are included in any comparisons, differences
in charges are not likely to reflect relative cost performance.
Box 5.2 Structure of port authority charges
Tonnage
At the ports of Sydney and Melbourne, tonnage is based on the GRT of the ship, and is
known as the navigation services charge and the channel use charge respectively.  At the
Port of Adelaide it is known as a harbour service charge and is levied as a fixed charge
plus a variable charge based on the GRT of the ship per hour at berth.  At the Port of
Fremantle it is known as tonnage rates and is based on the GRT of the ship.
Berth hire
Berth hire can be based on the time a ship occupies a particular berth, the size of the ship
or on the cargo being loaded or unloaded.  At the Port of Melbourne ship-based berth hire,
is levied in some cases on the ship operator and in other cases on the terminal operator,
depending on which dock is used.  In most cases the terminal operators pass this charge
onto ship operators.
Wharfage
Wharfage is levied on cargo owners.  As port authorities have no direct relationship with
importers or exporters, wharfage is generally collected by ship operators through a direct
wharfage charge or through a port services charge.  Additional cargo-based charges are
levied at the ports of Brisbane and Fremantle.
a
In the case of containers, port authorities generally levy separate wharfage rates for 20 and
40 foot containers and for loaded and empty containers.  Different wharfage rates may
also apply to incoming and outgoing cargo.  Wharfage is typically levied on a per TEU
basis.
a Harbour dues are levied on exporters and importers at the Port of Brisbane.  A cargo berth hire
charge is levied on importers and exporters at the Port of Fremantle.
                                                                                                                                 
only charged on the West Coast of the USA and is a cargo based charge, primarily including
a wharfage component).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Where port authorities do not levy ship-based charges it is likely that port
authorities will levy higher cargo-based charges to recover the costs of
providing port infrastructure.
Total wharfage charges levied per ship call will be determined by how much
cargo is loaded and unloaded.  In the case of container cargo it will also depend
on the composition of cargo as most port authorities levy different wharfage
rates on empty, full, 20 foot and 40 foot containers.  Therefore, total wharfage
charges for two similar sized ships visiting the same port could vary
significantly, depending on the amount and composition of cargo exchanged.
In order to make comparisons of total port authority charges levied on container
ships, it is necessary to estimate cargo-based charges, by making assumptions
about the composition of the cargo being loaded and unloaded at a port
(see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Cargo composition used in calculating wharfage charges per





(TEU) (%) (%) (%)
Sydney 814 45 45 10
Melbourne 825 45 45 10
Brisbane 510 45 45 10
Fremantle 353 45 45 10
Adelaide 477 45 45 10
Los Angeles 1386 45 45 10
Pusan 665 45 45 10
Auckland 545 45 45 10
Lyttelton 253 45 45 10
a: Average exchange calculated as a weighted average.  Weighted by share of ship calls to each port
for each trade.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
Port authority charges for container and bulk ships (wheat) are generally the
most significant component of combined port and maritime infrastructure and
marine services charges (see Figure 5.1).  For example, port authority charges
for container ships on the South–East Asia trade accounted for between
53  and  79  per  cent of combined charges at the ports of Melbourne and
Fremantle, respectively.  Similarly port authority charges for a 33  200 GRT5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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bulk (wheat) ship accounted for between 49  and  75  per  cent of combined
charges at the ports of Geelong and Adelaide, respectively (see Figure 5.1).
The significance of port authority charges levied on cruise ships varies from
port to port.  For example, in the case of the 55 000 GRT ship, port authority
charges account for between 37 and 12 per cent of combined port and maritime
infrastructure and marine services charges at the ports of Sydney and Cairns,
respectively (see Figure 5.1).8
There was a significant decline (in real terms) in port authority charges at
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane between 1994 and 1997.  For example, at
Brisbane, port authority charges levied on cruise ships fell 41.2  per  cent,
reflecting the Brisbane Port Authority’s policy of eliminating ship-based
charges (see  Table  5.1).  Although there were similar falls for charges on
container ships at most Australian ports, port authority charges at the Port of
Melbourne increased by about 6 per cent over the same period (see Table 5.3).9
Table 5.3 Change in port authority charges — container ships, 1994 to
1996
Port 1994 to 1995 1995 to 1996 1994 to 1996
(%) (%) (%)
Sydney 10.9 -13.8 -4.5
Melbourne 27.1 -16.5 6.2
Brisbane -17.8 16.4 -4.3
Adelaide 0.6 -26.7 -26.3
Fremantle 18.6 -31.2 -18.4
Note: Calculated in real terms by deflating charges by the appropriate capital city CPI.
Differences in charges over time might reflect the impact of movements in the level of cargo-based
charges associated with changes in cargo exchange and composition.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on BTCE Waterline (various issues).
                                            
8 At the Port of Brisbane large ships berth at Fisherman’s Island and small ships berth at
Sugar Wharf.  Ships berthing at Fisherman’s Island are not levied with any port authority
charges and ships berthing at Sugar Wharf are levied with berth hire.
9 It is not clear whether differences in port authority charges over time reflect changes in port
authority tariffs or the impact of changes in the exchange and composition of cargo.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Comparisons of port authority charges
Port authority charges for bulk (wheat) and cruise ships were generally mid-
range when compared with the overseas ports in the study.  For example,
although port authority charges levied on bulk (wheat) ships at Australian ports
were higher than the Canadian ports of Prince Rupert and Vancouver, they were
lower than the US ports of Portland and New Orleans (see  Figure  5.5).
Similarly, port authority charges for 55 000 GRT cruise ships at all Australian
ports were lower than Copenhagen, Miami and Los Angeles (see Figure 5.6).
The mix of cargo-based and ship-based port authority charges varies from port
to port and is generally determined by the objectives of the port authority
(see Box 5.3).  The Brisbane Port Authority, for example, does not have any
ship-based charges, preferring to levy both wharfage and harbour dues on cargo
importers and exporters, in an attempt to attract more ships to Brisbane.  All
other Australian port authorities levy a combination of ship-based and cargo-
based charges.
Box 5.3 The mix of ship-based and cargo-based charges
Tonnage and berth hire are ship-based charges and wharfage is a cargo-based charge.
Port authorities may vary the incidence of charges to reflect their policies on trade
facilitation and to attract more ships to a port.  The Port of Brisbane, for example, does
not levy any ship-based charges, preferring to levy charges on cargo owners.
Port authority ship-based charges levied at Australian ports are generally higher than those
levied at the overseas ports included in the study.
a
Port authority ship-based charges are not levied at Brisbane, Tilbury, and Port Klang.
The ports of Sydney and Melbourne have the highest ship-based port authority charges of
the Australian ports included in the study.  Ship-based charges at Adelaide and Fremantle
are low in comparison to the overseas ports in the study (see  Figure 5A.2).
The port authorities of Nagoya and Hamburg do not levy any cargo-based charges and at
the ports of Singapore, Port Klang, Philadelphia and Tilbury, wharfage is included in
container handling charges.
The Port Klang port authority does not levy any explicit ship-based or cargo-based
charges — tonnage and wharfage are both included in the charge for container handling.
a Port authority charges at Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide fell from 1 July 1997.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5.5 Port authority charges — bulk ships, 1996–97













16 500 GRT 33 200 GRT
Note: Charges include berth hire, wharfage and tonnage or harbour dues.  Port authority charges at
Adelaide and Port Lincoln include mooring charges.  Charges at Geelong include facility hire.
Dockage and a service and facilities charge are levied at Portland.  Dockage is levied for the
use, maintenance and up keep of the dock and is levied on the ship operator.  The service and
facility charge is a cargo based charge including a wharfage component.
Source: Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).
Figure 5.6 Port authority charges — cruise ships, 1996–97













19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
a
a In Brisbane small ships berth at Sugar Wharf and large ships berth at Fisherman’s Island, and
so charges may be levied at different rates.
Note: Includes tonnage, berth hire and wharfage.  Tonnage is not levied at Brisbane, Melbourne and
Auckland.  All wharfage charges are based on 90 per cent load factor and exchange, except
Cairns where it is assumed that the full passenger compliment is in transit.  Wharfage is not
levied on passengers at Auckland and all Australian ports, with the exception of Cairns.
Wharfage and berth hire are not levied at Copenhagen.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The importance of comparing only combined port authority charges is
demonstrated by the following example.  Ship-based charges at the ports of
Adelaide, Fremantle and Los Angeles are low by international standards
(see Figure 5.7).  However, when ship- and cargo-based charges are combined
they are no longer low cost ports (see Figure 5.8).
Combined ship- and cargo-based port authority charges were generally higher at
Australian ports than the overseas ports in the study.  Total port authority
charges were generally highest at the ports of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.
Figure 5.7 Port authority ship-based charges — container ships
(all trades), 1997




















Note: Port authority ship based charges include tonnage, and berth hire charges.  Charges at
Adelaide, Lyttelton and Auckland include mooring charges.  Berth hire is not levied at
Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, Port Klang, and Hamburg.
Port authority charges vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for
ships of different sizes on different trades.  For example, port authority charges for the
smallest ship in the sample at Melbourne were just over $4 000 and about $28 000 for the
largest ship.  Most overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are
therefore point estimates.  For example, port authority charges at Singapore were about $7
600.
na Not applicable.  Berth hire and tonnage are not levied at the ports of Brisbane and Tilbury.
Berth hire not levied at Port Klang and tonnage is included in container handling charges.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5.8 Port authority ship- and cargo-based charges —
container ships (all trades), 1997



















Note: Port authority ship and cargo based charges include tonnage, berth hire and wharfage charges.
Port authority charges vary by ship size.  The above chart presents the range of charges for
ships of different sizes on different trades.  For example, port authority charges for the
smallest ship in the sample at Sydney were just over $24 000 and about $73 400 for the
largest ship.  Most overseas ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are
therefore point estimates.  For example, port authority charges at Nagoya were about $11 602.
Total wharfage charges are calculated on the basis of average TEU exchange.  Berth hire is
not levied at the ports of Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, Port Klang, Tilbury and Hamburg.
Berth hire and tonnage are not levied at the Port of Brisbane.  Wharfage at the Port of
Brisbane includes harbour dues.  Wharfage rates for the Port of Los Angeles were estimated
by Thompson Clarke Shipping.  Wharfage charges at the ports of Philadelphia, Tilbury,
Singapore and Port Klang are included in container handling charges.  Wharfage is not levied
at the ports of Hamburg and Nagoya.  Port authority charges at the ports of Adelaide, Lyttelton
and Auckland include mooring charges.  Wharfage at ports of Singapore, Philadelphia and
Tilbury is recovered in container handling charges.
na Not  applicable.    Tonnage and Wharfage at the Port Klang included in container handling
charges.  Berth hire is not levied at Port Klang.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Factors explaining differences in charges
The institutional environment in which port authority charges are set can have a
significant impact on the level of charges.  Differences in charges may reflect
different policy approaches rather than superior performance.  The extent of
cost recovery pursued by port authorities through their pricing practices directly
impacts on the observed level of charges (see Section 3.2).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Australian owner governments generally place a higher priority than foreign
governments on the objective of cost recovery, although other objectives, such
as encouraging regular ship visits, may also be pursued through pricing policies.
The ports of Adelaide, Melbourne, and Brisbane aim to recover costs through
charges, whereas the ports of Sydney and Fremantle appear to place a lower
priority on cost recovery.  However, on the basis of available information, full
cost recovery is not pursued at the ports of Philadelphia, Nagoya and Hamburg
(all low charge ports) (see Table C.9).
In addition, all Australian ports are self-funding and do not receive additional
government funding for operational deficits.  Some overseas ports receive both
direct and indirect government funding in the form of operational subsidies,
interest free loans and funding for major dredging and infrastructure
development (see Table C.8).10  These subsidies have an impact on both the
level and structure of port authority charges at these ports.
The requirement for port authorities to make tax equivalent and dividend
payments will also have an impact on pricing practices and hence the observed
level of charges.  All port authorities in Australia are, or will be, making tax-
equivalent and dividend payments to their state government owners.  Only a
small number of overseas ports included in the study make tax and dividend
payments (see Table C.10).
Where such polices are not pursued, charges may not reflect the true cost of
providing services and facilities.  For example, the low cost ports identified in
this study (Hamburg, Philadelphia and Nagoya) are not required to fully recover
costs, nor to make tax and dividend payments.  Under the current institutional
arrangements under which Australian port authorities operate, it is unlikely that
charges could equate to those levied at these ports.
In Australia, port authority charges are highest at the ports of Sydney and
Melbourne.  These are the largest container ports servicing shipping in Australia
— but throughput is still significantly lower than some of the overseas ports
included in the study.  Higher throughput at these ports suggest that both costs
and charges should be lower compared to other Australian ports.  The
combination of government policies (full cost recovery and dividend and tax
equivalent payments) and the exercise of market power are likely to be the
major reasons why charges at these ports are high by both Australian and
international standards.
                                            
10 The port of Philadelphia appears to incur an annual operating deficit of around double its
revenue base.  In addition, major dredging costs at strategic US ports are financed by the
United States Government through the US Army Corps of Engineers.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Summing up
Port authorities levy a range of charges on ship operators and cargo owners for
the provision of port infrastructure.  Port authority charges for container and
bulk ships are generally the most significant component of combined charges.
The significance of port authority charges levied on cruise ships varies from
port to port.
Port authority charges on bulk and cruise ships at the Australian ports in the
study were generally mid-range when compared with the overseas ports.  Port
authority charges on containers ships were generally higher.
There are a number of possible reasons why port authority charges are higher at
some Australian ports.  The policies of Australian governments on cost
recovery, self funding and tax equivalent and dividend payments will also have
an impact on pricing practices and hence the observed level of charges.  There
is also limited scope for inter-port competition within Australia.
5.3 Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine
services charges
The variation in terminology and charging structures limits the usefulness of
inter-port comparisons made solely on the basis of individual charges.
Combined infrastructure and marine services charges provide a clearer picture
of the costs incurred by both shipping lines and shippers of cargo.11
Information on charges provided in Chapter 4 and in the preceding sections of
this chapter are therefore aggregated in this section.
Bulk ships
Combined charges levied on bulk (wheat) ships at Australian ports, while not
the highest, were still significantly higher than combined charges at the
Canadian ports of Prince Rupert and Vancouver.  Of the Australian ports,
combined charges were highest at the South Australian ports of Adelaide and
Port Lincoln, reflecting relatively high government, port authority and towage
charges at these ports (see Figure 5.9).
                                            
11 Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine charges include government and port
authority charges (ship-based and cargo-based), pilotage, towage and mooring charges.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 5.9 Combined infrastructure and marine services
charges — bulk ships, 1996–97













16 500 GRT 33 200 GRT
Note: Combined infrastructure and port services charges is calculated by adding government
charges, port authority charges, pilotage charges, towage charges, and mooring charges.
Source: Asiaworld Shipping (consultant).
Container ships
The combined charges levied on container ships were generally higher at
Australian ports than at overseas ports, although there was some variation
between trades (see Box 5.4).  Of the Australian ports, combined charges were
highest at the ports of Melbourne and Sydney, whereas charges at the ports of
Adelaide and Fremantle were not significantly different to the port of Tilbury.
Combined charges at the ports of Fremantle and Adelaide were still four times
higher than at the Port of Singapore (see Figure 5.10).  Combined charges were
lowest at the ports of Tilbury, Philadelphia, Singapore, Port Klang and
Lyttelton.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Box 5.4 Comparisons of combined port and maritime infrastructure
and marine services charges for container ships by trade
European trades
Combined charges levied at the ports of Hamburg, Tilbury, Fremantle and Adelaide are
similar.  Combined charges are substantially higher at the ports of Melbourne and Sydney,
largely reflecting the high level of port authority charges levied at these two ports
(see Figure 5.10 and Table 5A.3).
US trades
On the US West Coast trade, combined charges are highest at the Port of Los Angeles,
reflecting high port authority charges.  Ship-based port authority charges levied at Los
Angeles are low by Australian standards, cargo-based charges (wharfage) are, however,
relatively high (see  Figure 5.10 and Tables 5A.2, 5A.3).
On the US East Coast trade, combined charges are highest at the ports of Sydney and
Melbourne (see Table 5A.4).  However, the Port of Philadelphia receives funding to cover
annual operating deficits.
Asian Trades
On the North Asia trade combined charges at all Australian ports are substantially higher
than at the Port of Pusan.  Port authority charges at the Port of Pusan are low by
Australian standards (no cargo-based charges are levied at Pusan).  Pilotage, towage and
mooring charges are also significantly lower relative to the Australian ports called at
(see Tables 5A.3, Figure 5.10, and Tables 5A.1, 4A.2 and 4A.3).
On the South–East Asia trade all the Australian ports are more expensive than Singapore
and Port Klang.  Port authority charges at both ports are low (no port authority charges
are levied at Port Klang).  Singapore and Port Klang are also able to achieve low pilotage,
towage and mooring, because of high annual ships calls and high pilot and tug utilisation.
New Zealand trade
Combined charges are highest at the Port of Auckland, although there is not a significant
disparity in charges between Auckland, Melbourne and Sydney.  Although, ship-based
charges levied at the Port of Auckland are comparatively low, combined port authority
charges are high when compared to Melbourne and Sydney (see  Tables 5A.2, 5A.3).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 5.10 Combined infrastructure and marine services
charges — container ships (all trades), 1997

















Note: Combined port and maritime infrastructure and services charges includes government charges
(light dues, conservancy and oil pollution charges), port authority charges (wharfage, tonnage,
berth hire), pilotage, towage, and mooring charges.
The above chart presents the range of combined charges for ships of different sizes on
different trades.  For example, combined charges for the smallest ship in the sample at Sydney
were just over $28 000 and about $91 600 for the largest ship.  Most overseas ports only
accounted for one ship call in the sample and are therefore point estimates.  For example,
combined charges at Pusan were about $11 700.
See the notes to Figure 4.3, 4.6, 4.9, 5.3 and 5.8.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Expressing charges on a per TEU basis, provides an alternative way of
comparing the cost incurred by shipping lines and shippers in moving cargo.  At
the larger ports, ship-based charges can be defrayed against larger TEU
exchanges.  Combined charges per TEU were higher at Australian ports than at
the overseas ports.  Per TEU charges were highest at the ports of Fremantle,
Adelaide and Brisbane, and lowest at the ports of Sydney and Melbourne
(see Figure 5.11).  This is in contrast to the outcome when combined charges
were compared on a per ship basis.  The average TEU exchanged at Melbourne
and Sydney is generally larger than at the ports of Fremantle, Brisbane and
Adelaide.
In most cases the high combined charges per TEU at the Australian ports reflect
smaller average TEU exchanges.  Lower per TEU charges could be achieved by
increasing the number of TEUs exchanged, principally through a reduction in
the number of ship calls.  However, this would result in a less regular service.
Shippers prefer more ship calls to less, so that a reduction in ship calls would
represent a deterioration in service quality.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5.11 Combined infrastructure and marine services
charges per TEU — container ships (all trades),
1997

















Note: Combined port and maritime infrastructure and services charges includes government charges
(light dues, conservancy and oil pollution charges), port authority charges (wharfage, tonnage,
berth hire), pilotage, towage, and mooring charges.
The above chart presents the range of combined per TEU charges for ships of different sizes
on different trades.  For example, combined charges for the smallest ship in the sample at
Melbourne were $65 per TEU and about $109 per TEU for the largest ship.  Most overseas
ports only accounted for one ship call in the sample and are therefore point estimates.  For
example, combined charges at Pusan were $30 per TEU.
Most port and maritime and marine services charges are levied on the basis of ship size.
Expressing charges on a per TEU basis will favour ports with high average TEU exchanges.
See the notes to Figure 4.3, 4.6, 4.9, 5.3 and 5.8.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Cruise ships
Combined charges on cruise ships are highest at the Australian ports of Sydney
and Fremantle.  Although combined infrastructure and marine services charges
on cruise ships were lowest at the ports of Singapore and Copenhagen, charges
at the ports of Melbourne and Cairns were not significantly higher
(see Figure 5.12).
High combined charges at the Australian ports reflect comparatively high
government, port authority, pilotage and towage charges.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 5.12 Combined infrastructure and marine services charges
— cruise ships, 1996–97













19 000 GRT 55 000 GRT
Note: Combined infrastructure and port services charges is calculated by adding government
charges, port authority charges, pilotage charges, towage charges, and mooring charges.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Summing up
The variation in terminology and charging structures limits the usefulness of
comparisons of individual charges.  Combined government, port authority and
marine service charges provide a clearer picture of the costs incurred by both
ship operators and cargo owners.
Combined charges at the Australian ports for all classes of ship were higher
than the overseas ports in the study.  High combined charges on bulk and cruise
ships at some Australian ports reflect relatively high government, port authority,
pilotage and towage charges at these ports.
For container ships, combined charges per TEU were higher at the Australian
ports in the study.  In most cases, the high combined per TEU charges at the
Australian ports reflect smaller average TEU exchanges than those overseas.
However, higher charges are not necessarily excessive in efficiency terms.
Higher charges will depend upon cost recovery policies, the achievement of
appropriate rates of return and appropriate asset utilisation.5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Attachment 5A — Data
Table 5A.1 Government charges — container ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 7156 - - 3036 2310 - -
Brisbane - - - 4440 4264 4741 -
Fremantle 6826 4987 - - 3741 - -
Melbourne 2813 3530 139 729 698 1538 1615
Sydney 2813 3530 139 729 698 1538 1615
Overseas
Auckland - - 259 - - - -
Hamburg 731 687 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 829
Lyttelton - - 259 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 0 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 0 -
Port Klang - - - - 2783 - -
Pusan - - - 30 - - -
Singapore - - - - 131 - -
Tilbury 18920 17826 - - - - -
Note: Government charges include conservancy, light dues and oil pollution charges.  Charges valid for
a  number of months have been averaged over the number of ship calls made over the year.
Government charges at the Port of Hamburg include a State levy to finance life boats and a 
seamen’s mission.
Conservancy charges at the Port of Tilbury are recovered in the container handling charge.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table 5A.2 Port authority ship-based charges — container ships by
trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 5399 - - 7381 5192 - -
Brisbane - - - 0 0 0 -
Fremantle 6240 4864 - - 4635 - -
Melbourne 26790 21296 4265 27821 20708 15699 15699
Sydney 17906 13009 4275 15540 12921 10212 10212
Overseas
Auckland - - 1435 - - - -
Hamburg 11709 8779 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 7166
Lyttelton - - 1843 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 11603 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 4435 -
Port Klang - - - - 0 - -
Pusan - - - 9169 - - -
Singapore - - - - 7686 - -
Tilbury 0 0 - - - - -
Note: Port authority ship based charges include tonnage, and berth hire charges.
Port authority charges at the ports of Adelaide, Lyttelton and Auckland include mooring charges.
Berth hire is not levied at the ports of Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, and Hamburg.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 5A.3 Port authority ship- and cargo-based charges — container
ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 23543 - - 43021 29762 - -
Brisbane - - - 32114 37184 24101 -
Fremantle 25979 24720 - - 26009 - -
Melbourne 49666 49263 17543 70477 54867 49549 36304
Sydney 60993 66277 24154 73440 53885 49899 43118
Overseas
Auckland - - 32527 - - - -
Hamburg 11709 8779 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 96355
Lyttelton - - 12772 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 11602 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 4435 -
Port Klang - - - - 0 - -
Pusan - - - 16351 - - -
Singapore - - - - 7686 - -
Tilbury 0 0 - - - - -
Note: Port authority ship- and cargo-based charges include tonnage, berth hire and wharfage charges.  
Total wharfage charges are calculated on the basis of average TEU exchange.
Port authority charges at the ports of Adelaide, Lyttelton and Auckland include mooring charges.
Berth hire is not levied at the ports of Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, and Hamburg.
Berth hire and tonnage are not levied at the Port of Brisbane.  Wharfage at the Port of Brisbane 
includes harbour dues.
Wharfage charges at the ports of Philadelphia, Tilbury, Singapore and Port Klang are included in 
container handling charges.
Wharfage is not levied at the ports of Hamburg and Nagoya.
Wharfage rates for the Port of Los Angeles were estimated by Thompson Clarke Shipping.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table 5A.4 Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine
services charges — container ships by trade, 1997
($)
Europe New North South– North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 54739 - - 65287 46092 - -
Brisbane - - - 60006 63027 36658 -
Fremantle 56685 41581 - - 49210 - -
Melbourne 72756 67669 25132 88167 71944 68172 55004
Sydney 88042 83322 28227 91634 71539 68929 62225
Overseas
Auckland - - 35036 - - - -
Hamburg 62251 40090 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 107339
Lyttelton - - 15503 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 37135 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 11632 -
Port Klang - - - - 6507 - -
Pusan - - - 19861 - - -
Singapore - - - - 11742 - -
Tilbury 48774 38028 - - - - -
Note: Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges includes government
charges, port authority charges, pilotage, towage, and mooring charges.
Government charges valid for a number of months have been averaged over the number of ship
calls made over the year.
Conservancy charges at the Port of Tilbury are recovered in the stevedoring charge.
Government charges at the Port of Hamburg include a State levy to finance life boats and a
seamen’s mission.
Government charges are not levied at the ports of Pusan, and Nagoya.
Tonnage charges at the Port of Port Klang are included in container handling charges.
Berth hire is not levied at the ports of Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, Port Klang, and Hamburg.
Berth hire and tonnage are not levied at the ports of Brisbane and Tilbury.
Total wharfage charges calculated on basis of average TEU exchange.
Wharfage rates for the Port of Los Angeles were estimated by Thompson Clarke Shipping.
Wharfage is not levied at the ports of Hamburg and Nagoya.
Pilotage charges at ports of Tilbury and Hamburg include river and sea pilotage.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).5   PORT AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 5A.5 Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine
services charges per TEU — container ships by trade,
1997
($)
Europe New North South–- North America
Port East bound West bound Zealand Asia East Asia East coast West coast
Australian
Adelaide 163 - - 99 101 - -
Brisbane - - - 101 123 95 -
Fremantle 168 122 - - 134 - -
Melbourne 109 83 65 71 72 69 92
Sydney 99 75 69 76 84 108 91
Overseas
Auckland - - 64 - - - -
Hamburg 59 44 - - - - -
Los Angeles - - - - - - 77
Lyttelton - - 61 - - - -
Nagoya - - - 54 - - -
Philadelphia - - - - - 8 -
Port Klang - - - - 14 - -
Pusan - - - 30 - - -
Singapore - - - - 9 - -
Tilbury 27 48 - - - - -
Note: Combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges per TEU is calculated by
dividing combined port and maritime infrastructure and marine services charges (government
charges, port authority charges, pilotage, towage, and mooring charges). by the average TEU
exchanged by the ship at each port.
Government charges valid for a number of months have been averaged over the number of ship
calls made over the year.
Conservancy charges at the Port of Tilbury are recovered in the stevedoring charge.  Government
charges at the Port of Hamburg include a State levy to finance life boats and a seamen’s mission.
Government charges are not levied at the ports of Pusan, and Nagoya.
Tonnage charges at the Port of Port Klang are included in container handling charges.
Berth hire is not levied at the ports of Sydney, Fremantle, Adelaide, Port Klang, and Hamburg.
Berth hire and tonnage are not levied at the ports of Brisbane and Tilbury.
Total wharfage charges calculated on basis of average TEU exchange.  Wharfage rates for Los
Angeles were estimated by Thompson Clarke Shipping.  Wharfage is not levied at Hamburg and
Nagoya.
Pilotage charges at ports of Tilbury and Hamburg include river and sea pilotage.
- Port not included in sample for trade.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).105
6 STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
Container trade represents just over half the value of all cargo
passing through Australian ports.  When compared with overseas
terminals on a trade-by-trade basis, using the same ships, Australian
container terminals generally have higher stevedoring charges,
lower productivity, and evidence of poor reliability, indicating
significant scope for improvement.  The differences in performance
could not be explained simply by scale diseconomies.
Container stevedoring operations have been the focus of efforts to raise the
performance of the Australian waterfront over recent years.  Performance
improvement can provide direct and indirect benefits for Australian consumers
and businesses by lowering waterfront charges and raising service quality —
thereby expanding export opportunities and lowering import prices.
In this chapter, ‘container stevedoring’ refers to the traditional role of container
movement between ship and shore, and container yard handling operations.
International comparisons involve comparing services that may be identified by
different terminology or work organisation.  For example, at container terminals
in the US, ship-to-shore handling services are referred to as ‘longshore’
operations and may be provided by a different ‘stevedore’ (and be performed by
employees from different unions) to yard handling services.1
The relative performance and charges for container stevedoring services
between Australian and overseas ports are examined in this chapter.
Error! AutoText entry not defined..1 Container stevedoring and
terminal operations
Container trade has significantly increased in importance since the introduction
of standardised container sizes in 1966.2  In value terms, more than half of all
                                            
1 Shore-to-stack, shore-based reefer services and stack-to-land transport handling.
2 The International Standards Organisation (ISO) originally defined standard container sizes
based on an 8 foot square external end area with lengths and incorporated standard fastening
and lifting points.  However, 8 foot 6 inch and 9 foot 6 inch high ISO containers are used
extensively in the Australian trades.  Lengths vary in multiples of 10 feet from 10 to 40 foot
with the 20 foot (representing one ‘twenty foot equivalent’ or TEU) being a commonINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
106
trade (three-quarters of all non-bulk trade) that passed through Australian ports
in 1995–96 was accounted for by container and roll-on-roll-off (ro-ro) cargo
(see Table  6.1).  This proportion has increased significantly since 1983–84,
with most of the increase in non-bulk cargo occurring in the period to 1988–89.
Table 6.1 Container and ro-ro ship trade as a proportion of non-bulk










Proportion of total non-bulk cargo
c
Exports 28.4 63.0 40.1 71.5 53.4 74.0
Imports 58.9 72.0 61.4 79.8 69.4 76.1
Throughput 38.0 68.3 46.9 75.8 59.3 75.3
Proportion of total cargo trade
d
Exports 1.9 28.1 2.2 35.3 2.9 39.9
Imports 16.7 52.3 17.7 62.0 17.0 65.9
Throughput 3.3 39.4 3.5 46.2 4.4 52.4
a Container and ro-ro ship trade as a proportion of cargo weight in tonnes.
b Container and ro-ro ship trade as a proportion of cargo value in $A.
c Excludes cargo trade that could not be classified by the ABS.
d Includes unclassified trade in total.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS International Customs Statistics
data.
Container terminals
Container terminals generally comprise purpose-built berths and large open
areas for storing containers before loading or after discharge from purpose-built
container ships.  Specialised cranes on the berth — ‘portainer’ cranes — are
used to transfer containers between the ship and shore.
In addition to loading and unloading the ship, container stevedoring includes the
receival of export containers and the delivery of import containers at the
terminal.
                                                                                                                                 
measure.  Containers (or ISO boxes) based on these dimensions come in a variety of forms
including: open top; open sides; ventilated, and refrigerated (‘reefers’).6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Container shipping and terminal industry
Increasing competition in international container shipping is reflected in
Australian container trades and indirectly contributes to pressure on Australian
container terminal operators to improve performance.
The Commission’s consultant reported that one source of increased competition
is the excess capacity in container shipping as a new generation of container
ships (in the 4000 to 6000 TEU range) enter the world’s East–West trades.  This
in turn has increased the capacity in the Australian container trades, as ships in
the 2000 to 3000 TEU range have been displaced into the North–South trades.
The result is heightened competition in most Australian trades as shipping lines
compete to establish, retain or increase market share — with consequential
pressures on all their service suppliers, including the Australian container
terminal operators.
Increasing pressure from shipping lines, coupled with labour reforms and capital
investment since the completion of the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority
(WIRA) process, have contributed to heightened price competition between the
two major national container terminal operators.  However, it is unclear whether
the current price levels are sustainable at the current level of operating
efficiency, with terminal operators claiming that a normal return on investment
is not being achieved at current prices.
Data collected by the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA) suggests that average
stevedoring charges in Australia have fallen in real terms from $370 per TEU in
December 1985 to $203 per TEU in December 1995 (see Figure 6.1).
Error! AutoText entry not defined..2 Waterfront charges for
container services
The total cost to traders of moving a container from its country of origin to its
final destination consists of the ‘blue water’ freight rate, and land-side and
waterfront charges in the origin and destination countries.  Australian waterfront
charges are a relatively small proportion of the total direct cost of moving the
container.  They may for example, account for around 13 per cent or less of the
total direct cost of importing a container (see Box 2.5 in Chapter 2).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Source: Derived from PSA – Monitoring of Stevedoring Costs and Charges – various reports.
Waterfront charges (associated with moving the ship and cargo to and from the
wharf) include those for marine services, port infrastructure and container
stevedoring:
·  Marine services — charges for ancillary services that help ships to enter,
berth and leave a port (includes pilotage, towage and mooring charges).
These charges are discussed in detail in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3;
·  Port infrastructure — port owner charges shipping lines to recover the
cost of managing and maintaining port infrastructure (includes area hire,
berth hire, wharfage and tonnage).  Governments also levy charges on ship
operators utilising their waters (includes conservancy, light dues and
marine pollution levies).  Port authority and government charges are
discussed in detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2; and
·  Container stevedoring — charges for the cost of loading or discharging a
container between wharf and ship.  The charge also covers handling the
container in the terminal yard and either road or rail receival and delivery.
Container stevedoring charges are the most significant waterfront charges faced
by shipping lines.  For example, on average, about 66 per cent of waterfront
charges for Australia’s five major ports in June 1997 were stevedoring (see
Table 6.2).6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Table 6.2 Port and related charges, June 1997











($/TEU) ($/TEU) ($/TEU) ($/TEU) (%)
Adelaide 96 65 188
c 349 53.9
Brisbane 55 68 188
c 311 60.5
Fremantle 52 64 188
c 304 61.8
Melbourne 43 37 188
c 268 70.1
Sydney 33 60 188
c 281 66.9
All Five
d   44   53   188
c 286 65.8
a Ship-based charges include conservancy, tonnage, pilotage, towage, berth-hire and mooring.
b Cargo-based charges include wharfage, harbour dues and berth charge.
c The five port average is used for the stevedoring component at each port for confidentiality reasons.
d Average for five ports weighted by TEU throughput for June quarter 1997.
Note: Cargo based charges are lower for exports in Sydney ($45/TEU) and Adelaide ($61/TEU).
Source: BTCE Waterline 12, September 1997.
The sample data from the current study show similar patterns, with stevedoring
representing between 56 and 68 per cent of all waterfront charges per TEU at
Australian ports (Figure 6.2).  The experience at overseas ports, however, was
mixed.  At some overseas ports — Auckland, Hamburg, Los  Angeles and
Lyttelton — the contribution of stevedoring to total waterfront charges per TEU
was similar to the Australian ports, ranging between 58 and 72 per cent.  At the
other overseas ports, stevedoring represents a greater proportion of total
waterfront charges.  For example, stevedoring charges represented 86, 93 and
96 per cent of total waterfront charges per TEU at Port Klang, Singapore and
Philadelphia, respectively.
The variation in the importance of container stevedoring charges among ports
may result from differences in the charge structure, port-specific characteristics,
port ownership and cost recovery policies.
Marine services, port authority and government charges are based on factors
such as ship size and length, time at berth, services provided and the nature of
cargo (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).  Charges for marine services vary because
of geographical factors, competition amongst service providers or the nature and
volume of traffic serviced by the port (see Section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).
Government and port authority charges will depend partly on the degree of
commitment to ‘user pays’ and a commercial posture (see Section 5.1 and 5.2).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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When all waterfront charges are taken into consideration, the relative total
charges per  TEU changes for some terminals (for example, Philadelphia–
Hamburg–Los  Angeles and Pusan–Lyttelton).  However, this does not
significantly affect the relative costs of Australian and overseas ports (see
Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 The average composition of waterfront charges per































































































































































Container handling Marine services Port authority and government
Note: The indices are based on a trade-mix weighted average of the average box exchange to take
account of different container stevedoring charges for full/empty and 40’/20’ containers.
Shore-based reefer charges have been excluded because data on the number of reefers were
not available.  This is likely to exaggerate the level of container stevedoring charges at
Australian terminals relative to overseas terminals because, on average, waterfront reefer
charges at Australian terminals represent a significantly lower increment to overall
stevedoring charges.
Marine services include charges for pilotage, towage and mooring (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3).  Port infrastructure is discussed in more detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Exchange rates: Charges at overseas ports have been converted into Australian dollars based
on exchange rates as at 30 June 1997 (see Chapter 2).
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Comparison of container stevedoring charges
Container shipping lines were approached for actual cost data for container
stevedoring charges and the additional waterfront reefer charges, which were
defined as:
·  Container stevedoring charges — charges for loading and unloading a
container between wharf and ship (stevedoring) plus the charge for
handling the container in the terminal yard and of receiving or delivering it
to either road or rail.  The data presented is expressed on a per TEU basis.
·  Shore-based reefer charges — charges for shore-based reefer services —
plugging and unplugging refrigerated containers into power or attaching
fixed and portable refrigeration units as well as the cost of monitoring
temperatures and the power consumed.  They are charged in addition to
the container stevedoring charge.
These charges take into account volume discounts, productivity incentives and
paid idle time incurred for scheduled interruptions.
Container stevedoring charges were, on average, higher at all Australian
container terminals than at any of the overseas terminals surveyed.  On the
South–East Asia trade, for example, container stevedoring charges were over
150 per cent higher at Adelaide than at Port Klang.  The exception is Nagoya,
which was at least 130 per cent more than for Australian terminals on the same
trade (the North Asia trade).  However, the Australian charges on this trade
were still between 10 and 15 per cent higher than Pusan in South Korea.
Charges may vary between different Australian terminals and between different
trades at the same Australian terminal due to contractual arrangements.
However, there is evidence in the data collected for this study that shipping
lines typically negotiate national contracts for container terminal services with
the one national provider.  This may reflect the transaction costs of negotiating
separate prices for each terminal and network cost advantages.
Shore-based reefer handling charges apply to a small proportion of the export
and import containers passing through terminals.  For example, in the six
months to December 1997, reefers comprised 15 per cent of the full containers
handled at the Port of Brisbane.
In contrast to container handling charges, shore-based reefer charges were
generally lower at Australian terminals.  Shore-based reefer handling charges at
Hamburg on the European West Bound trade, for instance, were over three
times more than the comparable Australian terminals.  Similar differencesINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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existed across all ports except Philadelphia on the US East Coast trade, which
was lower than the Australian ports with which it was compared.
Excluding the North American trades, shore-based reefer handling charges
generally represent an additional 10 to 15  per  cent on the standard handling
charge for a full container at Australian terminals.3  The difference was more
significant at the overseas terminals in the study with shore-based reefer
handling charges adding, on average, about 27 per cent to the cost of container
stevedoring.
Differences in container stevedoring charges can be explained, in part, by
characteristics of individual terminals and trades.  Characteristics such as scale,
productivity and the composition of the workforce directly affect the cost of
providing stevedoring services.4  And the level of competition (both between
terminal operators within the same port and between ports) influences terminal
operator performance and profitability.5
Comparisons of container stevedoring charges are presented in the following
sections.  They were undertaken on a trade basis using a typical ship to ensure
comparability (see Chapter 1 and Appendix B).  Indices are used to respect the
commercial confidentiality of the container shipping lines that provided data.
US East Coast trade
On the US East Coast trade, the shipping service included in the study
employed container ships in the 1000 to 2000 TEU class.  Data were obtained
for Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney in Australia, and for Philadelphia in the
US.
                                            
3 Charges are significantly higher for all terminals on the North American trades because of
the relatively high use of port-hole containers — representing a 24 to 45 per cent addition to
the standard container handling charge at Australian terminals, and as much as 71 per cent
at some overseas terminals.
4  Work force composition is affected by the proportion of workers working overtime
compared with the use of supplementary workers.  This issue is discussed further in the
Commission’s study ‘Work Arrangements in Container Stevedoring’ (PC 1998).
5 Industry dynamics also influence the comparison of terminal handling charges between
ports.  In particular, about three-quarters of all the container terminal handling contracts in
Australia were renegotiated during the second half of 1996.  This resulted in some major
switches of allegiance — for example AAX, the major South–East Asia trade consortium
switched from Patrick to P&O Ports and the ANSCON consortium switched in the opposite
direction.  In addition, there were important consortia realignments in the South–East Asia
trade and New Zealand trades which altered operating patterns.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Philadelphia is the major entry port for containerised frozen meat shipments
from Australia and New Zealand to East Coast North America (including
Canada).  For the sample service, frozen meat is the dominant North-bound
commodity, and containers destined for the Canadian market are transferred to
rail at an intermodal container transfer facility.
Container stevedoring charges were more than 20 per cent higher at Australian
terminals, when adjusted for the average trade share of 20 and 40 foot
containers.  The greatest difference was at Brisbane, where charges were about
30 per cent higher (see Figure 6.3(a)).
Shore-based reefer charges at all Australian terminals on the trade were also
higher than Philadelphia, with the difference being greatest at Melbourne which
is more than twice as high.  The difference is less pronounced for Sydney and
Brisbane respectively (see Figure 6.3(b)).
Shore-based reefer charges were relatively high in both the US East and West
Coast trades when compared with other trades.  This can be explained, in part,
by greater use of port-hole refrigerated containers, which have high attendant
capital infrastructure costs.  Unlike standard reefer containers, port-hole
containers are not fitted with their own refrigerated system and require separate
blown-air refrigeration units when not connected to the ship’s system.
US West Coast trade
On the US West Coast trade, the shipping service included in the study
employed container ships in the 500 to 1800 TEU class.  Data was obtained for
Melbourne and Sydney in Australia and for Los Angeles.
A significant feature of the US West Coast trade is the relationship between the
container shipping line and the container terminal operator at Los  Angeles.
That is, the container terminal operator at Los Angeles is a subsidiary of an
organisation that also contracts with the container shipping line on the US West
Coast trade to supply feeder and intermodal services management.  This
relationship may be taken into consideration when negotiating container
stevedoring rates.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 6.3 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
US East Coast trade, 1997


















































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
The bounds represent the charges for 40 foot (upper) and 20 foot (lower) containers relative to
the cargo mix weighted average.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Figure 6.4 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
US West Coast trade, 1997






























































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
The bounds represent the charges for 40 foot (upper) and 20 foot (lower) containers relative to
the cargo mix weighted average.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Figure 6.5 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
European East Bound trade, 1997










































































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Figure 6.6 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
European West Bound trade, 1997


























































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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On this trade, Australian container stevedoring charges were between 40 and
50 per cent higher than the Los Angeles terminal.  However, both Melbourne
and Sydney had considerably lower shore-based reefer handling charges than
Los Angeles (see Figure 6.4 (a) and (b)).
European East Bound trade
On the European East Bound trade, the sample service employed container
ships in the 2000 to 3000 TEU class.  Data was obtained for Sydney,
Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle in Australia, Tilbury in England and
Hamburg in Germany.
Adelaide had the highest container stevedoring charges on this trade and was
about 90  per  cent higher than Tilbury.  However, at all other Australian
terminals the charges were higher than for Tilbury — and to a lesser extent
Hamburg (see Figure  6.5(a)).  In contrast, shore-based reefer charges at
Australian terminals were generally less than half those in overseas ports (see
Figure 6.5(b)).
European West Bound trade
On the European West Bound trade, the sample service employed container
ships in the 2000 to 3000 TEU class.  Data was obtained for Sydney,
Melbourne and Fremantle in Australia, Tilbury in England and Hamburg in
Germany.
Container stevedoring charges at Australian terminals were about 70 per cent
higher than for Tilbury — the port with the lowest charge on the trade (see
Figure 6.6(a)).  However, as with the East Bound European trade, shore-based
reefer charges at Australian terminals were considerably lower than either
Tilbury or Hamburg (see Figure 6.6(b)).
South–East Asia trade
On the South–East Asia trade, the sample service employed container ships in
the 1500 to 2500 TEU class.  Data was obtained for Adelaide, Brisbane,
Sydney, Melbourne and Fremantle in Australia, Port Klang in Malaysia and
Singapore.
Container stevedoring charges at the majority of Australian terminals were
about 1.9 times those at Port Klang — the terminal with the lowest charges on
the trade.  The exception is Adelaide which was about 2.4 times higher (see
Figure 6.7(a)).  However, the relatively high charges at Adelaide may, in part,
be explained by the regular scheduling of the port call on a Sunday with
corresponding penalty rates for labour.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Shore-based reefer charges, on the other hand, were considerably lower at
Australian terminals with the lowest being Adelaide.  In comparison, Port Klang
and Singapore were more than 80 and 180 per cent higher, respectively (see
Figure 6.7(b)).
Figure 6.7 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
South–East Asia trade, 1997


































































































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
The bounds represent the charges for 40 foot (upper) and 20 foot (lower) containers relative to
the cargo mix weighted average.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
North Asia trade
On the North Asia trade, the sample service employed container ships in the
1500 to 3000 TEU class.  Data was obtained for Adelaide, Brisbane, Sydney,
Melbourne and Fremantle in Australia, Pusan in South Korea and Nagoya in
Japan.
Some container ship operators on the North Asia trade were reluctant to divulge
their container stevedoring costs.  For the Australian ports, the consultant
(Thompson Clarke Shipping) used the market rate that applied at the time the
consortia (included in the study) negotiated its stevedoring handling charges.6
For the overseas ports, the data were based on published charges with
                                            
6  This occurred at a time when several shipping consortia renegotiated their contracts and
changed their stevedore.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
118
adjustments made for the estimated degree of discounting likely in that port and
the relative market power of the consortia.
The evidence on container stevedoring charges on the North Asia trade is
somewhat mixed.  Although charges at Australian terminals were higher than
Pusan, the difference was not great.  Container stevedoring charges at
Australian terminals were less than those at Nagoya (see Figure  6.8(a)).
Nagoya is reputedly the most expensive container port in Japan.  The favourable
performance of Australian terminals when compared with Nagoya should also
be treated with caution because of the difficulty in obtaining data for this trade.
Figure 6.8 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
North Asia trade, 1997
































































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
The bounds represent the charges for 40 foot (upper) and 20 foot (lower) containers relative to
the cargo mix weighted average.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
In contrast, shore-based reefer charges at all Australian terminals were
considerably lower than either Pusan or Nagoya which were between 75 and
150 per cent higher than those for Adelaide — the cheapest port in Australia
(see Figure 6.8(b)).
New Zealand trade
The ships on the sample service for the New Zealand trade were all less than
1000 TEU capacity.  Furthermore, container ships on the New Zealand trade
sample service were not worked at the major container terminals in Melbourne,6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Sydney and Lyttelton, but at outside berths using shipboard cranes that transfer
containers at a lower rate than specialised shore-based cranes.7
Container stevedoring charges were higher at Australian ports than at the
New Zealand counterparts (see Figure 6.9(a)).  However, container stevedoring
charges for the New Zealand trade were lower than for any other trade at both
Melbourne and Sydney.
Shore-based reefer servicing charges were lower at terminals in Melbourne and
Sydney than at Auckland (see Figure 6.9(b)).  Furthermore, as with container
stevedoring charges, the shore-based reefer charges for this trade were the
lowest for any trade.
Figure 6.9 Index of container stevedoring charges per TEU on the
New Zealand trade, 1997













































































































































Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Note: Index is based on the lowest cost port.
See note on exchange rate in Figure 6.2.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Error! AutoText entry not defined..3 Container terminal
productivity
Container productivity is a key determinant of the cost of providing container
stevedoring services.  Industry-recognised partial indicators of capital
productivity, labour productivity and capital utilisation are examined in this
section.
                                            
7  Ships using shipboard cranes were chosen for the sample because these are typical of the
ships on this trade.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Measures and influences on productivity
Productivity is defined as output per unit of inputs employed.  Improvements in
productivity can result from advances in technology or more efficient use of
inputs, through better utilisation of capital equipment or improved work
practices.
Although overall productivity growth can result from more efficient use of
capital or labour, it is often difficult to isolate the contribution of each.
Increasing the efficiency of labour will also increase the output per unit of
capital and vice versa.  This suggests that approaches that take into account the
contribution of all factors of production (such as total factor productivity
measures or data envelopment analysis) are preferable to partial measures.
However, the data requirements of such measures are considerable.  In addition,
some of the assumptions underlying the analysis do not always hold, making
interpretation difficult.
For practical reasons, the analysis in this section is limited to measures of
labour and capital productivity.  The two industry-recognised partial
productivity measures examined are annual lifts per employee and net crane
rates:
·  Annual lifts per terminal employee — the number of container movements
(box lifts) per terminal employee.  Terminal employees include all those
engaged in terminal activities.  No allowance could be made for hours
worked because these data were not available (see below).
·  Net crane rates — the number of container movements (box lifts) per net
crane hour.  A net crane hour excludes award shift breaks, among other
things.8
These indicators are compared for Australian and overseas terminals.
Caution must be exercised when comparing measures such as ‘crane rates’,
because they may not be defined in the same way.  For this reason, data were
collected specifically for this study to enable consistent measurement of
performance.  Further information on the various measures of ‘crane rates’ are
presented in Box 6.1.
                                            
8 An alternative measure is ‘elapsed rate’ — which the BTCE defines in terms of labour
aboard to labour ashore (BTCE  1997).  Although this measure incorporates different
working arrangements (including scheduled breaks), it understates the actual ‘working rate’
of the crane.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Box 6.1 Capital productivity measures
A number of capital productivity measures are commonly used when discussing stevedore
performance.  They all seek to measure the efficiency of the stevedores in one of their main
tasks — loading and unloading ships.  The measures can differ widely, however.
A first source of difference depends on whether they are  crane rates or ship rates.
·  Crane rates measure productivity on an individual crane basis; that is, the average
number of lifts or TEUs moved over the period by a crane.
·  Ship rates measure the total productivity of loading and unloading a ship, that is the
total number of lifts or TEUs moved over the period.  The measure will therefore
depend, in part, upon the number of cranes in use on the ship.
Productivity measures also differ depending upon how the time period is defined.  The
rates are measured either in terms of elapsed time (the time labour is on to labour off), or
net time, which is equal to elapsed time minus time unable to work the ship due to award
shift breaks, ship’s fault, weather, awaiting cargo, industrial disputes, closed holidays, or
shifts not worked at the ship operator’s request.
The four measures most commonly used are:
Crane rates
·  elapsed crane rate: the number of containers moved per crane per elapsed hour;
·  net crane rate (also known simply as the crane rate): the number of containers
moved per crane per net hour;
Ship rates
·  elapsed rate: the number of containers moved per elapsed hour for the ship; and
·  net rate: the number of containers moved per net hour for the ship.
In making comparisons of capital productivity performance between workplaces, it is
important to compare like with like.  For example, comparing an Australian workplace net
crane rate with an overseas workplace net rate would be invalid.  The former measures
individual crane productivity, the latter total productivity of the ship being worked (and is
therefore dependent on the number of cranes being used).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Differences in measured productivity may reflect differences in operational
characteristics that are outside the control of the operator — for example, the
size of ships and the variability of demand — as well as differences in
underlying performance.  The other influences on productivity are analysed by
comparing the partial labour and capital productivity measures with measures of
the scale of operation, asset utilisation and factor intensity.
Scale of operation
The proposition that larger terminals are likely to be able to achieve greater
productivity through economies of scale is tested by two measures of the scale
of operation, namely:
·  Average exchange per ship call — the average number of containers
exchanged per ship call.  This measure gives an indication of the impact of
job-by-job scale on terminal performance.  When compared with net
cranes rates, average exchange per ship call refers to exchanges on a liner
shipping trade basis (the same basis on which net cranes rates were
collected).  However, annual lifts per terminal employee is a terminal-
wide measure and is therefore compared with average exchange per ship
call for the port as a whole.9
·  Annual terminal throughput per berth metre — the total number of
containers exchanged at the terminal, divided by the total length of
available terminal berth.  This provides a standardised measure of terminal
throughput.
Asset utilisation
Greater productivity is likely to be achieved at higher levels of asset utilisation.
However, economies of massed reserves will also place bounds on the levels of
asset utilisation that can be achieved at smaller ports and terminals.10  The
influence of asset utilisation on terminal performance is examined using
terminal berth occupancy rates:
·  Terminal berth occupancy rates — the percentage of the time container
berths are occupied.  This can be affected by a number of factors,
including the relative variability of ship arrivals, delays at other ports and
terminal productivity.  Very high berth occupancy is not necessarily
optimal, because it may be associated with ship queuing.
                                            
9 Terminal specific data were not available.
10 See Chapter 2.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Factor intensity
The combination of inputs is likely to have some influence on the level of
performance.  However, different combinations of capital and labour can
achieve similar performance depending on the quality of the capital and labour
involved.  The influence of factor intensity on terminal performance is
examined using berth metres per terminal employee and berth metres per
terminal crane:
·  Berth metres per terminal employee — the average number of berth
metres per terminal employee; and
·  Berth metres per terminal crane — the average number of berth metres
per crane.
Capital productivity and asset utilisation
Container terminal operations are typically capital intensive.  However, because
demand — and hence operational intensity — fluctuates, equipment utilisation
is an important measure of overall capital productivity.
Portainer productivity is particularly important because it also reflects the level
of service provided to ship owners.  Ship turnaround time depends on the rate at
which the crane works.  Turning ships around quickly also reduces the
likelihood of berths not being available and ships having to queue at times of
peak demand.
Shippers also potentially benefit from the possibility of lower ‘blue water’
freight rates.  The improved reliability of shipping services assist them in co-
ordinating land-side activities, thereby reducing their overall transport cost.
Crane productivity
Various crane rate measures are widely used as indicators of capital
productivity
in stevedoring (see Box 6.1).  While this is generally appropriate, the crane rate
measures also embody elements of labour productivity (for example, how well
the crane operator works) and management performance.  It is difficult to
separate out these influences to achieve a true capital only productivity
measure.
Crane performance indicators have been collected by various government
agencies since 1989.  Quarterly crane performance indicators were collected by
the WIRA between June 1989 and September 1992.  After a short interval,INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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regular quarterly monitoring was resumed by the Bureau of Transport and
Communications Economics (BTCE) from September 1993.11
There appears to have been significant improvement in net crane rate
performance — measured in TEUs per hour — since the initiation of the WIRA
reforms in 1989, although the rate of improvement has slowed (see
Figure 6.10).  However, some of the observed improvement may be due to a
change in the mix of container sizes, with an increase in the proportion of 40
foot containers (which count as two TEUs).  Between December 1989 and
September 1992, the average annual improvement in net cranes rates was
3.8 per cent; however, this declined to less than 0.7 per cent over the period
September 1993 to June 1997.
Figure 6.10 Net crane rate (TEUs per hour) at Australian
container terminals (five port average), December


























































































































































































































Fitted trend line for illustrative purposes only
y = -0.0007x2 + 1.6988x - 988.16
R2 = 0.8617
Note: Error bars indicate the highest and lowest recorded net crane rates for the five Australian
ports (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle).  The curved line is an
estimated trend.  See Attachment 6A for detail on individual ports.
Source: Waterline, various issues.
The five port average crane rate (measured as containers per hour) at
September 1997 was reported by the BCTE to be 18.3.  This had increased from
                                            
11 There are some differences between the indicators collected by these two agencies.  The
WIRA measure of net crane rate referred to the number of TEUs moved per crane gross
hour, where a gross hour was defined as the elapsed time minus the time unable to work the
ship due to ship’s fault, weather, awaiting cargo, industrial disputes, closed holidays, or
shifts not worked at shipowner’s request.  The BTCE measure of net crane rate refers to the
number of TEUs moved per crane net hours, where a net hour is the same as the WIRA’s
gross time less award shift breaks.  In the first issue of its Waterline series, the BTCE
suggested these differences were ‘... not expected to have a major impact on the analysis’
(BTCE 1994, p. 5).6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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15.9, two years previously.  This measure is almost equivalent to the lifts per
net hour used in this study.12
Notwithstanding these improvements in performance, net crane rates at
Australian terminals were found in this study to be significantly below those at
most of the overseas ports examined (see Figure 6.11).13

































































































































































































































































































Europe East Bound Europe 
West Bound




Australian terminals Overseas terminals
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
The greatest performance differences occurred on the North Asia trade.
However, there were also marked performance gaps on the Europe West bound
                                            
12 A minor source of difference occurs when cranes are capable of lifting two containers
simultaneously.  The Commission would count the movement as a single lift and the BTCE
would count the movement as two lifts.  However, few cranes in Australia are capable of
lifting two containers simultaneously.
13 It is not appropriate to compare the data in Figure 6.11 across trades because of differences
in ship size and the number and composition of container exchanges.  Note that data
presented in Figure 6.10 were an average of the recorded net crane rate at each of
Australia’s five major container ports (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and
Fremantle).  These port net crane rates are in turn averages over all trades and vessel calls
for that port.  The result is a range of net crane rates for the best and worst performing port
(shown by the error bars) around the five port average.  The international comparison of
cranes rates, on the other hand, is based on the average rate experienced by the sample ships
on individual trades at each port.  As such, the net crane rates presented in Figure 6.11 are
not directly comparable with those presented in Figure  6.10.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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and US East coast trades.  The results for the South–East Asia and US West
coast trades were mixed.
The differences highlight the potential gains that may be derived from
increasing crane performance at Australian terminals.  One form these gains
might take is faster turnaround times for container ships.  For example, were
Australian terminals to achieve net crane rates comparable with the best practice
rate on the trades for that sample, cumulative turnaround times for container
ships on some trades could be reduced considerably for most trades (see
Table 6.3).
It is important to note, however, that the potential savings are based on the
difference between terminal and trade best net crane rates and the average box
exchange.  The greater the difference between the terminal’s recorded net crane
rate and the trade best practice rate, the greater the potential time saving per
TEU.  However, if two terminals have the same differential in net crane rate
relative to the trade best rate, the terminal with the greater average box
exchange will have a potentially higher saving in total average exchange time.
Differences in net crane rates among terminals within Australia suggest that the
scope for improvement varies.  For example, analysis of sample data for
Melbourne and Sydney, where terminal throughput is similar, indicates
statistically significant variations in net crane rates between terminals in these
cities.14  The Sydney terminals’ performance was significantly lower than at the
Melbourne terminals.
The analysis suggests that differences in capital and labour productivity at
Sydney and Melbourne are behind the observed difference in net crane rates —
given that variation due to ship type was eliminated.
The analysis also indicated statistically significant differences between liner
shipping trades.  This supports the view that trade-specific characteristics such
as the ship type and the loading and unloading task, have a bearing on net crane
rates.  It highlights the care that must be exercised in making international
comparisons of crane handling rates involving different types of ships.
                                            
14 The results of a two factor (port and ship) statistical analysis of variance.  The F-statistic for
ports was 11.33 (compared with a critical F-statistic of 6.61 at 95 per cent confidence) and
the F-statistic for ships was 9.49 (critical F-statistic 5.05 at 95 per cent confidence).6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Table 6.3 Potential gains from improving net crane rates, 1997

































(hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs)
Adelaide 3.0 5.5 - - 4.6 4.4 3.5 5.0 - - - -
Brisbane - - - - 10.1 10.3 3.5 4.1 2.5 4.5 - -
Fremantle 2.9 4.8 8.9 16.2 - - nil
c nil
c ----
Melbourne 4.7 4.1 13.0 10.0 12.1 6.3 2.6 1.6 7.5 5.1 nil
b nil
b
Sydney 17.3 11.2 26.7 15.1 27.8 15.7 2.9 2.1 6.7 6.7 10.0 10.6
Total 27.9 48.6 54.6 12.5 16.7 10.0
a Although Nagoya had the highest net crane rate for this trade, this represents a terminal rather than
trade average.  To avoid inconsistent comparisons, Pusan was used as the ‘best practice’ rate.
b Potential savings for an exchange of 500 boxes.  Calculated in the same way as ABX but weighted
for a standard 500 box exchange.
c Fremantle is the best performing port on the South–East Asia trade and Melbourne is the best
performing port on the US West Coast trade.
ABX Potential savings per average box exchange.  Calculated by subtracting the total time taken to
unload an average box exchange at the trade ‘best practice’ or highest net crane rate from the total
time taken to unload an average box exchange at the current net crane rate.
- not applicable (terminal not included in sample for this trade).
Note: These savings are based on the sample data which are indicative of the experience of a single ship
on the above trades.  See Chapter 1 and Appendix B for more detail on the study scope and
methodology.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
As noted previously, the ability of Australian terminals to realise net crane rates
achieved at overseas terminals is likely to be influenced not only by terminal
performance, but also by a number of factors that are beyond the terminal
operator’s control.  Some indication of their potential influence can be gained
from Figure 6.12.
For example, the size and nature of the stevedoring task could be expected to
influence net crane rates.  The unloading task at terminating ports such as those
in Australia is complicated by the need to unload specific boxes for final
destinations.  This may involve moving or restowing other containers to gain
access.  Such difficulties are not as significant at large transhipment ports such
as Singapore.  Although the data exhibited a degree of variability, there was
some correlation between job-by-job scale of operation and net crane rates (see
Figure 6.12(a)).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Australian terminals Overseas terminals
rs = -0.421
Note: In each of the charts above, obvious outliers have been excluded from the analysis.
rs The ‘Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient’ presents a measure of correlation between two
data series.  A coefficient of +1 indicates perfect positive correlation, a coefficient of -1
indicates perfect negative correlation and a coefficient of zero indicates no correlation.  For
sample sizes presented above, a coefficient of greater than +0.40 or less than -0.40 indicates a
97 per cent probability that the two series are correlated.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
However, there was a stronger relationship between overall scale and crane
productivity for the overseas terminals in the study, than for the Australian
terminals (see Figure 6.12(c)).
Demand volatility and the lumpy nature of capital investment also influence
performance.15  The more cranes available to work a ship, the greater the
                                            
15 See Chapter 2, Box 2.1 for further discussion.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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potential net crane rate for any one crane.16  However, a generalised industry
standard for investment in a portainer crane is around 50 000 lifts per year.
Most Australian terminals fall below this level of utilisation.  Similarly, most
Australian terminals fail to achieve the berth occupancy rates of the more
productive overseas terminals (see Figure 6.12(b)).
The relatively low throughput and short-term volatility of Australian trades
contribute to the lower crane intensity of Australian terminals when compared
with the overseas terminals in the study.  Australian terminals, for example,
generally have about one crane for every 180 metre of berth, less than half the
intensity of some overseas terminals (see Figure 6.12(d)).
Labour productivity
On average, box lifts per terminal employee at Australian terminals were
significantly lower than at overseas terminals.  For example, one terminal at the
Port of Hamburg averaged around 1600 box lifts per employee per year,
compared with between 500 and 800 for Australian terminals.  The only
overseas terminal in the study with lower performance (in terms of box lifts per
employee) was Philadelphia (see Figure 6.13).
Although there was observable variation in performance at any given Australian
terminal on a trade-by-trade basis, it is unclear whether this is atypical when
compared with overseas terminals.  For all overseas terminals, except Tilbury
and Hamburg, data were collected for a single trade, precluding judgements of
variability in performance between trades at a given terminal.  In the case of
Hamburg, where information is available, there was considerable variability in
performance between the European East bound and West bound trades.
                                            
16 That is, the greater the number of cranes working a ship, the less time lost in moving the
crane to access different holds.  There are of course limits placed on this by congestion and
also by ship size.  With some smaller ships the achievable net crane rate is limited by the
ship’s ability to maintain stability by adjusting its ballast.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 6.13 Container lifts per terminal employee by terminal, 1997




























Annual container lifts per employee (boxes)
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Overall, the relatively small scale of container operations is likely to limit the
ability of Australian terminals to match the levels of labour performance
experienced in the largest terminals included in the study.17
There appears to be some positive correlation between the overall scale of
terminal activity and labour performance (see Figure 6.14(c)).  However, the
number of container transfers — scale on a job-by-job basis — does not appear
to have a significant correlation with labour productivity (see Figure 6.14(a)).18
                                            
17 Four of the ten international ports benchmarked in this study have a greater annual
throughput than Australia as a whole (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1).
18 One possible explanation for the weak relationship between performance and scale on a job-
by-job basis may be the different types of operations performed at the larger international
terminals.  For example, receival and delivery operations at ports such as Singapore are
relatively less significant because they are trans-shipment ports.  In comparison, receival and
delivery operations are likely to be more significant at smaller terminating ports such as
Melbourne.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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rs = -0.428
Note: In each of the charts above, obvious outliers have been excluded from the analysis.
rs The ‘Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient’ presents a measure of correlation between two
data series.  A coefficient of +1 indicates perfect positive correlation, a coefficient of -1
indicates perfect negative correlation and a coefficient of zero indicates no correlation.  For the
sample sizes above, a coefficient of greater than +0.40 or less than -0.40 indicates a 97 per cent
probability that the two series are correlated.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
There is a weak positive correlation between asset utilisation and labour
performance (see Figure 6.14(b)).  The lower performing Australian terminals
generally also have considerably lower berth occupancy rates than the more
productive overseas terminals.
The international level of workforce intensity averages one employee for every
2 to 4 metres of berth (see Figure  6.14(d)).  Although generally within this
range, Australian terminals exhibit significantly lower performance than mostINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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overseas terminals.  This may result from different work arrangements or the
application of labour to different tasks.  Further information on work
arrangements is in the Commission’s study ‘Work Arrangements in Container
Stevedoring’ (PC 1998).
Limitations of analysis
Caution has been used in drawing conclusions from this information on labour
productivity for a number of reasons.  First, as discussed above, the use of
partial productivity indicators has inherent limitations.  Second, it was not
always possible for the consultant (Thompson Clarke Shipping) to obtain
consistent responses across all ports — that is, although some data were
obtained from container operators on an individual trade basis, other data
related to a terminal as a whole.19  Similarly, as the majority of the data were
supplied by terminal operators based on their information systems, differences
in these information systems may have resulted in some measures deviating
from the prescribed definition.
Comparing ports on the basis of container lifts per terminal employee (for
example in Figure 6.13) also has limitations.  A range of factors may influence
the comparability of the results.  In particular, this measure takes no account of
the number of hours worked by each employee, nor the mix of permanent and
casual employees.  Taking account of these factors could only alter the
conclusion that there is scope for improvement if, on average, foreign workers
worked considerably longer hours than Australian workers.
The definition of terminal employee includes all employees, not just those
directly involved in stevedoring operations.  Data on the composition of
terminal employees were not available to the Commission.  However,
differences in the composition of employees are unlikely to be so large as to
make a significant difference.
                                            
19 The total terminal activity is the sum of terminal activity on all trades serviced.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Error! AutoText entry not defined..4 Timeliness and reliability of
container operations
Timeliness and reliability are among the most important problems facing users
of the Australian waterfront.  Timeliness and reliability are particularly
important to shippers of containerised cargo because of its relatively high value,
and time sensitive nature (compared with bulk cargo).
Poor timeliness and reliability adversely affect waterfront users in several ways.
Unreliability directly raises the cost of using the waterfront through its effect on
shipping schedules and terminal charges.  The number of port calls a ship can
make is reduced and the ability of container ship operators to maintain
schedules is adversely affected (see Box  6.3).  It also amplifies time-related
terminal charges.  For example, unreliability may result in stevedores working
through periods that attract high overtime rates.
Poor reliability indirectly increases the cost of using the waterfront by
constraining productivity and limiting resource management options.  For
instance, poor reliability adversely impacts on a container terminal operator’s
ability to efficiently plan capital utilisation.  Similarly, poor reliability restricts
the ability of importers and exporters to take advantage of just-in-time delivery
of cargo.
Box 6.3 The cost of unreliability on shipping schedules
The cost of poor waterfront reliability on shipping schedules is illustrated by the
experience of one of the container ship operators in the study.  This operator employs a
fleet of 7 ships in the Australia–US West Coast trade.
This operator has found it necessary to employ one additional ship in order to protect
schedule integrity against delays on the Australian coast — an asset utilisation
contingency factor of 14 per cent.  Thompson Clarke Shipping estimate that this
contingency factor represents an annual cost of at least US $7.0 million.  If other major
container operators in the Australia–US West Coast trade have built in comparable
contingency factors, Australian waterfront ‘unreliability contingency costs’ could represent
around US $20 million each year in that trade sector alone.
Based on the 1996 total round trade of about 97 000 TEUs between Australia and the US
West Coast, this cost penalty can be expressed as the approximate equivalent of A$215
per TEU.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The reliability of container terminal services affects the reliability of waterfront
services.  In addition, the actions of importers and exporters can affect the
commencement of the service — which, taken together with delays in providing
the service, adversely affects overall timeliness and reliability.
Timeliness and reliability performance of Australian terminals
Berth availability is a key factor influencing the timeliness and reliability of
container services.20  Delays in securing a berth upon arrival may cascade into
delays in unloading (loading) and departure on the next leg of the voyage.  They
may also force stevedoring tasks across shifts, or into penalty-related time
frames.
Berth availability generally appears to be a greater problem in Sydney than in
most overseas terminals (see Figure 6.15).  This may be of concern given the
volume of container trade passing through this port — more than twice that of
most other Australian ports (except Melbourne).21  However, the small sample
size from which the data are drawn make it difficult to be conclusive.
Cost and sources of delays
Shipping lines were approached for additional data regarding the cost and
source of delays for ships using Australian ports in 1996–97.  The definitions
are based on those of the individual shipping lines which supplied the data and
may vary considerably among shipping lines.  This makes detailed comparisons
of data from different shipping lines difficult.
                                            
20 Berth availability was measured as the proportion of ship arrivals that could access a berth
within four hours of the advised arrival time.  (This assumes that the terminal operator is
advised of the arrival time by the shipping agent more than 24 hours prior to actual arrival).
21 As the major terminating ports in Australia, Sydney and Melbourne are also especially
vulnerable to whatever delay factors may be imposed on them by other ports as well as
themselves.  For example, a poorly designed loading plan at an overseas terminal may
reduce delays (and loading time) at that port but increase them at the unloading end where
multiple lifts and restows are necessary to access containers that are to be unloaded at their
final destination.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Figure 6.15 Berth availability
(a) Europe West Bound (b) Europe East Bound
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Note: Berth availability relates to the percentage of arrivals able to berth within four hours of an
  arrival time that was advised by the shipping agent more than 24 hours prior to arrival.
Nagoya (North Asia) and the New Zealand trade lane have been excluded because no
meaningful data were collected.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping Pty Ltd (consultant).
Information was collected on the length and source of delays.  Delays of less
than four hours are generally considered unexceptional in a trading environment
and are not recorded by shipping lines.  The major sources of delay identified
were berth availability, congestion, industrial disruption and ‘other’:INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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·  Berth availability — indicates a delay because a berth was not available,
for whatever reason.  Note that this measure of berth availability does not
assume the terminal was notified of the ship’s arrival time.  In some cases
failure to notify the ship’s arrival time may result in berths being
unavailable;
·  Congestion — indicates a delay because the ship was unable to berth at
the terminal, because of traffic congestion;
·  Industrial disruption — indicates a delay caused by a formal industrial
dispute.  Disputes in land transport, pilotage or any other port service
could be included; and
·  Other — delays for any other reason, mainly adverse weather.22
A ship can be delayed for more than one reason, such as berth availability on
the way in and congestion on the way out.  It is also important to note that these
categories are not mutually exclusive.  For example, industrial relations
problems other than formal ‘disputes’, such as ‘go slows’, can affect both berth
availability and congestion, while not being recorded as a dispute.
Table 6.4 Proportion of ships delayed in Australian ports by port,
1996–97 (per cent)
Port




26 25 27 10 14 21
a Only includes ships delayed for 4 hours or more.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
Notwithstanding some variation among liner shipping trades, about one-fifth of
the sample experienced some sort of delay when calling at Australian ports (see
Table 6.4).  Around a quarter of ships visiting Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane
experienced delays.
The survey results indicated that, for a five port average, berth unavailability
was classified as the cause of delay in 24  per  cent of cases, congestion in
28 per cent, and formal industrial disputes in 19 per cent of cases.  The category
‘other’ (mainly weather) accounted for delays in 31 per cent of cases.
                                            
22 For the purposes of this study, delays due to ship malfunction or agreed ship rescheduling
were excluded.6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Cumulatively, these delays represent a direct cost to shipping lines of the order
of A$500 000 per year (see Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Summary of shipping line survey of ship delays, 1997
Trades
Experience in Australian ports Unit Europe US Asia
Proportion of calls delayed (%) 22 18 17
Average delay per call (hrs) 3.0 2.1 1.7
Delay per voyage in Australia (hrs) 10.4 4.9 8.5
Delay per ship per year (hrs) 45.2 29.7 88.1
Service days lost in Australia per
year
(days) 22.6 17.3 18.4
Opportunity cost per year
a (A$’000) $565 $432 $460
a This cost is calculated assuming a time charter rate of about A$25 000 per day for a 2500 TEU
container ship, and is a function of the delay hours incurred in each service, the number of
Australian port calls, the length of the international voyage and the number of ships in the service.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.
Timeliness of container receival and delivery
Data were collected on six indicators of the timeliness of the delivery and
collection of containers to and from container terminals:
·  Export cargo cut-off — the time at which terminals cut-off receival of
export boxes was obtained from some terminals;
·  Export cargo truck waiting — the average time from a truck arriving at a
terminal until it is issued a gate pass to deliver a box;
·  Export cargo box off-load — the time from gate in to gate out after
delivering a container;
·  Import cargo FCL availability — the time at which a full container is
available for pick up from a container terminal;
·  Import cargo truck waiting — the average time from a truck arriving at a
terminal until it is issued a gate pass to pick up a box; and
·  Import cargo box load — the time from gate in to gate out after picking up
a container.
The overall results do not reveal any patterns that might assist Australian port
authorities or shipping and terminal operators to improve the timeliness of
container receival and delivery.  However, there is evidence that delays at someINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Australian ports are much greater than those typically experienced at overseas
ports.
One of the possible reasons why Australian terminals compare poorly with
overseas ports is the mismatch of working hours between the waterfront and the
land-side delivery, warehousing and distribution facilities (see Chapter  10).
Although container terminals are manned to service their shipping customers 24
hours a day for 360 days a year, most land-side operators generally work 8
hours a day for 260 days a year.
Error! AutoText entry not defined..5 Summing up
Container stevedoring charges, labour and capital productivity and timeliness
and reliability were benchmarked.  The results indicate that, overall, Australian
performance lags significantly behind that achieved in other ports.
For the services examined in the study, container stevedoring charges were
significantly higher at Australian container terminals than at any of the overseas
terminals (except Nagoya).  This may be explained, in part, by the scale
diseconomies faced by Australian terminals.  However, New Zealand terminals,
faced with similar conditions, are performing better.
Conversely, shore-based reefer handling charges were generally lower at
Australian terminals (excluding the East Coast US trades).  The reason for the
different outcome for reefers relative to the general container charge is unclear.
A contributing factor may be the highly competitive nature of the international
trade in meat products.
The international comparisons of indicators of labour and capital productivity
indicate scope to improve performance.  Although average net crane rates have
improved since 1989 at Australian terminals, they were significantly below
those at most of the overseas ports examined in this study.
The potential gains from matching best performance outcomes would be
significant.  For example, if Australian terminals could achieve net crane rates
comparable with those of the best performing terminals on the trades for this
sample, cumulative turnaround times for container ships on some trades could
be reduced by as much as 2 days.  However, given the thinness and variability
of the trade serviced at Australian terminals, it is unlikely that they could
achieve the productivity levels of the largest terminals in this study.
The data relating to timeliness and reliability, although limited, indicated
relatively poor performance at key Australian ports.  Survey data for Australia
suggest that about one-fifth of ships experience some sort of delay calling at6   STEVEDORING — CONTAINERS
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Australian ports, with Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne experiencing the
greatest delays.
Taken together, these results reveal significant scope for improvement in the
performance of container stevedoring in Australia.140
Attachment 6A — Net cranes rates at Australian ports between December 1989 and June 1997
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Source: Waterline, various issues.141
7 STEVEDORING — BREAK-BULK CARGO
There are a range of techniques used in the stevedoring of break-
bulk cargo, depending on the nature of the cargo.  Stevedoring of
hot-rolled coil, motor vehicles, timber, pulp and newsprint were
benchmarked.
Charges at Australian ports were found to be high compared to other
ports in the study.  Service levels were found to be comparable.
The term ‘break-bulk’ refers to general cargo which is carried ‘loose’ or in
unitised form.  Break-bulk cargo is not containerised, generally because the
physical characteristics (weight or dimensions) of break-bulk cargo are not
suited to transportation in containers.  It may be palletised, boxed, coiled or
bundled.  Examples of break-bulk cargo include iron and steel, timber, metal
ingots, motor vehicles, machinery and paper products.
As noted in Chapter  2, break-bulk cargo shipped through Australian ports
represented about 22 per cent of the value of total imports by sea in 1995–96
and 10 per cent by volume.  Exports of break-bulk cargo represented  about
5 per cent of all sea exports by value and about 3 per cent by volume.
Stevedoring of break-bulk cargo involves both ship-based and shore-based
stevedoring.  This chapter deals with shore-based stevedoring.1
7.1 Break-bulk operations
In Australia, most break-bulk cargo is shipped through the ports of Melbourne
and Sydney (see Table 7.1).  Some regional ports also play an important role —
Newcastle, Hastings and Port Kembla are major iron and steel ports.
Several types of ships are used in the shipment of break-bulk cargo, depending
on the nature of the cargo.  Break-bulk may be carried on conventional cargo
ships together with containers.  It is also carried on roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) ships
specifically designed to carry break-bulk cargo, which can be loaded or
unloaded using wheeled transport.  There are also several types of specialised
                                            
1 Ship-based stevedoring involves moving the cargo over the ship’s rail.  Shore-based
stevedoring involves moving the cargo from the ship’s rail to the sorting and stacking areas.
The charge for ship-based stevedoring is typically included in the blue water freight rate.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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ships used — pure car carriers (PCCs), reefer ships equipped to carry palletised
meat, specialised forest products and livestock carriers.
Table 7.1 Non-containerised general cargo throughput, selected ports,
1996–97
Port Non-containerised general cargo Share of total cargo throughput
(‘000 tonnes) (%)
Sydney 806 3.8




Total 4 562 5.2
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on BTCE Waterline 11, June 1997.
Stevedoring of break-bulk cargo is traditional stevedoring.  Unlike container
stevedoring, it is relatively labour intensive and there is limited scope to
substitute labour with capital.
Techniques used in the loading and unloading break-bulk cargo can range from
using ship’s cranes or derricks, to in the case of motor vehicles, the goods being
driven on and off the ship.
Loading and unloading may include the use of hooks, slings, nets, mechanical
or magnetic grabs or vacuum handling equipment in the case of newsprint.
Cargo may be lifted to or from trucks directly under the hook or carried by fork
lifts to storage areas in the case of timber.  In some cases, there is significant
handling and stowing activity on board the ship.
Like the container trades, most importers and exporters of break-bulk cargo do
not have a direct relationship with the stevedore, who is engaged by the
shipping line.7   STEVEDORING — BREAK-BULK CARGO
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7.2 Benchmarking break-bulk stevedoring
The shore-based stevedoring of four break-bulk cargoes — hot-rolled coil,
motor vehicles, timber, pulp and newsprint — were benchmarked in this study.
These cargoes were chosen in consultation with industry participants.
The case studies concentrated on outcomes for importers and exporters in terms
of charges incurred and the timeliness and reliability of services.  This is a
slightly different focus than previous studies, which concentrated on labour
productivity and charges, but did not include information on timeliness and
reliability.
The disparate nature of break-bulk cargo and the variety of ships carrying it,
make it difficult to monitor performance on a consistent basis over time and
between ports.2  Some performance data have been published by the Bureau of
Transport Communications and Economics (BTCE 1995), the Prices
Surveillance Authority (PSA 1994) and the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE
1995a).  These reports concentrated on labour productivity and stevedoring
charges.  All found that although stevedoring charges had fallen since the
WIRA reforms, they remained high by international standards.
Many importers and exporters of break-bulk commodities do not systematically
collect or have readily available information on reliability, timeliness and cargo
integrity (damage).  The lack of such information limits the ability of importers
and exporters to pressure service providers for improved performance.
Hot-rolled coil
Hot-rolled coil is a steel product made from hot rolling steel slabs.  It is
processed and used in the manufacture of such products as automobiles,
refrigerators, pipes and steel cans.
The Commission obtained performance information for the ports of Durban
(South Africa), Philadelphia (USA), Auckland (New Zealand) and Port Kembla
(Australia).
Completely built up motor vehicles
Completely built up (CBU) motor vehicles are imported through the ports of
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Fremantle, Adelaide and to a lesser extent
Darwin and Townsville.  They are exported through the ports of Adelaide and
                                            
2 It is also possible that differences in charges may reflect differences in the services provided
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Melbourne.  Motor vehicles are shipped on either ro-ro ships or PCCs.  PCCs
are purpose-built, car-carrying ships to make loading and unloading
straightforward.
Generally, there are three components to the charges incurred by shippers in
importing CBU motor vehicles through Australian ports — a port services
charge (levied by the shipping line), wharfage (levied by the port authority) and
a sorting and stacking charge (levied by the stevedore).  Charges are typically
levied on a per cubic metre basis, but can be levied on a per unit or vehicle
basis.
Unloading involves stevedores unlashing the vehicles and driving them down a
ship’s ramp into the wharf sorting and stacking area (vice versa for loading).  A
number of motor vehicle importers contract out pre-delivery care.  In some
cases, companies providing pre-delivery care have car compounds located on or
adjacent to the wharf.
As with container shipping, the choice of stevedore rests with the shipping line.
Generally, importers and exporters have no contractual relationship with the
stevedore.  However, shippers are involved in monitoring performance.  For
example, the Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries (FCAI) has established
a transport committee which meets regularly to discuss issues relating to the
transportation of motor vehicles.3
The Commission obtained some performance information for the ports of
Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle and Amsterdam (Netherlands).
Timber
Timber is shipped in importer or exporter lots known as marks.  There are a
number of packs of timber per mark, when timber is loaded onto a ship the
marks are split and the timber is stowed ship to length.4  Ship’s gear are used to
load and unload timber from the ship.  Once unloaded, timber is moved to the
sorting area and re-sorted into marks, ready for collection.
At Australian ports, importers of timber generally incur wharfage (charged by
the port authority), area hire (charged either by the port authority or the
stevedore) and a charge for shore-based stevedoring.5  The level of charges can
vary on the basis of conversions used (hard versus soft), gross and net sizes and
                                            
3 The committee has representatives from the four Australian manufacturers (Ford, Holden,
Toyota and Mitsubishi) and three importers (Honda, Nissan and Mazda).
4 The packs of timber are stowed on the basis of timber length.
5 Shore-based stevedoring typically includes running back from the hook to the sorting area,
sorting to mark and loading trucks for delivery.7   STEVEDORING — BREAK-BULK CARGO
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the dimensions of the timber.  In addition, all timber imported into Australia
must be inspected by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS)
before it is released.
Forest Products Terminal in Melbourne and Timber Tallying in Sydney provide
specialised stevedoring for forest products such as timber.  Forest Products
Terminal is a joint venture between the Strang Stevedoring group and a
consortium of the major Victorian timber importers.  Forest Products Terminal
are able to provide an integrated service from the discharge of ships, handling,
quarantine inspection, warehousing, transport and delivery.  The joint venture
also provides importers with greater control over stevedoring operations.
The Commission obtained performance information for the ports of Melbourne,
Grangemouth (Scotland), Hull (England) and Barking (England).
Pulp and newsprint
Pulp and newsprint are shipped either in conventional ships or in specialised
forest product ships (which are loaded from the side).  Pulp units are formed by
strapping together bales of pulp into 1.8 tonne packs.  Pulp units are loaded and
unloaded using cranes with special clamps or slung with hooks.
Newsprint is transported loose in reels which can vary in diameter and weight
— the average height is one metre and weight 1.2 tonnes.  Handling
requirements are strictly controlled because of the high value of newsprint and
the sensitivity of newsprint to damage.  It is loaded and unloaded using cranes
and paper side clamps or specially designed vacuum lifting equipment.
The Commission obtained performance information for the ports of Brisbane,
Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide, Devonport and Tauranga (New Zealand).
7.3 Performance
The level of charges is a relevant measure of performance.  It provides an
indication of the cost to importers and exporters of transporting their goods.  It
is, however, only one element of performance — timeliness, reliability and
cargo integrity are also important.
Charges
On the basis of the information provided to the Commission, shore-based
stevedoring charges incurred by importers of break-bulk cargo were consistently
higher at Australian ports than at overseas ports (see Figure 7.1).  Shore-based
stevedoring charges levied on motor vehicle importers at Australian ports wereINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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up to 1.3 times those overseas, with one exception.  Charges at the Port of
Amsterdam were 1.3 times those at Fremantle.
Shore-based stevedoring charges levied on timber importers included in the
sample were between 1.5 and 2 times those overseas.  Charges levied on pulp
and newsprint importers were up to 2.5 times those overseas.
Higher charges at Australian ports may reflect poor stevedoring productivity,
higher labour costs or market power.
Figure 7.1 Ratio of shore-based stevedoring charges levied by
















































Motor vehicles Timber Pulp and newsprint
Notes: Each data point corresponds to the ratio of charges at an Australian port compared to an
overseas port.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates derived from data provided by importers and exporters.
Shore-based stevedoring charges are not the only costs incurred by shippers of
break-bulk cargo — others include site or area hire, port authority cargo-based
charges and quarantine or clearance charges.
For the ports included in the study, total charges incurred by importers of break-
bulk cargoes were higher at Australian ports than at overseas ports
(see Figure 7.2).  Total charges at Australian ports were up to 3.7 times those7   STEVEDORING — BREAK-BULK CARGO
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levied overseas.6  Total charges on motor vehicle importers were up to 1.6 times
those overseas and charges on timber importers were between 2 and 2.5 times.
Wharfage is levied on break-bulk cargo at all Australian ports to recover some
of the costs of providing port infrastructure.  In contrast, most overseas ports do
not levy wharfage (for example, the ports of Hull, Barking, Grangemouth and
Amsterdam).  At ports where wharfage is not charged, the provision of port
infrastructure is likely to be recovered through ship-based charges.  If these
ship-based charges were included it is likely that the difference between
Australian charges and overseas charges would be less.  This provides a further
example of the difficulties in making meaningful comparisons of charges
between ports (see Chapters 4 and 5).
















































Motor vehicles       Pulp and newsprint Timber Hot rolled coil
Notes: Total charges include stevedoring, port authority and clearance charges.
Each data point corresponds to the ratio of charges at an Australian port compared to an
overseas port.
Source: Productivity Commission estimates derived from data provided by importers and exporters.
Comparing shore-based stevedoring charges (Figure  7.1) with total charges
(Figure  7.2), the ratios between Australia and overseas generally remain the
same, at between one and just under three.  In most cases, the relatively higher
                                            
6 The disparity in total charges for hot rolled coil between Australia and overseas is likely to
reflect significant differences in the wages of stevedoring labour.  For example, stevedoring
wages at Australian ports are up to 10 times higher than at the Port of Durban.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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shore-based stevedoring charges at Australian ports are the major determinant of
total charges.
The most significant difference in ratios is in the case of timber — shore-based
stevedoring charges were between 1.5 and 2 times higher and total charges were
between 2 and 2.5 times higher.  This reflects higher port authority, site hire and
clearance charges at Australian ports relative to overseas ports.
Service
Although the level of stevedoring charges is important, importers and exporters
of break-bulk cargo are also concerned with the timeliness and reliability of
stevedoring operations, as well as wanting to minimise damage to their cargo.7
Importers and exporters want reliable and timely services delivered at a
reasonable price.  A lack of timeliness and reliability can impose significant
costs on importers and exporters, including additional storage costs, the cost of
making alternative arrangements and the cost of damage.
Timeliness and reliability
Delays in the availability of cargo can result in additional costs associated with
the inability to deliver goods to customers on time, additional storage costs and
lost customers.  The time taken to complete stevedoring operations and the time
taken before cargo can be collected from the wharf impact on timeliness and
reliability.
Timeliness and reliability are particularly important in the case of motor
vehicles, because of the cyclical nature of the market.  Most motor vehicle sales
are completed at the end of the month or at Christmas and Easter.  It is
important for dealers to have sufficient stock on hand at these times to avoid
loss of sales.
Infrequent ship calls to some ports can exacerbate this problem.  For example,
at the Port of Fremantle there is generally only one shipment of motor vehicles
per month.  A number of importers are likely to be awaiting the discharge of
motor vehicles which can result in congestion at the terminal and cause delays
for dealers.
Timeliness is, in part, determined by the time taken between the discharge of
cargo and the availability of cargo for collection.  At Australian ports, motor
vehicles and pulp and newsprint are generally available for collection from the
                                            
7 Timeliness is a measure of the time taken for a service to be provided.  Reliability is a
measure of the variability of performance.7   STEVEDORING — BREAK-BULK CARGO
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wharf after 2 and 3 working days respectively.  At the Port of Philadelphia, hot-
rolled coil is generally available for collection ten days after it is unloaded.  At
the ports of Hull and Grangemouth, timber is generally available for collection
two days after it has been unloaded.
Generally, at Australian and overseas ports, stevedores require less than 24
hours notice before importers can collect their cargo.
At the major Australian ports, importers of break-bulk cargo have 3 days of free
storage on the wharf, before a storage charge is incurred.  This can cause
problems especially in the case of timber, which has to be inspected by AQIS
before it can be removed from the wharf.  If AQIS has not inspected the timber
within 3 days, importers incur additional storage charges.
At overseas ports, free storage on the wharf varies from 3 days at the Port of
Durban, 5 days at Philadelphia, up to 10 days at the Port of Grangemouth and
up to 14 days at the ports of Hull and Amsterdam.
On the basis of the information provided, cargo is generally available for
collection at the scheduled time at both Australian and overseas ports.  When
delays do occur they average between 1 to 2 days.  On average there is a
maximum delay of 2 days in the availability for collection of motor vehicles at
Australian ports.  Similar delays occur at the Port of Amsterdam.
Importers and exporters identified the following as typical causes of delays at
Australian ports:
·  late arrival of ships;
·  problems with documentation;
·  industrial disputes;
·  berth congestion;
·  unavailability of equipment; and
·  problems with the clearance of cargo.
Importers and exporters identified the following as typical causes of delays at
overseas ports:
·  the late arrival of ships;
·  problems with documentation;
·  berth congestion; and
·  problems with the clearance of cargo.
In contrast to Australia, importers and exporters did not identify industrial
disputes and unavailability of equipment as causes of delays at overseas ports.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Cargo integrity
The integrity of cargo can be a significant issue in the shipment of break-bulk
cargo, because of the way in which it is shipped, loaded and unloaded.
Compared to containerised cargo, break-bulk cargo is relatively unprotected and
exposed to damage both in transit and in loading and unloading.
Damaged cargo imposes additional costs on importers and exporters, be it the
cost of repairing damage or the value of goods written off in extreme cases.
Furthermore, damaged cargo can result in additional production costs.  For
example, modern newsprint presses run at high speed and if the reel is out of
shape, nicked or damaged in any way, press runs can be stopped or delayed.
In most cases importers and exporters have insurance cover for cargo both in
transit and during the loading and unloading process.
On the basis of the information provided to the Commission it appears that the
level of service in Australia is comparable to that overseas.151
8 STEVEDORING — BULK
The stevedoring of wheat and fertiliser were benchmarked.  These
are the only two bulk commodities for which contract stevedoring
services are engaged.
On average, the Australian Wheat Board pays substantially less for
stevedoring services than typical charges at North American ports.
The stevedoring of bulk fertiliser in Australia is more expensive than
New Zealand, where product is discharged at a faster rate by use of
additional labour.
The principle bulk cargoes handled at Australian ports are coal, petroleum
products and refinery feedstock, iron ore, alumina, wheat, sugar and fertiliser.
Most are handled at specialised bulk-handling facilities in a relatively small
number of ports located close to the commodity’s source (or destination).  Two
exceptions are wheat and fertiliser, which are handled at 17 and 21 ports
respectively.
Arrangements at bulk terminals and ports are quite different from container
operations.  Terminals for most bulk commodities are closely integrated with
production facilities and transport operations.  For example, Alcoa Australia
uses its own ships to transport alumina from its terminals in Western Australia
to its terminals in Victoria.
Previous benchmarking studies revealed that Australia’s bulk terminal
operational performance to be among the best in the world for some
commodities (BIE 1995a).  For example, Australian coal export terminals were
found to have relatively high labour productivity and capital utilisation,
consistent with observed lower terminal charges.
In work undertaken by the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and the Queensland
Sugar Corporation (QSC), the performance of Australian wheat and sugar
terminals was found to be good by international standards, although there is
some over capitalisation of grain exporting facilities.1  The QSC reported
Australian sugar terminal handling costs to be about half of those in Thailand
and about one eighth as expensive as South Africa.  The AWB did not compare
terminal or stevedoring charges.
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The vertically integrated nature of most bulk industries makes it difficult to
identify and obtain the cost of stevedoring.  Stevedoring activities are
undertaken ‘in-house’, usually by terminal employees who also perform other
functions.  Even when the cost of stevedoring can be isolated, terminal
operators will not disclose it.
Wheat and fertiliser are the only two bulk commodities for which contract
stevedoring services are engaged.  Stevedores play a major role in the discharge
of fertiliser, but a relatively minor role in loading export wheat.
8.1 Wheat
Australia is the fourth largest wheat exporter, behind the United States, Canada
and the European Community.  Australia produced 17 million tonnes of wheat
in 1995–96.2  Although this represented just over 3 per cent of 1995–96 world
production, 70  per  cent of Australia’s harvest was exported, accounting for
about 14 per cent of world trade (Gordon et al 1997).  Cereal grains, of which
wheat is by far the largest item, accounted for 7  per  cent of Australian
merchandise exports in 1996–97 (ABS 1997).
The AWB is the statutory ‘single desk’ seller of Australian wheat.  It markets
wheat and other grains on behalf of Australian growers.  It also provides finance
to growers during the post-harvest period before revenue from wheat sales is
received.
Grain storage and handling is undertaken primarily by five Bulk Handling
Corporations (BHCs), one in each mainland State.  Each BHC operates a
network of country receival and storage facilities connected by road or rail
transport to seaboard export terminals also owned by the BHC.  Bulk wheat is
usually stored temporarily within the terminals and value-adding services such
as blending are sometimes undertaken before the wheat is loaded onto ships.
Most Australian export wheat is sold ‘free-on-board, stowed and trimmed’.3
The remainder (about 25 to 30  per  cent) is sold ‘cost and freight’ or ‘cost,
insurance and freight’.  The AWB engages the BHCs, together with providers of
                                            
2 In 1994–95, Australia produced just 9 million tonnes as a result of the drought throughout
eastern grain growing states.  Almost 90 per cent of this harvest was exported.
3 ‘Stowed and trimmed’ refers to loading the wheat into all corners of the hold and smoothing
it so that it sits level just below the hold’s top edge.8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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transport services, to handle the movement of bulk wheat from country receival
facilities to ‘ex-spout’ at the terminal.4
Stevedoring services consist of stowing and trimming the wheat on board the
ship.  The AWB engages stevedoring services at each port by tender.
The cost of stevedoring services for the AWB averaged around 25 cents per
tonne in 1996–97.  This represents a decrease of 70 per cent in real terms since
late 1989, when the average cost was about 70 cents per tonne.5  The AWB was
not prepared to disclose port-specific stevedoring cost data because contractual
arrangements between itself and stevedores are confidential.
The average Australian cost was significantly lower than typical stevedoring
costs at four major grain handling North American ports — approximately half
the cost at Vancouver, Prince Rupert and New Orleans, and one fifth the cost at
Portland (USA) (see Figure 8.1).  The ports of Vancouver, New Orleans and
Portland (USA) have multiple grain terminals.  Approximately 40 per cent of
US wheat exports are handled though Portland (USA).
Figure 8.1 Cost of stevedoring bulk wheat, 1996–97






Australian cents per tonne
Notes: Costs at overseas ports are typical only.  Actual costs can vary widely over time, between
terminals, and depending on the quantity loaded.
Source: Asia World Shipping (consultant) and Australian Wheat Board.
                                            
4 ‘Ex-spout’ refers to that stage of the transportation and handling chain when wheat has been
released from the BHCs’ loading infrastructure into the ship.
5 Note that prior to 1990, the AWB did not directly incur stevedoring costs.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The reduction in stevedoring costs in Australia commenced with the waterfront
reform processes overseen by the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority
(WIRA) during 1989–92.  Prior to 1989, stevedoring for grains (like many other
commodities) was overmanned, inefficient and over priced.  Since l989, a
number of changes have occurred within the industry that have had a positive
and lasting effect on grain export productivity.  In essence, these changes are:
·  reductions in the on-board labour requirement for grain loading;
·  introduction by BHCs of continuous loading at grain ports on a two shifts
minimum of 14 hours with availability on a 7 day basis; and
·  the AWB competitively tendering for provision of stevedoring services by
stevedoring companies.
The results of these initiatives have been:
·  a reduction of stevedoring manning by up to 75 per cent;
·  a reduction in stevedoring costs of around 70 per cent;
·  a reduction in actual loading time for grain vessels from 4.5 days in
1988–89 to around 1.6 days in 1996; and
·  creation of a positive performance history with international grain buyers
and ship owners.
The AWB changed its Charter Party in early 1990 to allow for ships to be
stowed and trimmed.  By taking responsibility for engaging stevedoring
services, the AWB could negotiate from a position of strength, facilitating
performance improvement.
Previously, wheat was sold free on board, with the buyer responsible for the
product ex-spout.  The shipping company acted on behalf of the buyer in
engaging stevedoring services.  This arrangement meant that the AWB did not
have a contractual relationship with the stevedores, even though it had most to
gain from efficient loading.
In contrast, shipping companies had little incentive to ensure stevedoring was
undertaken efficiently and provided at least cost.  High stevedoring charges and
expected delays in ship turnaround could be factored into the ‘blue water’
freight rate.  In turn, buyers included this margin in the comparative price of
Australian wheat.
8.2 Fertiliser
Fertiliser is an important input for Australia’s agricultural sector.  It is required
to correct natural deficiencies in soil and to replace nutrient components8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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absorbed by crops in their growth.  Australia’s consumption of the three major
fertiliser nutrients — nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium — has grown by over
50 per cent since the mid 1980s.
Fertiliser accounts for approximately 5 per cent of Australian farm input costs
(FIFA undated).  This figure is higher for crop commodities such as grains and
sugar, and for those products reliant on pastures.
In 1994–95, Australia imported over 3.3 million tonnes of manufactured
fertiliser and fertiliser raw materials worth $570 million (see Table 8.1).  Single
superphosphate and ammonium sulphate have been the traditional source of
phosphorus and nitrogen fertilisers in Australia.  However, these have been
increasingly replaced by imports of high analysis fertilisers such as triple
superphosphate, diammonium phosphate and monoammonium phosphate which
have higher concentrations of phosphorus and nitrogen.  High analysis
fertilisers provide cost savings in transportation and application per unit of plant
nutrient.  Imports of phosphate rock, urea and potassic fertiliser have also
increased substantially since 1990–91 (see Figure 8.2).
Table 8.1 Australian imports of manufactured fertiliser and fertiliser
raw materials, 1994–95
Manufactured fertiliser or fertiliser raw material Quantity Value
(kt) ($m)
Urea 554 140.0
Triple superphosphate 307 57.4
Diammonium phosphate 549 145.5
Monoammonium phosphate 233 62.8
Other ammonium 125 31.4
Potassic fertiliser 366 67.3
Phosphate rock 1 067 55.4
Sulphur 143 10.7
All 3 343 570.6
Note: Sulphur value is estimate based on Vancouver spot price.
Source: ABARE Australian Commodity Statistics 1996.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 8.2 Australian imports of major fertiliser products and 


































































































Notes: 1995–96 data is preliminary.
Source: ABARE Australian Commodity Statistics 1996.
The waterfront plays a significant role in meeting Australia’s fertiliser
requirements.  Virtually all fertiliser passes through the waterfront, either in
manufactured form or as raw materials requiring further processing in Australia.
Waterfront costs (port and stevedoring charges) contribute approximately
3 per cent to the price farmers pay for fertiliser.
The majority of bulk fertiliser is purchased ‘free-on-board’ on world markets.
Australian importers are responsible for engaging shipping and stevedoring
services.  Most cargoes are mixed, that is, each ship carries more than one
fertiliser product.  A high proportion of shipments are discharged at multiple
ports as the ship moves around the coast.
The mix of products passing through each port reflects the crops grown in that
area.  For example, products with high nitrogen content (such as urea) make up
a relatively large proportion of fertiliser discharged through Queensland ports
because sugar crops require high quantities of nitrogen.  Phosphate rock and
sulphur are handled at fewer ports located near fertiliser manufacturing plants.
Bulk fertiliser is discharged using grabs which are lowered and raised using
either ships gear or shore-based cranes or gantries.  The fertiliser is released
from grabs into hoppers which are used to regulate its flow into trucks or on to8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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conveyor belts.6  Some products tend to ‘hang’ in the ship holds.  In these
instances, an excavator is periodically lowered into the hold and used to shift
product away from the walls so that it can be removed by the grab.
Discharging the last of a product from a hold is labour intensive and time
consuming.  Referred to as a ‘clean-out’, it initially involves the use of a small
front-end loader such as a bob-cat to scrape product away from the edges to the
centre of the hold.  Hand shovelling is then undertaken to remove product from
corners.
Stevedoring services are engaged on either a cost plus or charge per tonne
basis.  Cost plus involves the shipper paying a rate based on the cost of labour
employed by the stevedoring company in discharging the fertiliser.  A charge
per tonne is invariant to the time taken but usually varies across products and
additional payments for major delays and hold clean-outs are required.
Each system has its merits.  A charge per tonne encourages the stevedore to
operate efficiently, and the shipper knows the total charge a priori.  However,
in calculating the charge per tonne rate, the stevedore builds in a margin to
cover factors that affect stevedoring productivity and are outside its control.
Some shippers prefer cost plus charging because many of these factors are
within their control and they can therefore avoid paying this margin.  For
example, shippers can manage the initial stowage of product so that it can be
discharged with minimal switching between holds.  Shippers also have control
over the type of ship and the supply of trucks.
Unlike major bulk exports, fertiliser is not handled through designated
terminals.  Discharge equipment is leased or owned by the shipper, pertains to
the ship, or is supplied by the owner of the berth.  Both public access and
private berths are utilised.
Benchmarking
Certain aspects of the shipping and stevedoring of bulk fertiliser make
benchmarking difficult.  These include:
·  differences in the physical characteristics of products, especially density,
ease of flow, and sensitivity to adverse weather conditions;
·  differences in the mix of cargo passing through each port;
·  variation in unloading equipment used;
                                            
6 In some instances, the fertiliser is released from the grab onto the wharf and a front-end
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·  variation in size of typical discharge across ports and across products;
·  unequal distribution of ‘clean-outs’ across ports;
·  variation in frequency and duration of adverse weather conditions across
ports;
·  high frequency of ships carrying mixed cargoes; and
·  variation in ship size, age, and hold characteristics.
In particular, it is the combination of two or more of the above features which
make it difficult to ensure that like is compared to like.  For example, it would
be preferable to benchmark the stevedoring of bulk fertiliser on a product-by-
product basis so as to control for variation in the physical characteristics of
products.  However, this is not possible, because most shipments include a
number of fertiliser types and data is recorded on a per-shipment rather than per
product basis.
Port-specific information was collected on many of these features so as to
facilitate a more robust comparison.  Nonetheless, it was not possible to control
for all factors which may affect relative cost and performance.
There are only a small number of overseas ports through which bulk fertiliser is
discharged from ocean-going vessels in a manner similar to operations in
Australia.  These are in New Zealand, South Africa and Europe.7
The results presented below are based on data for stevedoring at the Australian
ports of Kwinana, Geelong, Newcastle, Adelaide, Albany, Brisbane, Townsville
and Hobart, and the New Zealand ports of Napier, Lyttelton and Dunedin.
Shippers in countries other than New Zealand were unwilling to provide
information.
The volume of bulk fertiliser discharged at these ports varies considerably (see
Figure 8.3).  Shore-based discharge equipment is used at the two high volume
ports — gantries at Kwinana and luffing cranes at Geelong.  Gantries are also
used at Newcastle.  Ships gear is used at the other ports.
There is no clearly defined relationship between the type of discharge
equipment and its relative rated capacity.  The shore-based gear used in
Australia has a higher rated capacity than most older ships gear.  However, the
discharge capability of modern ships gear is generally faster still.
                                            
7 North America is largely self-sufficient, with most product transported internally by road,
rail or barge.  Discharge operations in other countries are generally far more labour intensive
than in Australia.8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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Figure 8.3 Bulk fertiliser discharged at selected ports, 1996–97













Source: Productivity Commission, based on data supplied by Australian and New Zealand shippers of
bulk fertiliser.
The indicators used to benchmark relative cost and performance have been
calculated on both a tonnage and volume basis. They are:
·  total stevedoring cost per tonne (cubic metre);
·  tonnes (cubic metres) per hour; and
·  tonnes (cubic metres) per stevedoring man hour.
Stevedoring productivity is largely a function of volume discharged rather than
tonnage discharged.  The reporting of indicators on both bases (tonnage and
volume) gives some indication of the sensitivity of findings to differences in the
mix of products discharged through the different ports.
The total stevedoring cost is inclusive of the cost of discharge equipment.  For
Australian ports, tonnes (cubic metre) per hour is based on the number of hours
that the ship is worked.  It excludes all delays such as adverse weather
conditions and mechanical failure.  New Zealand data do not exclude delays.
Consequently, reported tonnes (cubic metre) per hour for New Zealand ports
understates performance at these ports relative to Australia.
Comparative performance
It is not possible to benchmark the cost and performance of stevedoring at
individual ports from the available data.  As previously discussed, the nature of
shipping and stevedoring bulk fertiliser means that operations at each port variesINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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due to a multitude of factors — all of which impact upon relative productivity.
Observed differences in stevedoring costs and performance between the
Australian ports are consistent with the characteristics particular to each port.8
However, it is more meaningful to compare the cost and performance of
stevedoring at a group of Australian ports with a group of New Zealand ports.
This is because a number of factors which have a significant influence on
productivity at individual ports no longer apply when data for multiple ports are
aggregated.  For example, most product at Townsville is discharged from the
top half of each hold whereas most is discharged from the bottom half at
Brisbane.  Combining data mitigates the impact that this difference has on
relative productivity.
Data were aggregated for those ports where ships gear is used — Adelaide,
Albany, Brisbane, Townsville and Hobart for Australia, and Napier, Lyttelton
and Dunedin for New Zealand.9  The two groups receive a similar mix of
products discharged from ships of a similar size and age, and have similar
average discharge size.10
One difference is that phosphate rock represents a lower proportion of product
discharged at the Australian ports than at the New Zealand ports.  This is
because most phosphate rock discharged in Australia passes through ports using
shore-based equipment.  To accommodate this difference, data pertaining solely
to the discharge of phosphate rock at Australian ports were collected separately
from other products.  Data for phosphate rock and other products for the group
of Australian ports were then weighted by the respective share that each
contributes to the total product passing through the New Zealand ports.11
                                            
8 This is not to say that productivity and cost would be equal across all ports if all factors
could be taken into consideration but rather that it is not possible to make such an
adjustment from the data available.
9 Aggregating data for the three New Zealand ports also overcame another difficulty.  The
shipper discharging through these ports pays a pan (per tonne) rate to a single stevedore for
all product it brings into New Zealand.  As such, it is unlikely that this pan rate reflects the
true stevedoring charge at any of the three ports.  However, the pan rate is close to the true
charge for the three ports combined because over 85 per cent of the shipper’s product is
discharged through the three ports.
10 A minor difference is the mix of products discharged in each country is that New Zealand
imports virtually no urea.  Urea is the least dense of all products.  Consequently, results
calculated on a per tonne basis will slightly understate Australia’s relative performance.
However, this difference is accounted for by making comparisons on a volumetric basis.
11 Separate data for phosphate rock were not available for New Zealand ports.8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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The relative levels of the indicators used to benchmark stevedoring of bulk
fertiliser in the two countries are presented in Figure 8.4.  Stevedoring charges
for bulk fertiliser at New Zealand ports are about 20 to 25 per cent less than
Australian ports.
Product is discharged at least 60 per cent faster in New Zealand.  However,
New Zealand stevedores engage relatively more labour to achieve higher capital
productivity.  Consequently, labour productivity (measured as quantity
discharged per man hour) is about 15 per cent lower.12
The same indicators calculated for all eight Australian ports are reported in
Figure 8.5 — that is, results include data for the three Australian ports using
shore based discharge equipment.  Australia’s relative discharge rate in terms of
both time and man hours improves with the inclusion of these high volume
ports.  Nevertheless, the results indicate that, on average, bulk fertiliser is
discharged at least as quickly in New Zealand using additional labour but at
lower cost.
                                            
12 It was suggested to the Commission that the observed difference between the discharge rate
in Australia and New Zealand could be partly attributable to the stricter Australian
environmental standards regarding whether product can be stored outdoors.  It is possible
that bottlenecks in the receival of product from conveyor belts and trucks into works or
storage may have contributed to the relatively slow discharge rate in Australia.  However,
the Commission was informed by the importer shipping product through the three New
Zealand ports that discharged product is rarely, if ever, left uncovered.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 8.4 Cost and productivity indicators for selected Australian






































 Australia  New Zealand
Notes: Australian ports: Adelaide, Albany, Brisbane, Hobart and Townsville.  New Zealand ports:
Dunedin, Lyttelton and Napier.
The measure of cubic meters per hour understates the performance of New Zealand ports
relative to Australian ports.  This is because the Australian data excludes delays while the New
Zealand data does not (see text).
Source: Productivity Commission, based on data supplied by Australian and New Zealand shippers of
bulk fertiliser.8   STEVEDORING — BULK
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Figure 8.5 Cost and productivity indicators for selected Australian





































 Australia (shore-based and ships gear) New Zealand (ships gear)
Notes: Australian ports: Adelaide, Albany, Brisbane, Geelong, Hobart, Kwinana, Newcastle and
Townsville.  New Zealand ports: Dunedin, Lyttelton and Napier.
The measure of cubic meters per hour understates the performance of New Zealand ports
relative to Australian ports.  This is because the Australian data excludes delays while the New
Zealand data does not (see text).
Source: Productivity Commission, based on data supplied by Australian and New Zealand shippers of
bulk fertiliser.165
9 STEVEDORING — CRUISE SHIPS
Sydney receives about half of the cruise ship calls to Australian
ports.  The cost of baggage handling and stevedoring of supplies at
Sydney was up to five times that at overseas ports.  Baggage
handling charges at other Australian ports are more in line with
those experienced overseas.
Cruise ships calling at Australian ports fall into two broad categories:
·  Australian-based ships, either permanently or seasonally operating
international itineraries and predominantly carrying domestic passengers;1
and
·  ships based in other countries on round-the-world or regional itineraries,
predominantly carrying international passengers.
Sydney receives approximately half of all cruise ship calls at Australian ports.
In part, this is because Sydney is home to the only permanently Australian-
based, deep water cruise ship — P&O’s m.v. Fair Princess, which accounts for
just under half of the Sydney calls.2  The number of cruise ship calls and
passenger exchanges during 1996 at selected ports are presented in Table 9.1.
Auckland and Tilbury receive a similar number of cruise ship calls to those at
Australian ports.  Singapore, Copenhagen, Los Angeles and Miami all receive
more than the total number of cruise ship calls made in Australia.
Cruise ships represent only a small proportion of ships calling at Australian
ports.  In contrast, Miami, and to a lesser extent Los Angeles, could be
considered cruise ship specialty ports because cruise ships represent a relatively
high proportion of calls at these ports (see Table 9.1).
A passenger exchange is defined as a passenger embarking or disembarking a
ship at the commencement or termination of their journey.  It does not include
passenger movements at stop-over ports.  Passenger exchanges are highest at
home ports.  However, a ship sometimes terminates and commences a new
voyage at a non-home port.  Also, ships on round-the-world itineraries have
passengers embarking and disembarking at ports other than the ship’s home
                                            
1 Australian-based does not imply Australian-owned.  Rather, the Australian cruise industry
was comprised of mostly of foreign-owned ships.
2 P&O operated the m.v. Fairstar rather than the m.v. Fair Princess prior to February 1997.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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port.  With the exception of Auckland, the selected overseas ports are home
ports.













(No.) (%) (No.) (No.)
Sydney   73 3.4  101 715  1393
Fremantle   15 0.8  9 880   659
Cairns   21 0.3  5 235   249
Brisbane   19 1.1 not available minimal
Melbourne   12 0.4   570 minimal
Auckland   21 0.9  10 500   500
Los Angeles   324 12.3  942 338  2908
Miami  1557 39.0 3 052 450  1960
Tilbury   37 1.3  19 395   524
Singapore  1301 1.1  794 357   611
Copenhagen   201 0.8  150 000   746
Note: Cruise ship calls at Tilbury includes 21 calls at PLA Central London River mooring; as a
percentage of total ocean-going ship calls only.
Sydney passenger exchange numbers are for 1994–95; ship calls are for 1995–96.
Auckland passenger exchange numbers are estimates.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Although the average passenger exchange at Sydney is high relative to many of
the overseas ports examined, it is nevertheless lower than that of the high
volume ports of Los Angeles and Miami.  Fremantle and Cairns have an average
passenger exchange comparable to the other overseas ports.
Cruise ships require a wide range of services upon arriving at a port.  The costs
of baggage handling and stevedoring of supplies are discussed in this chapter.
Those services not specific to cruise ships were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
9.1 Baggage handling
Baggage handling is a relatively labour intensive task compared to most
waterfront activities.  With the exception of those ports with minimal passenger9   STEVEDORING — CRUISE SHIPS
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exchange, baggage handling charges will reflect the underlying cost and
productivity of labour if baggage handling services are competitive.
The cost of baggage handling at Cairns and Fremantle compared favourably
with most overseas ports (see Figure 9.1).  However, the cost of baggage
handling was highest at Sydney — five times more than Auckland — despite a
relatively high average passenger exchange.3  Baggage handling at Sydney is
monopolised by the Marine Porters Association.
The variation in costs is largely attributable to the number of baggage porters
engaged.  In general, those ports with the highest baggage handling costs engage
the most porters for a given passenger capacity, and thus have the lowest labour
productivity (see Figure 9.2).
Figure 9.1 Baggage handling costs, June 1997










Australian dollars per passenger exchange
na
Notes: Melbourne and Brisbane not represented due to minimal average passenger exchange.
Cost at Singapore assumes 1.5 pieces of luggage per passenger exchange.
Baggage handling at Copenhagen is undertaken by ships crew.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
                                            
3 Baggage handling charges at Melbourne and Brisbane are also quite high on a per passenger
exchange basis.  However, this is consistent with the minimal average passenger exchange
taking place at these ports.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Figure 9.2 Baggage porters engaged for cruise ships with 900 and
1600 passenger capacity, June 1996










Number of baggage porters
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Notes: Data not available for Tilbury and Singapore.  Not applicable for Copenhagen.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
9.2 Stevedoring supplies
Cruise ships usually take on most supplies at their home port.  However, small
quantities of provisions are often taken on at transit ports, depending upon the
relative cost of supplies, the facilities available, and the length and destination
of the cruise.  In Tilbury, Singapore and Copenhagen, stevedoring of supplies is
undertaken by ships crew or the provedore rather than by a contracted
stevedore.
The cost of fully stevedoring a 900 passenger exchange cruise ship at Sydney
was four times that at Miami and twice that at Los Angeles (see Figure 9.3).
The relative cost of stevedoring a larger ship (16000 passenger) at Sydney was
even higher — 5 and 3 times more than at Miami and Los Angeles, respectively.9   STEVEDORING — CRUISE SHIPS
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Figure 9.3 Cost of stevedoring full supplies for cruise ships with
900 and 1600 passenger capacity, June 1996






 900 passenger capacity 
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
In instances when cruise ships take on only a small quantity of provisions, the
stevedoring charge can be relatively high, because a minimum amount of
stevedoring labour has to be engaged regardless of the quantity of stores to be
loaded.
Until recently, a stevedoring gang of 6 to 8 persons had to be employed for a
full shift at most Australian ports (with a cost of $4 000 to $5 000), regardless
of the quantity of stores to be loaded.  Whilst this remains the situation in
Sydney and Fremantle, small quantities (less than about four pallets) can be
loaded by the ships crew or provedore in Melbourne.  Larger quantities must be
loaded by contracted stevedoring labour but less than a full gang shift can be
engaged.
In Brisbane, the use of contracted stevedoring labour depends upon where the
ship is berthed and the quantity to be loaded.   Arrangements for the dedicated
cruise ship berth due for completion in December 1998 are yet to be
determined.  All stevedoring of supplies in Cairns is undertaken by the ships’
crew or provedore.171
10 PORT–LAND INTERFACE
Port–land interface operations involve many participants and a wide
range of activities.  Efficient interface operations require that each
activity be undertaken in a timely fashion and be co-ordinated with
the rest.
There is evidence of problems that are affecting overall timeliness
and reliability.
Moving imports and exports to and from the waterfront involves the services of
a number of participants.  They include container terminal operators or
stevedores, transport operators, freight forwarders, customs brokers, the
Australian Customs Service (ACS), Australian Quarantine and Inspection
Services (AQIS) and facilitators of electronic data interchange (EDI).  The
range of activities for which they are responsible include loading, unloading,
delivery, collection, clearance and preparation of documentation for all cargo
types.
Efficient port-land interface operations depend on the container terminal
operator or stevedore undertaking their activities in a timely and reliable
fashion.  Similarly, there are a number of land-side activities that must be
completed before cargo is delivered or collected.  There are others, such as
quarantine inspection, that must be co-ordinated with the cargo transfer
operation where delays can act to the detriment of overall timeliness and
reliability.
If delays occur anywhere in the chain, their cost will ultimately be borne by
shippers.  The magnitude of these costs are considered in Chapter 11.
The roles and responsibilities of stevedores and land-side participants in
Australia and the factors that affect the timeliness and reliability of their
operations at the port–land interface, are considered in this chapter.  Container
terminal interface operations are discussed in particular.  However, the factors
that affect timeliness and reliability could equally apply to non-containerised
bulk and break-bulk cargo.
International comparisons have not been undertaken.  The complexities of
interface operations make it difficult to compare performance on a consistent
basis over time and between ports.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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10.1 Stevedoring operations
At the port–land interface, stevedores are responsible for operating receival and
delivery facilities for land transport operators.1  Although a number of factors
affect the timeliness and reliability of stevedoring services, those most often
raised by importers and exporters are:2
·  industrial disputes, stop-work meetings, ‘go slows’; and
·  lack of terminal–transport operator co-ordination or planning for the
receival and delivery of containers, resulting in truck queues.
Industrial disputes, stop work meetings, ‘go slows’
Industrial disputes have ramifications for all land-side operators as well as
importers and exporters and shipping lines.  Any dispute adversely affects
timeliness and reliability of interface activities.
The number of working days lost due to industrial disputes declined from
around 30 000 in 1986 to 4 500 in 1996 (ABS Catalogue No. 6322.0 various
issues).3  Nevertheless, the stevedoring industry continues to have a much
higher incidence of industrial disputation than other Australian industries —
exceeded only by the coal mining industry (Productivity Commission
(PC) 1998).
Under the Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 (SIA), all stevedores are entitled to
eight stop-work meetings per year, of up to four hours duration, with two of
these on full pay.  The number of stop-work meetings held each year may vary
from port to port.  In some ports, these meetings take place during the afternoon
when there is a shift changeover, in other ports they occur in the morning, for
example 7.30 am to 11.30 am.  These meetings directly affect road transport
operators who cannot deliver or collect containers during these periods.
                                            
1  Includes both road and rail transport operators.  Only road transport operations are
discussed in this chapter.
2  Other factors include technical provisions at the port, (size of cranes), maintenance of
equipment and the incidence of break downs, the variability of shipping arrivals and
departures, the work organisation of the port (pay incentives, leave structures, work specific
provisions, flexibility of rosters and the industrial relations environment).
3  These data understate the extent of time lost to industrial action because of the definitions
used.  For example, a dispute is not included when it involves a stoppage of less than ten
working days at an establishment.  A dispute which involves 3 000 workers on strike for two
hours is counted as 750 working days lost (assuming that employees work an eight hour
day).10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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Stevedoring employees reputedly also engage in what is commonly referred to
in the industry as ‘go slows’ (Smithwick 1995, and DCN 1997a).  Although not
measured, they can affect the timeliness of operations at the waterfront,
including those at the interface.  Effectively, ‘go slows’ increase the time taken
to unload and load cargo.  For example, one importer noted that stevedores
normally discharge 800 cars in a shift.  However, the rate of discharge declined
by 50  per  cent on one occasion when the stevedores were renegotiating an
enterprise agreement.
There are incentives within enterprise agreements for stevedores to engage in
this practice.  Stevedoring employees can generally earn more from overtime
payments than productivity bonuses (PC 1998).
Co-ordination of cargo receival and delivery
Any lack of co-ordination between stevedores and the large number of transport
operators for the delivery and dispatch of containers, can either mean that
stevedoring operations get ahead of truck arrivals so that idle time is created, or
they fall behind and schedules have to be re-organised.  The latter often results
in truck queues at the terminal gate and can have a direct impact on importer
and exporter operations.
Terminals either operate a random receival and delivery or a vehicle booking
system (VBS) service in Australia.4  While truck queues are more likely to be a
problem where a random receival and delivery system operates, they may still
occur under a VBS.
Truck queues are a manifestation of delays resulting from poor co-ordination of
cargo receival and delivery.  These delays are caused by inadequate levels of
service to meet demand peaks.  Whether the levels of service provided in
terminals for this activity are economically appropriate is not considered here.
The prospect of delays at the terminal is often factored into the time road
transport operators expect to collect or deliver containers, irrespective of the
existence of a VBS.  Consequently, the delays associated with truck queues and
the inefficient use of transport resources increases the cost of cartage to both
importers and exporters.  These higher costs may be incorporated in the total
cost of cartage or explicitly charged as demurrage.5
                                            
4  A VBS assigns time slots for the delivery and collection of containers.
5  Demurrage is a charge relating to the time spent waiting in a truck queue and is usually
based on an hourly transport rate.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The incidence of truck queues is more common at container terminals in
Fremantle and Sydney than at any other major ports in Australia.6  Container
terminals in Fremantle operate a random receival and delivery service.  In
Sydney, the P&O and Patrick terminals introduced a VBS in 1995 and 1997
respectively.7
It is generally accepted by terminal and road transport operators that a 30
minute truck turnaround time is achievable in Australia.8  However, estimated
truck turnaround times at the container terminals in Fremantle range from one
hour to one and a half hours (information supplied by Western Australian Port
Operations Taskforce).9  The Road Transport Association of NSW (RTA) also
estimated that truck turnaround times averaged around one and a half hours at
the Sydney container terminals in 1995–96.10
Causes of co-ordination problems
Container terminal and road transport operators may agree that operational
problems at the terminal disrupt the receival and delivery of containers and
cause delays.  However, they have different perceptions about the causes.
One of the major difficulties faced by container terminal operators is their
inability to plan and co-ordinate the late delivery of containers, when exporters
do not abide by container delivery cut-off times.  For example, as one operator
noted, terminals can be receiving cargo up to ten minutes before the ship sails.
In Australia, some shipping lines are prepared to accept late container deliveries
— even if this involves delaying their departure.11  Consequently, there is often
a concentration of trucks arriving after cut-off time.  In the March quarter 1997,
the proportion of receivals (exports) completed by the stevedores after cut-off
                                            
6  Includes Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle.
7  Patrick introduced a VBS at their container terminal in Fremantle in December 1997.  There
are no VBS operating at bulk and break-bulk terminals in Australia.
8  Terminal and road transport operators measure truck turnaround time differently.  Terminal
operators define truck turnaround time as the time taken from when the paperwork is
presented at the terminal gate to when the truck leaves the terminal.  Road transport
operators include the time spent waiting outside the gate or in the queue. Consequently, road
transport operators turnaround statistics will be higher than those quoted by terminal
operators.
9 These figures measure the time from arrival at the terminal or in a queue to departure from
the terminal.
10 The RTA figure measures the time from arrival at the terminal or in a queue to departure
from the terminal.
11 In Rotterdam, a 24 hour cut-off prior to the ships scheduled departure is imposed.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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averaged 9 per cent at Brisbane, 7 per cent at Sydney, 4 per cent at Fremantle
and 5 per cent at Melbourne (BTCE 1997d).12
Container terminal operators also find it difficult to co-ordinate the collection of
containers when their operating hours do not coincide with those of road
transport operators.  This limits the ability of stevedores to utilise their capital
and equipment to its maximum potential.
Most transport operators prefer to collect and deliver containers between 7 am
and 3 pm on weekdays.  There appear to be a number of reasons for this:
·  first, there is a reluctance on the part of some transport operators to pay
overtime above a 38 hour week; and
·  second, transport operators have to organise their business activities
around the hours of ACS, AQIS, the container parks and customer
warehouses.13
Stevedores service shipping lines 24 hours a day for 360 days per year.14
However, the same operating hours do not apply to receival and delivery
activities.  Terminals will accept receivals and deliveries of containers after
3 pm and will open on weekends only if sufficient demand exists.  For example,
one container terminal in Brisbane operates an evening shift from 3.30 pm to
10 pm for four of the larger transport operators (information supplied by Road
Transport Authority of Queensland).  The VBS are also designed to operate for
up to 15 hours per day.
Although terminals open on weekends for delivery or collection, the reluctance
of transport operators to collect containers on the weekend results in a
concentration of truck arrivals on Monday mornings, leading to congestion at
the terminal gate.
In addition, container terminals provide for 3 days’ free storage after a ship’s
departure.  Some importers delay collection until the third day to take advantage
of the free storage time, however this sometimes results in congestion and truck
queues on the third day after the ship has been unloaded.
                                            
12 The proportion for Brisbane is higher than at the other ports because one terminal operator
has special arrangements for late receival of refrigerated containers because of a limited
number of powered outlets at the terminal (BTCE 1997d).
13 ACS, AQIS, container parks and customer warehouses normally operate eight hours a day,
Monday to Friday.
14 Refers to the loading and unloading of ships by stevedores.  In Brisbane stevedores work 3
by 8 hour shifts per day, in Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Fremantle stevedores work 3
by 7.5 hour shifts per day.  In Adelaide and Brisbane stevedores work 3 by 7 hour shifts on
weekends.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Road transport operators contacted in the course of the study believe that there
is insufficient communication with the stevedore.  Operational delays or
disruptions to receivals and deliveries are allegedly not being reported to truck
drivers.  This denies them the opportunity to consider alternative plans to utilise
their vehicles and offset non-productive time.15
They claim that the first priority of stevedores is to service the shipping line,
because stevedores are contracted to the shipping line and not to road transport
operators.  Hence receival and delivery activity is not afforded the same priority
as loading and unloading ships.  There is a lack of co-ordination between
equipment and manning levels for receivals and deliveries and ship-based
activities.  This is evident when terminal employees are transferred at short
notice from the receival and delivery area to service a ship that may have just
berthed — leaving truck drivers waiting.16
Transport operators can also experience delays during shift changeover at the
terminals where a vehicle booking scheme is not in place.  The recent
introduction of continuous shifts at the port of Fremantle has largely overcome
the delays once experienced by road transport operators.17  It was also noted by
a large transport company that more delays were experienced in Melbourne on
the evening shift, because there were less management on duty and hence
reduced control over operational activities.
Vehicle booking systems
In an attempt to improve the co-ordination of cargo receival and delivery, some
terminals have introduced a VBS.18  A VBS controls the rate at which trucks
arrive to coincide with the terminal’s ability to service them.  Regulating the
distribution of truck arrivals allows for the more efficient use of both stevedore
and transport operator resources.
Although similar in concept, P&O Ports and Patrick stevedores have taken
different approaches to developing a VBS (see Boxes  10.1 and 10.2 for an
overview of their current VBS).
                                            
15  This information was supplied by the Western Australian Port Operations Taskforce .
16 This should not occur where a VBS exists because terminal operators have made a
commitment to road transport operators to honour the pre-booked time slot.
17 Prior to the introduction of continuous shifts at the port of Fremantle, up to 35 minutes
could be lost during the day to evening shift changeover.  This caused all waiting trucks to
suffer consequential delays until the backlog was eliminated.  Information supplied by
Western Australian Port Operations Taskforce.
18 First introduced during 1994 at container terminals operated by P&O Ports and Patrick in
Melbourne.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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These systems both impose and require discipline from all interface operators.
They require a commitment by container terminal operators to provide the
appropriate equipment and manning levels to undertake receivals and deliveries.
Furthermore, road transport operators must be punctual.  They also provide a
greater level of certainty for road transport operators, importers and exporters,
insofar as they know the time that their goods will be collected and delivered.
The systems have significantly reduced truck turnaround times, reduced the cost
of waiting in queues and minimised truck queues.  In 1993, delays of up to 3
hours were common at the P&O terminal in Melbourne.  With the introduction
of the VBS it now takes less than 1 hour from arrival at the terminal to
departure from the terminal (Maunsell 1997).  In referring to the improvement
in Melbourne’s West Swanston Dock, Mr Tim Blood from P&O Ports stated
that:
A well formed carrier interface was established and truck delays vanished as did a
staggering $35 million in demurrage charges that end users had been paying because of
the constant queue of trucks and other infra-structural problems (Truck Australia 1997,
p. 12).
A VBS also allows containers to be received and delivered quicker.  In addition,
there is a reduction in cartage charges if demurrage is charged explicitly by road
transport operators.  One major importer in Australia advised that their overall
waterfront costs had declined by 30 to 40 per cent as a result of a reduction in
demurrage charges.
That said, the current incompatibility of systems places a burden on road
transport operators who have to install and train for multiple systems.  Although
there have been positive outcomes from the implementation of VBS, it may
have been more efficient to have designed a standard system for all container
terminals.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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There may also be scope for improvement to the existing systems.  Some of the
concerns about the operation of the systems raised with the Commission are:
·  the terminal operators will not compensate road transport operators for the
costs they incur while waiting in a truck queue if they fail to unload and
load trucks and truck queues occur.  (P&O Ports will compensate ‘B’ class
operators; refer to Box 10.1);
·  the lack of certainty that the stevedore will have the equipment or
appropriate manning levels available to clear the containers, despite
having a VBS in place; and
·  the cost to install an on-line computer system and the associated charges
are considered to be too expensive by some road transport operators.19
Some road transport operators argue that delays are still occurring.  They claim
that the problem is less apparent because the queues have been transferred to
the transport operator’s yard, because of the difficulty in obtaining time slots.
The cost to the transport operator of having the truck waiting in the yard may
still be reflected in the overall cartage charge levied on their customers.
In addition, country transport operators indicated that they found it difficult to
obtain concurrent time slots — which would enable them to deliver and collect
a container simultaneously.  Two independent booking systems operate, and do
not provide for import slots to be booked at the same time as export slots.
However, country operators can arrange with container terminal operators to
obtain concurrent time slots independently of the VBS.
For metropolitan operators, it is not so critical to obtain concurrent time slots, as
very few are contracted to both importers and exporters.20
                                            
19  Both VBS system operators offer a telephone booking service.  Logichip offer this service to
road transport operators who do not have access to the required computer equipment or
whose size does not warrant the purchase of computer equipment.  A surcharge applies for
this service.  The P&O Booking Bureau offer a telephone service for country or metropolitan
road transport operators for an annual registration fee of $500.
20 As stated by one large metropolitan operator only 12 per cent of their total container
movements were arranged concurrently.  P&O Ports also stated that less than 10 per cent of
all container movements at the port of Melbourne were arranged concurrently (back loaded).10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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Box 10.1 VBS operated by P&O Ports
·  P&O Ports system categorises carriers by fleet size, proximity of their container park
to the terminal and the level of service required.  ‘A’ class carriers pay in advance an
annual registration fee of either $1 000 if the past years total time slot usage was
greater or equal to 250 time slots, or $500 if the past years usage was less than 250
time slots.  ‘B’ class carriers pay in advance an annual registration fee of $20 000.
The higher registration fee provides the carrier with more time slots available per day
and first access to new available bookings.
·  P&O Ports also operate a stand-by access to their terminal.  This is available to all
carriers, however it is primarily intended for carriers not participating in the VBS.
·  Each day is divided into 14 time slots from 7 am to 10 pm.  These time slot zones begin
at 7 am and most are 50 minutes long, starting on the hour.  Bookings can be made one
day in advance for the collection of import containers and two days in advance of the
proposed delivery of export containers.
·  Once bookings are made they cannot be cancelled but may be offered to another
carrier.  Import and export time slots cannot be interchanged.  Failure to meet a time
slot incurs a $100 fine.
·  P&O Ports accepts claims for reasonable out of pocket costs incurred by ‘B’ class
carriers delayed at the terminal for more than two hours.  There is a limit of up to $500
per incident and in any one year (July 1 to June 30) up to $10 000 total per year
maximum.  ‘A’ class carriers have no claim to such reimbursement.
·  ‘B’ class carriers have first choice of available time slots and can access these bookings
from 7.30 am.  ‘A’ class carriers are only able to access these bookings from 8.30 am.
Country carriers based 100 kilometres from West Swanston Dock can access export
time slots at 8  am or 30 minutes before other carriers (excluding major carriers).
Country carriers have the same access time for import time slots as other ‘A’ class
carriers.
·  ‘A’ class carriers are permitted up to 4 time slots per time slot zone on day shifts (7 am
to 2.30 pm) and a maximum of eight time slots per time slot zone on evening shifts
(2.30 pm to 10 pm).  ‘B’ class carriers are permitted a maximum of eight time slots in
each time slot zone.
·  Carriers are required to arrive at the terminal from the commencement of the time slot
zone and no later than 30 minutes after the commencement of the zone.  Carriers who
arrive late may not be admitted and maybe directed to the stand-by queue.
Source: P&O Ports (undated).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box 10.2 VBS operated by Patrick terminals
·  Logichip, an independent company, administers the VBS for Patrick.  Registered users
pay Logichip directly for the service they provide.  Charges include a booking fee of
$3.30 per container, a monthly service fee of $10, a telephone booking surcharge of $2
(for those carriers who do not have an on-line computer system).
·  The system does not differentiate between carriers and there is no random queue system
for road transport operators.
·  There are no restrictions on the number of bookings a user can make in any one time
slot.  However, there are penalties for excessive bookings in the form of cancellation
and ‘no-show’ fees of $20 and $50 respectively.  The ‘no-show’ fee is the only charge
imposed by Patrick.  On average one per cent of bookings are cancelled per week in
Melbourne.
·  A user is only allowed one container per booking.  Where a truck is to move more than
1 container then multiple booking numbers need to be presented at the terminal (around
2  per  cent of moves are booked for multiple containers in Melbourne).  Import
container numbers can be swapped between 2 bookings but import and export container
numbers are not interchangeable between 2 bookings.
·  Once bookings are made they can be cancelled but a cancellation fee applies.  However,
to avoid the cancellation fee transport operators are able to move a container to an
earlier (but not later) time slot (subject to availability).  They can offer the booked slot
to a third party and change a container number on an import booking and a vessel
number on an export booking right up to the time the trucks arrive at the terminal.
·  There is one opening time for bookings.  Users can access the system 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, however during the peak period (8am to 10am) each user’s access
is limited to a maximum of ten minutes per session.
·  Prior to each day Patrick determine the volume of containers that can be handled and
enter this volume into the booking system.  In Melbourne around 50 per cent of planned
export time slots are entered for five days hence, with additional top-up slots entered
the following day.  However, import time slots are only released 1 to 2 days in advance
because terminal operators need to be sure that there is no risk of a shipping delay prior
to the release of import time slots.
Source: Information supplied by Logichip.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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10.2 Land-side operations
Land-side operations involve road transport operators, freight forwarders,
customs brokers and facilitators of EDI.
Road transport plays the pivotal land-side role.21  In the major Australian capital
city ports at least 80 to 85 per cent of containerised cargo is delivered to and
collected from the waterfront by road transport operators (HORSCOTCI 1992,
p. 30).  They also deliver and collect empty containers to and from container
parks.22  Bulk and break-bulk cargoes are also carried by road.
Road transport operators co-ordinate the delivery and collection of containers to
and from the terminal, container parks and customer warehouses.  In addition,
road transport operators must obtain the relevant documentation from either the
importer, exporter or freight forwarder prior to delivery or collection of a
container.  This documentation is required by the terminal operator to enable
containers to be collected and delivered.
The ACS (see Attachment 10A, and AQIS (see Attachment 10B) have statutory
responsibilities.  Land-side service providers must interact with these agencies
in the course of their activities.
There are a number of factors that affect the timeliness and reliability of land-
side operations.  These include:
·  documentation problems, including customs and quarantine clearance;
·  lack of exporter and importer discipline;
·  incompatible AQIS, container park and warehouse operating hours;
·  lack of flexibility in the transport workers award;
·  the slow uptake of EDI; and
·  problems associated with accessing the VBS (already discussed in
Section 10.1 above).
                                            
21 There are a large number of road transport operators at each major port in Australia.  For
example, at least 120 operate at the port of Fremantle, a further 300 or so operate at the port
of Melbourne, at least 150 operate at the port of Brisbane and more than 550 operate in
Sydney.
22  Container parks store and repair empty containers and act as the shipping companies’ agents
for receiving and issuing containers.  In addition, they offer storage of full containers,
container packing and unpacking, bond and free storage, welding and other engineering
services and container transport.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The interactions of each and every land-side operator has an impact on overall
timeliness and reliability.  Cartage rates range from $50 to $60 per hour.23
Therefore any delay adds to road transport costs and to the overall cost of sea
freight transport.
Documentation problems
To deliver a container for export, the transport driver must produce an export
receival advice (ERA).24  To collect an import container the transport driver
must produce an import delivery order (IDO) at the terminal gate.25  I f  t h e
document is incorrect or has not been cleared by ACS, the terminal operator
will not allow the truck driver to deliver or collect until corrections or clearance
are obtained.
Documentation problems delay delivery and collection because the driver has to
contact either the importer, exporter or freight forwarder to make the necessary
corrections or obtain clearance.  For example, P&O Ports in Melbourne advised
that it is not unusual for at least 5  per  cent of trucks in any one day to be
delayed at the terminal gate because customs duty has not been paid on
imported containers.
Road transport operators can also experience delays when delivering or
returning empty containers to the container parks or when presenting
documentation that is found to be inadequate or inaccurate (information
supplied by the Road Traffic Authority of Queensland).  These delays may
occur if trucks arrive with incomplete or inaccurate container release or hand-
over documentation, or if the shipping line has failed to provide the container
park with release details.  On some occasions, delays may also occur if releases
                                            
23 Road cartage cost have not changed significantly over the past 15 years, partly because of
productivity improvements in road transport.  For example, some transport companies have
invested in B-doubles or super B-doubles.  These trucks have the capacity to transport up to
4 containers on any one movement.
24 A document which accompanies the export consignment to the terminal or wharf detailing
information about the cargo and quoting the export clearance number (ECN) issued by the
Australian Customs Service.  The VBS operated by Patrick terminals allows for the pre-
entry of Export Receival Advice (ERA) details.  This eliminates the need for road transport
operators to present the ERA at the terminal gate.
25 A document which is initiated by the shipping line and forwarded to the shipper.  It includes
information on the container number, pick up point, shipping line reference number, Lloyds’
number, voyage number, type of container, bill of lading number, contents, where empty
container should be returned to, the weight and quarantine information.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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for containers have been issued by the shipping line before empties have been
returned following unpacking of import cargo.
Such delays can be critical if the container park is unable to contact the shipping
line during their operating hours.  For export containers it might result in the
container missing the ship’s cargo cut-off time.
Road transport operators can also experience delays at authorised tail-gate
inspection facilities if the paperwork they present is inadequate.26  One tail-gate
inspection operator commented that this can occur once or twice a day.
Documentation and communication with AQIS and the ACS are critical to the
timeliness and reliability of freight forwarder and customs brokers operations.
Some of the problems experienced in these two areas are set out in Box 10.3.
The timeliness and reliability of current operations could be improved by
implementing a fully integrated electronic system — linking the Sea Cargo
Automation system (SCA) into other electronic systems such as electronic funds
transfer and electronic payment systems.  However, there is no central body —
such as the ACS in the case of the SCA — to drive the use of EDI in
commercial and operational activities.
Lack of exporter and importer discipline
As discussed in Section 10.1, it is not unusual for some exporters to leave the
movement of containers to the wharf until the last day prior to cut-off or after
cut-off time.  This impacts on road transport operators as well as stevedores.  It
limits their ability to plan and co-ordinate the use of their trucks in the most
efficient way (HORSCOTCI 1995).
This lack of discipline also makes it difficult for country operators to obtain
time slots if exporters have not given them advance notice of an expected
delivery.  Country operators require information two to three days in advance to
allow them enough time to obtain a time slot.
                                            
26 Tail-gate inspections are carried out to check containers for the following: wooden
packaging ie dunnage, inadequate certification, verification of new or used machinery,
verification of packaging used, verification of documentation, peatmoss contamination,
internal and external cleanliness of the container and insect infestation.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box 10.3 Documentation and communication problems with the
ACS and AQIS
The SCA system allows all cargo to be reported electronically and provides for the
electronic clearance of cargo.  However, registered users of the system are unable to
identify exactly why there may be a problem with the clearance of cargo, because each
registered user has access to a limited amount of information.  Consequently, time can be
wasted tracking down a problem — such as contacting shipping lines, terminal operators
and the ACS — adding to business costs.
a
Freight forwarders expressed concerns about the prescriptive manner in which AQIS
undertakes its role and responsibilities.  It was alleged that communication with AQIS
officers can be difficult because of the time taken for them to respond to a query and the
difficulty in identifying the appropriate person to contact.
The COMPILE system, which is currently used by registered users to input manifest
information, is to be replaced by an EDI based system referred to as EDIFICE.  This is a
message-based system and delays in the transmission of information are inevitable because
it is a store and forward system.
When problems are experienced with the COMPILE system it is difficult to reach the help
desk or obtain a response from an ACS officer.  If problems occur outside the operating
hours of the ACS — that is 8.30 am to 4.51 pm Monday to Friday — substantial delays
can occur.
Containers cannot be cleared until a freight forwarder or customs broker has paid duty (if
applicable), presented the bill of lading to the shipping line or agent and paid wharfage on
the cargo.  Shipping lines or their agents have been slow to implement electronic payment
systems for wharfage.  As a result, freight forwarders or customs brokers are required to
pay wharfage and present the bill of lading at shipping line offices. This is a time-
consuming task which has the potential to be streamlined. Furthermore, until recently,
customs brokers had to present the customs clearance advice to the shipping lines.
The export integration (EXIT) system is an electronic system for the lodgement of export
entries and manifests by exporters and shipping companies respectively.  It is not user
friendly for those involved with exports and, as one freight forwarder acknowledged,
delays of up to 2 hours are not uncommon.  However, this system is currently being
redeveloped to make it more attractive to users.
a On 16 January 1998, the ACS advised Brokers that a new diagnostic facility has been developed
to enhance the SCA system.  Brokers will be given greater access and improved problem
solving facilities.
Source: Freight forwarders.
Country operators often receive information on the same day that containers are
ready for delivery to the container terminal.  This is not always under the10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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control of the exporter.  For example, the exporter may receive a just-in-time
request for a container of fruit.  This places pressure on the exporter, who in
turn places pressure on the transport operator to book a time slot and arrange
delivery to the wharf.
Some importers display a similar lack of discipline by delaying container
collection until the third day to maximise free storage time — this affects the
timeliness of road transport operations.
Operating hours of AQIS, container parks and warehouses
As discussed in Section  10.1, the majority of land-side operators have less
flexible operating hours than container terminal operators.
Warehouse operating hours have the greatest impact on the timeliness and
reliability of road transport operations.  Most warehouses are open for limited
hours — typically, eight hours a day, but it can be less.  As noted by one
transport operator, the delivery window at a number of warehouses is being
more compressed in an attempt by importers and exporters to reduce operating
costs.
Consequently, road transport operators are unable to utilise their trucks in the
most efficient way.  They are forced to move containers from the terminal, to
their yards instead of directly delivering containers to their customer’s
warehouse.
One large transport operator advised that at least 50 per cent of all containers
collected from the terminal were delivered to the transport yard prior to delivery
to the customer’s warehouse.  There are costs involved in this double handling
— a greater number of trips than necessary and the additional cost of container
handling.
For country operators, the operating hours of AQIS and container parks can be
more critical.  Country operators have a preference for morning time slots to
allow them enough time to either collect an import container which will require
a tail-gate inspection or to collect an empty container from a container park
after delivering a container to the terminal.
All containers destined for country unpacking addresses must receive a tail-gate
inspection during daylight hours.  Operating hours for tail-gate inspection
services vary from port to port.  In Melbourne, one private company conducts
tailgate inspections (employing the services of an AQIS officer) from 7.30 am to
3 pm on weekdays with out-of-hours inspection by prior arrangement.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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In the event that a country transport operator does not obtain a morning time
slot, or one early enough to meet the 3 pm deadline for a tail-gate inspection,
the container has to be held overnight until the inspection service reopens the
next day.  The result of a 24 hour delay in import delivery adds to the cost of
doing business for both the importer and road transport operator.
Similarly, the opening hours of container parks — typically eight hours a day
weekdays only, effectively eliminates the opportunity to collect and deliver
empty containers after 4  pm.  Furthermore, empty containers have to be
returned to a designated container park within a specified period and during
operating hours, irrespective of whether a transport operator is city or country
based.
The late delivery of an empty container to a container park incurs a fine.  The
time period and the magnitude of the fine varies between shipping lines
operating on Australian trades.  Container park operating hours and the time
allocated to return empty containers to the container park disadvantage country
operators.
Lack of flexibility in the transport workers award
Road transport operators stated that the award covering transport workers does
not provide the flexibility for road transport operators to adopt more flexible
hours of operation.  However, this situation is improving.
The Industrial Relations Commission of NSW recently allowed an application
(by the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch) for a
pay increase accompanied by a number of award changes.  These changes have
provided greater flexibility for the industry with the inclusion of Saturday as
part of ordinary hours, an increase in the span of hours, a reduction in the
minimum engagement for casual employees, a provision for part-time work for
drivers and the payment of wages by electronic funds transfer.
At the Federal level, the Workplace Relations Act is intended to ensure that
issues to do with workplace flexibility are dealt with through enterprise
bargaining, rather than prescriptively in the award.
Electronic data interchange
In Australia, over 110 million documents are produced to support more than
three million import and export consignments that occur annually.  An
individual transaction could involve over 27 to 30 parties and over 40
documents.  It is estimated that 15 per cent of consignment detail is repeated at10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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least 30 times and that 70 per cent of data is re-keyed at least once (information
supplied by Tradegate ECA).
EDI has the capability to improve the timeliness and reliability of exchanging
consignment-based data by reducing the delays and costs associated with
generating and dispatching documentation.  It involves the computer-to-
computer exchange of documents and information in a structured form using
commonly agreed standards.27  It is not necessary for trading partners to have
identical document processing systems.28  The need for standard messages in
EDI necessitates a significant amount of co-operation between users in
developing those standards.
EDI makes significant savings in time and money possible by eliminating or
reducing the paper flow between importers, shipping lines, freight forwarders,
customs brokers, banks, insurance companies, terminals, container parks and
exporters.  An efficient and effective EDI system also enables businesses to
monitor the performance of particular links within the transport chain.29  I t
provides businesses with additional information, allowing them to adjust their
business operations accordingly.  In addition, those involved in the transport
operation are in a better position to respond to new developments more rapidly
and benefit from enhanced communication and co-ordination between transport
chain participants.
Factors affecting implementation of EDI
Implementation of EDI in Australia has been significant in the area of
regulatory messaging.  The uptake of EDI in commercial and operational
activities has been comparatively slow.  The following factors have been cited
for this:
·  lack of awareness of the benefits and implications of EDI;
·  partial implementation throughout the transport chain;
·  user establishment costs, including the cost of software acquisition;
                                            
27 The International Standards Organisation and the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe are responsible for the development and promotion of the International EDI
standard, EDI for Administration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT).  These standards
are known as UN/EDIFACT.
28 In most cases, EDI messages are transferred on value added networks (VANs) or by the
Internet, which provide an electronic link to users.  Users do not need to be connected to the
same VAN in order to send messages to each other.  However, VANs providing services
need to be able to communicate with each other.
29 The transport chain includes shipping lines as well as the port-land interface.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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·  the inability of industry bodies such as Tradegate ECA to impose or
enforce the use of consistent implementations;
·  concerns about message security, legal matters relating to international
trade, and the negotiability of instruments; and
·  inconsistent proprietary messaging and system interface formats.30
Most, if not all, of the developments in EDI for sea transport have concentrated
on container cargo.  This is because container cargo, unlike break-bulk cargo, is
readily identifiable through container numbers.  There have been some recent
developments relating to the electronic release of break-bulk cargo under the
SCA system.  However, while the declaration of manifests may be electronic, a
parallel process requires the cargo to be manually cleared before it is released
from the wharf.
With the development of the ELECTRA project and other commercial and
operational messages, participants in the transport chain can now implement
EDI beyond regulatory messaging.31  However, the significant benefits of EDI
will not be realised until there is a critical mass of users.  For this to occur,
greater demand for, and commitment to, the use of EDI by importers and
exporters would be needed.
10.3 Logistical co-ordination
Many of the problems identified in this chapter could be overcome by improved
co-ordination.  However, there are few incentives to encourage the numerous
operators to co-ordinate their activities.
Stevedores are usually contracted to the shipping line in Australia.  They do not
have a direct contractual relationship with the transport operator contracted to
an importer, exporter or freight forwarder (see Figure 10.1).
                                            
30 See HORSCOTCI (1992, 1995) and Cameron (1996a, 1996b).
31 The ELECTRA project is a suite of messages which allow importers, exporters, airlines,
shipping lines, forwarders, brokers, transport operators, terminal operators, container parks
and banks to exchange electronic messages in a standard electronic format.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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Figure 10.1 Contractual links













 represents contractual relationship
 represents relationship resulting from Statutory requirements
(a)
(b)
a Exporters typically deal directly with shipping lines and their agents.
b Importers typically use the services of freight forwarders and customs agents.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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The absence of contractual arrangements between the terminal operators and
road transport operators, the inflexible operating hours of customer warehouses,
the absence of a facilitator to drive the use of EDI in commercial and
operational activities, and the lack of discipline on the part of exporters and
importers, act as barriers to co-ordination.
The lack of contractual relationships acts as a barrier because there is no
incentive for a container terminal operator to improve the efficiency with which
cargo reaches importers and exporters as they have no direct relationship.
Similarly, container terminal operators incur no financial penalty for imposing
delays on road transport operators.  They are not directly accountable to road
transport operators for their actions.  Furthermore, transport operators may be
able to recover the costs of delays from importers and exporters by charging
demurrage, which weakens the incentive to use resources efficiently.
There have been some attempts to improve co-ordination at the interface.  For
example, for the past six years, P&O Ports in Melbourne have employed two
people to discuss logistics issues with road transport operators.  In addition, the
ACS is attempting to pursue with other government agencies, the concept of a
single window to government, by promoting greater co-ordination and co-
operation among government agencies.  The objective is to examine ways of
sharing information and resources to provide a more co-ordinated approach to
services.
The ACS envisages further development of existing arrangements with AQIS in
order to establish the basis for wider Government involvement in such
arrangements.  In addition, the ACS supports the development of a unique client
identifier for all Commonwealth Government agencies (DCN 1997b).191
Attachment 10A
Customs
The ACS is responsible for the collection of customs and excise duty,
maintaining an export data entry system as well as providing border protection
to ensure that prohibited cargo is not brought into the country.  All sea cargo
entering Australia must be cleared by the ACS.
Freight forwarders and customs brokers prepare on behalf of importers most of
the required documentation.  In the past this task was time consuming and
complex.
Freight forwarders and customs brokers have benefited in recent years from the
introduction of a number of electronic systems by ACS and AQIS.32  These
systems are the national SCA system and the electronic export inspection and
clearance system known as EXDOC which interacts with the EXIT system.
The SCA system was implemented in July 1994 by the ACS to complete the
clearance process for containerised cargo.33  The SCA system automates the
reporting, screening and clearance of imported cargo through the use of
computer links between the ACS, parties reporting and delivering cargo, and
other members of the cargo importing community (TEDIS 1996).
It allows manifests to be reported electronically by shipping companies and
freight forwarders.  These manifests are processed through a computerised
profile utility, identifying ‘high risk’ cargo to the ACS and AQIS.
Since 1994, the ACS has shifted the balance of its responsibilities from control
to facilitation and as a result has adopted a more risk assessment mindset.  The
ACS no longer examine all manifests but rely on the SCA and COMPILE
                                            
32 Freight forwarders are responsible for arranging the movement of cargo using one or more
transport modes according to the wishes of importers and exporters, with whom they have a
contractual relationship.  Customs brokers are engaged by importers to arrange clearance
and payment of customs duty on cargo (HORSCOTCI 1992).  However, some importing
companies have their own in-house customs brokers.  Freight forwarders may also have a
packing and unpacking facility on their site and operate their own road transport operations.
33 In 1998 Patrick and P&O Ports intend to implement an electronic reporting system for the
clearance and delivery of break-bulk cargo.  For bulk cargo, there are no benefits to be
gained from developing an electronic system for a one line entry.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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systems to assess the risk profiles of the cargo and to identify those items that
may be ‘high risk’.
The COMPILE system allows customs brokers to create, lodge and pay import
entries at their offices and obtain ACS clearance within minutes.  Messages
concerning the status of cargo are transmitted to the container terminal at the
time of the ship’s arrival and made available to customs brokers through the
COMPILE system progressively as it becomes available.
Although clearance may occur within minutes via the COMPILE system, the
affect of polling, that is, the frequency in which mailbox messages are read can
impact on the timeliness of container collection.  This is of particular concern
where waterfront activities are concentrated close to a port.  For example, in
Fremantle where it may only take a few minutes for a road transport operator to
reach the terminal.  A road transport operator may arrive at the terminal to
collect a container (having received advice from the ACS that the container has
been cleared) to find that terminal staff have not received or read the clearance
advice.34
The SCA has reduced both the amount of paperwork in the waterfront chain and
the number of staff required to process the paperwork.
Overall, around 90 per cent of all shipping lines and 70 per cent of all freight
forwarders in Australia that use SCA.  The number of registered users is
constantly changing and varies between States.  For example, there are currently
85 out of 165 freight forwarders in Melbourne who use SCA and at least
75  per  cent of all manifest lodgements in Melbourne occur electronically
(includes electronic entries by both the shipping line and freight forwarder).  All
container terminals use SCA (with the exception of some berths in Brisbane).
From 1 April 1997, the ACS has applied a policy of cost recovery for
commercial customs activities required to process imports.  The Cargo
Automation Processing Charge has been absorbed by new charges (Australian
Customs Notice No.96/44).
The services to be covered by the new charges include cargo reporting (both sea
and air) and import entry processing (sea, air and post).  Charges will not apply
to the processing of export transactions, nor will they cover activity associated
with ACS community protection functions relating to the detection and
interception of prohibited imports and drugs (Australian Customs Notice
No.96/44).
                                            
34 This may occur if the terminal has prioritised its messages in such a way that a bayplan will
be processed before a clearance message.  It may take between 15-20 minutes to process a
bayplan before a status message from the ACS can be read.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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As a consequence of the introduction of cost recovery, SCA usage has increased
and reduced paper flows.
The ACS is also currently developing a cargo management strategy.  In June
1997, eight companies were selected to participate in a pilot program aimed at
streamlining processes for moving cargo into and out of the country.  The
objective of such a study is to improve flexibility by breaking the nexus
between payment of duty and release of cargo by the adoption of new practices
based on periodic accounting and duty deferral.
The electronic clearance of containers has significant benefits for importers,
exporters and their agents.  First, it has the potential to eliminate transcription
errors.  Second, it reduces processing and transmission time.  Clearance
approval can occur within minutes via the transmission of status messages.  A
20  ft container can now be cleared on the same day.  Finally, it introduces
greater flexibility into the system.
That said, ACS claimed that there is scope for improvement.  Some of the
problems reported to the Commission that affect the timeliness and reliability of
sea cargo movements are:
·  inadequate training in the use of ACS computer systems;
·  slow user uptake of customs systems;
·  late submission of documentation; and
·  lodgement of inaccurate information.
Inadequate training in the use of ACS computer systems
All registered users (freight forwarders, customs brokers) have had to invest in
compatible software.  However, there has been a reluctance by a number of
users to invest in training.  As a result the ACS is inundated with calls by users
who do not understand how the system works.  ACS are unable to provide
assistance because they are not familiar with the systems users have invested in.
The SCA help line receives on average 1500 calls per month, the majority of
which come from new users or inexperienced staff.
Slow uptake
There are a number of importers, exporters or their agents that have been slow
to embrace the SCA system.  As a consequence, the manual processing of
documentation required to be undertaken by the ACS affects the timeliness and
reliability of their operations.
Another reason for slower than expected uptake is the continuing use of paper
documents.  For example, a large number of permits are required to beINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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administered for exported goods. With EDI this is harder to do because the
permits cannot be sighted.
Late submission of documentation
Legislative requirement stipulates that manifests must be lodged with the ACS
48 hours before the arrival of the ship.  However, most shipping lines do not
lodge the manifest until 24 hours before the arrival of the ship because ACS
guarantee that manifests will be screened 24 hours before the ship’s arrival.
There can be some delays with freight forwarders, but generally they are only
penalising themselves.
There may also be problems with trans-Tasman cargo because shipping lines
don’t often finalise their manifests until the ship is half way to Melbourne.  If
the ACS receive the manifest information within 48 hours, the cargo can be
released before it is discharged and this may reduce delays in delivery.
Shipping lines have to provide a full list of what is being exported, but often it
is difficult to know this until the last minute.  Shipping lines have asked if they
can provide this information 48 hours after exports are loaded because it is
easier to know after the event what is on the ship.
Lodgement of inaccurate information
Shipping lines send manifests to the ACS and if the manifest contains errors it
will be transmitted to the shipping line for correction.  Consequently, it is easy
to lose a day correcting for the errors.  Around 4 to 5  per  cent of cargo is
delayed because of problems with the documentation and or clearance of cargo
through the COMPILE system (this excludes the computer system going down).195
Attachment 10B
Quarantine inspection
AQIS is responsible for export inspection and import quarantine clearance
services.  All plants, animals and associated products that are to be imported to
Australia are subject to quarantine.  The inspection procedures for imported
containers are described in Box 10.4.
Similarly, most bulk agricultural produce exported from Australia is inspected
by AQIS.  This includes meat, dairy produce, seafood, grains and fruit and
vegetables.  The service ensures that export premises are up to standard, that
product description, labelling and documentation are in accordance with
regulations, and that the requirements of importing countries and Australian
marketing authorities are met. The inspection procedures for exported
containers are described in Box 10.5.
Since 1991, government policy requires AQIS to recover its user–attributable
costs for all quarantine and inspection services on a fee-for-service basis.
AQIS provides services through 20 programs, each program has a different
charging structure and there is no cross-subsidisation between programs.
Overhead costs are allocated across programs at the start of each financial year
based on the number of staff in each program.  A flat rate is charged to cover
the screening process for container clearance through the SCA system.
At the interface AQIS must co-ordinate the clearance of all imported cargo and
inspect most food exports and issue certificates if required by the importing
country.  The timeliness and reliability of their operations are directly affected
by inspection and documentation requirements.  It is inevitable that delays will
occur in the clearance of some cargoes particularly if the cargo has to be
fumigated, or unpacked and if documentation is incorrect.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box 10.4 Quarantine procedures for imported containers
The AQIS currently inspect:
·  The external surfaces of empty containers at the wharf or terminal during unloading
operations as well as the interior to determine if the container is contaminated with
plant and animal matter.  All LCL containers once they are delivered to a quarantine
controlled area for unpacking and all necessary treatment, provided the exterior is free
from contamination;
·  all containers from known Giant African Snail (GAS) locations;
·  all containers destined for rural areas.  This involves a tail-gate examination;
·  all FCL containers which contain goods subject to quarantine ie imported foods, if
timber packing, crates, dunnage, straw or other cereal packing has been used in the
consignment or if the consignment is not free of soil, insects, plant and animal residues;
a and
·  all timber irrespective of whether it is break-bulk or containerised cargo.
A quarantine entry must be lodged by the importer or authorised agent for any container
that is subject to quarantine.  Quarantine action may be required for a number of reasons,
including the presence of unregistered containers, untreated timber packing, uncertified
timber packing, straw packing country destination or incomplete manifest information.
Customs brokers that are connected to the COMPILE system can lodge quarantine entry
information and will receive information relating to the consignment’s quarantine status,
via their COMPILE entry message advice.
The immediate release of an FCL container is only possible if appropriate documentation
has been provided to AQIS at the port of entry prior to arrival of the vessel.  This must
include:
·  a packing declaration provided by the overseas supplier indicating that no timber or
straw packing, crates or dunnage have been used in the consignment;
·  a treatment certificate, if timber packing has been used; and
·  a container cleanliness statement indicating that the consignment has been swept or has
been visually inspected and found to be free of soil, insects, plant and animal residues.
a. Dunnage includes mats, brushwood, gratings and so on stowed under or among cargo to prevent
wetting or chafing.
Source: AQIS 1996.10   PORT–LAND INTERFACE
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Box 10.5 Quarantine procedures for exported containers
Before a product can be exported, the exporter must prepare an export receival advice
which quotes an export clearance number (ECN) which is issued by AQIS.  This
documentation is all that is required for an establishment that operates under a Quality
Assurance inspection system.
However, for those establishments not operating under a Quality Assurance system an
export permit must be prepared for each consignment and presented to an AQIS officer
prior to shipment for signing and stamping.
For some agricultural products such as meat, meat products, poultry, game and rabbit
meat, the ECN can be generated electronically using the EXDOC program.  This reduces
the time taken to obtain such documentation.  For other agricultural exports, such as dairy,
seafood, grains and fruit and vegetables, the ECN has to be generated manually.
Some importing country governments insist on having certain product certification before
goods are permitted entry.  AQIS can provide certificates to satisfy importing country
authorities and advice as to certification requirements.
Source: AQIS 1997.
In response to the Nairn report into quarantine services, AQIS recently
undertook a review of container inspections and proposes to:
·  conduct external inspections of all land-bridged containers, commencing
with the major ports of Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane;
·  conduct external inspections of all containers moving to rural areas as well
as tail-gate internal inspection;
·  conduct random external inspections of up to 5 per cent of all containers
delivered in the port of discharge;
·  conduct external inspections of all containers from known GAS locations;
and
·  conduct 100 per cent assessment (external and internal) of imported empty
containers using industry based quality assurance (QA) arrangements
(DCN 1997c).
AQIS also proposes to implement an accreditation system which is designed to
equip customs brokers with the skills to check import documents for quarantine
clearance.  The introduction of this system is intended to provide customs
brokers with increased flexibility through reduced dependence on AQIS.  With
agents performing some of the tasks formerly carried out by AQIS officers, it is
expected that customs brokers will be able to provide faster and potentially
cheaper freight clearance through improved efficiency (Chambers, 1997 p. 2).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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11 IMPACT OF WATERFRONT SERVICE
PERFORMANCE ON IMPORTERS AND
EXPORTERS
Delays on the waterfront increase the cost of importing and
exporting.  They impose production, transport and inventory costs.
Ultimately, export sales may be lost and Australia’s reputation as a
reliable supplier damaged.
The magnitude of the costs that arise when there is a lack of
timeliness are the focus of this chapter.  They are significant when
compared to the sea transport freight bill and highlight the national
importance of efficient waterfront service performance.
There are approximately 3000 exporters and 30  000 importers in Australia
(Cameron 1996a).  They shipped approximately $120 billion of cargo in 1995–
96 — $62 billion of which was containerised (see Chapter 2).
The time taken to move sea cargo through the Australian waterfront and its
predicability, is usually critical to importers and exporters.  They require timely
receival of imports to maintain production schedules and delivery of export
cargo to meet contractual commitments.
Timeliness is a function of the time taken and the reliability with which a
service can be predicted.  Reliability is usually the most important aspect of
timeliness in planning logistical arrangements.  However, with some time
sensitive cargoes — such as perishable goods — the time taken is also
important.
Some of the typical reasons for delays and hence unreliability of waterfront
operations that result in ships being unable to maintain shipping schedules
(early or late arrivals and departures) are:
·  berth unavailability;
·  industrial disputation and inflexible work arrangements; and
·  co-ordination problems.
Berth availability problems delay the stevedoring of ships (see Chapter 6).  This
reduces asset (ship) utilisation, resulting in higher shipping costs and charges.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
200
Industrial action adversely impacts on reliability by disrupting the efficient
planning of work arrangements, delaying ship working and exacerbating
congestion for the receipt or delivery of cargo.  The demand for stevedoring
services fluctuates over time and the task varies from ship to ship and voyage to
voyage.  Flexible work arrangements are also required for the stevedore to be
responsive to this challenging service environment to provide an efficient and
reliable service.
Co-ordination problems at the port–land interface result in avoidable demand
peaks and impact on the planning of stevedoring operations.  Some possible
underlying causes are:
·  insufficient capacity at port terminals to prevent congestion for the receipt
or delivery of imports and exports in periods of peak demand;
·  the slow uptake of electronic commerce facilities;
·  quarantine inspection and customs clearance problems;
·  documentation problems; and
·  difficulties in obtaining containers for exporting goods (see Chapter 10).
Unreliability militates against effective co-ordination of the complex chain of
activities that constitute waterfront services.  Furthermore, delays in one activity
have ‘knock-on’ effects, because they are difficult to compensate for and affect
co-ordination in subsequent activities (as discussed in Chapter 2).
Unreliability adversely affects the efficiency of interface transfers and the co-
ordination of land-side logistical arrangements.  This gives rise to a range of
direct costs borne by shippers, above and beyond those paid for waterfront and
shipping services, such as demurrage charges when trucks are delayed in queues
outside container terminals.
In addition to the direct costs, there are internal ‘indirect’ costs to Australian
shippers.  These costs — such as those associated with holding additional
inventories — can significantly increase the total costs faced by importers and
exporters.
The magnitude of direct and indirect costs resulting from a lack of timeliness —
that is, costs other than those for waterfront and shipping services — are the
focus of this chapter.
Importers and exporters were approached to identify the difficulties encountered
with the timeliness of sea transport.  Information was also sought on the costs
that poor performance imposes on importers and exporters across a range of
cargo types — including high value, perishable, inputs critical to manufacturing
and those with special handling requirements (see Appendix B).11   IMPACT OF WATERFRONT SERVICE PERFORMANCE ON IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
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The magnitude of the additional costs attributable to poor service performance
depends on the gap between ‘efficient’ and current levels of performance.  The
overseas levels of performance identified in this study do not necessarily
provide an adequate indication of what an achievable ‘best practice’ benchmark
is for Australia (see Chapter  1 for a discussion of the limitations of
benchmarking).
Consequently, the estimated cost savings presented in this chapter represent
rough ‘best estimate’ numbers.  They are intended to illustrate the broad
magnitude of the possible gains.
11.1 Impacts of service problems
Perceptions about the timeliness of sea transport can differ among importers and
exporters depending on the type of cargo exported and imported.  Generally,
shippers are aware that delays are affecting their logistical arrangements and
imposing costs.  However, those contacted in the course of the study were
unaware of the extent to which waterfront services might be improved.
Consequently, they were unable to quantify the cost of poor performance.
Timeliness is particularly important to suppliers of highly perishable products,
such as fruit and vegetables, seasonal products and non-seasonal products
associated with just-in-time deliveries.  A 2 day delay in ship arrival and
departure is usually critical to shippers of perishable products, but may not be
for a product with a longer shelf life.
Delays can also present problems for exporters and importers of seasonal
products.  Some seasonal products attract premiums during a narrow span of
time when no alternative supplies are available.  If the product does not arrive
before its expiry date it is unlikely that the product can be sold at all.  Particular
examples include Chinese cabbage, broccoli and asparagus sold into South–East
Asia.
Furthermore, if commodities are imported to supply seasonal industries such as
the fishing or wine industries and if these goods miss the season for which they
were purchased, sales may be lost or made at greatly reduced prices.  Shippers
incur the financial cost of having the capital tied up when goods are held over to
the next suitable season.
Airfreight is used on some occasions, and regularly for some high valued
products such as crayfish.  However, most shippers have no financially viable
option other than sea transport.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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There have been improvements in waterfront services over the last 10 years.
For example, the number of industrial disputes has reduced.  That said, the
analysis of stevedoring service performance in earlier chapters indicates
significant scope for further improvement (see Chapters 6 to 9).
There has been improvement in interface operations as well.  For example: the
introduction of vehicle booking systems in Melbourne and Sydney, which are
the largest container ports in Australia; the introduction of SCA for the
clearance of cargo; the introduction of BAPLIE, which allows the ships stowage
plans (bayplans) to be electronically transmitted between the container
terminals, container parks and the shipping line, and the introduction of fixed-
day sailing schedules in some major ports.
Nevertheless, problems remain, as discussed in Chapter 10.  There are a number
of proposed changes envisaged, such as greater use of sea waybills and
electronic commerce, an upgrade of the EXIT system and the phasing out of
COMPILE.  The ACS is also trialing a cargo management strategy in
partnership with a number of international traders and government.  However,
these initiatives will not fully address the problems.
Importers and exporters also have to improve their performance so that cargo is
delivered to the waterfront and picked up in a timely and reliable manner.  As
noted by some traders, it is often their own internal operations and practices that
create delays.
11.2 Direct costs
Failure to achieve efficient levels of waterfront service results in higher ‘blue
water’ freight charges.  Delays to ships in ports affect capital utilisation if
shipping schedules are to be maintained at levels required by shippers.  Where
shipping services are competitive and providing a normal rate of return, the
savings from better utilisation of ships and the use of larger ships would be
reflected in the service charge.
Direct costs of poor service performance are also incurred at the port–land
interface and in contingent international and domestic transport arrangements.
Terminal delays to ships
There is a spectrum of possible changes to both charges and service with
productivity improvement.  At one extreme, the same level of output or service
could be produced with less resources.  At the other, services could be improved
without increasing charges.11   IMPACT OF WATERFRONT SERVICE PERFORMANCE ON IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
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The issue considered in this section is the improvement in service to shipping
lines.
Faster turnaround
Savings could be achieved with an increase in the net crane rate through faster
ship turnaround times.  The benchmarking results for container stevedoring
indicate that the differential varies between 12.5 hours and 54.6 hours,
depending on the trade (see Table 6.3).  The upper and lower bound of these
delays account for between 2.4 and 0.6  per  cent of the total voyage time
respectively.
Not all of this is realisable however, given the scale disadvantages of Australian
stevedoring operations (see Chapter 2).  It is doubtful whether ship owners
would fully rationalise their fleets or services, given that they are not currently
facing capacity constraints.
If most of the lower bound of the delay (0.6 per cent of the voyage time) could
be removed — say half of one per cent — a saving of around 2 days per year
might be achieved.  This is equivalent to $25 per TEU per annum, adopting $14
per slot day as a typical current ship operating cost.1  This amounts to around $2
per TEU for a ship making six voyages per annum (8 hours per round trip or
4 hours per voyage leg).
Delays
Shipping lines claim that they must build slack into their shipping schedules to
take account of delays that they may experience on the Australian waterfront.
This is required because of the importance placed by shippers on frequent and
reliable shipping services — and by shipping lines because it affects patronage,
as a consequence.  Where delays occur, they are compensated by increasing
frequency.
Operators in the North American liner shipping trades report that they found it
necessary to employ one additional ship in order to protect their schedule
integrity against delays on the Australian coast — a contingency factor of
14  per  cent (see Box 6.1).  Thompson Clarke Shipping estimate that if this
contingency factor were universal to the trade, it would represent a cost of at
least US $21.0 million annually.
Based on the 1996 total trade of 97 000 TEU between Australia and the North
America, this cost penalty can be expressed as the approximate equivalent of
A$215 per 20 foot container.
                                            
1 A ‘slot’ refers to a space aboard a cellular container ship for one TEU.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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On shorter trades, the saving would be much less because of the greater number
of ships and sailing options open to shippers.  Consequently, an indicative
contingency factor may be in the order of 10 per cent.
Assuming that this factor could be halved (to 5 per cent — or approximately
one third of the delay experienced by operators in the North American trades),
18 days of ship operating costs would be saved per year.  This amounts to
3 days per round trip or 1.5 days for each voyage leg.  Again, adopting the
Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics’ (BTCE) typical cost for
a ship making six voyages per annum, the saving represents around
$20 per TEU for each leg.
Interface delays
Importers and exporters face a number of interface delays that affect the
timeliness and reliability of their logistical arrangements.  These delays are
caused by a lack of co-ordination and inadequate interface service (see
Chapter 10).
The breakdown in co-ordination can emanate from within the waterfront from
labour disputes and other disruptions to the operations of terminals (see
Section 10.1).  They can also be caused by land-side problems — for example,
with quarantine and customs clearance or documentation — that delay road
transport operations (see Section 10.2).  They are exacerbated by late delivery
of export containers and collection left until the last day prior to the imposition
of storage fees by the stevedore.
Interface delays result in additional road transport costs, typically demurrage
charges for trucks waiting at container terminals.  They particularly affect
imports because the need for co-ordination is greater with more activities
involved.
The BTCE (1997d) estimated that a 50 per cent reduction of demurrage costs in
Sydney and Botany Bay would save shippers approximately $14 million per
annum.  This represents approximately $25  per container or 30 minutes of
demurrage at $50 per hour.
Sydney ports, through which one third of all containers in Australia pass, are
alleged to have the worst truck queuing problems in Australia.  The records of
one exporter show that average demurrage costs in Melbourne are currently $10
per container.  If this is a universal experience in ports other than Sydney, the
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($10 x 1 million containers).2  Assuming half of the delays could be eliminated,
the additional saving in all ports other than Sydney would be $5 million per
annum.
On the basis of these calculations an indicative estimate of the savings that
could be made by reducing truck queue delays by 50  per  cent is around
$19 million per annum.  This is equivalent to $9 per container.
To this estimate must be added the costs associated with break-bulk operations.
Contingency transport arrangements
When delays occur to the shipment of goods, shippers are sometimes compelled
to use alternative transport arrangements (see Box 11.1 for examples).  Any
additional transport cost incurred, represents a direct cost of poor performance.
Box 11.1 Example of a contingency transport arrangement caused
by an industrial dispute
If there is an industrial dispute which prevents a reefer valued at $25 000 from reaching
Japan, it can be held until the next sailing in two weeks time.
a  It may be stored at the
wharf (storage costs).  Payment for these products is delayed by a further two weeks
(Opportunity cost of $25 000 invested elsewhere for two weeks).
If these products were to be airfreighted, the costs will include unpacking the container and
repacking ($180 times 2), transportation costs ($190 times 2), the cost to airfreight which
is three times the cost of sea freight ($3 000 times 3).
The total cost to airfreight is around 40 per cent of the total value of the products.
a This is a low-valued reefer cargo.  The value can be $80 000 or more.
To maintain supply schedules, shippers who are unable to airfreight may be
required to use road freight to and from other ports, such as Fremantle and
Brisbane, when strikes occur at Sydney and Melbourne.  This imposes
additional costs, because road freight costs are more than sea freight over the
same distance.  There is also a cost associated with organising the shipment at
short notice.
Shippers who have to maintain supplies in Australia or overseas are often forced
to airfreight when there is industrial action.  Significant additional transport
                                            
2 Assuming that the number of containers is equivalent to 80 per cent of the 2.1 million TEUs
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costs are incurred.  For example, air freight to New Zealand costs one exporter
$0.90 a kilo compared to a sea freight cost of $0.60 a kilo.3
General delays — and early arrival of ships for that matter — can also require
the importers or exporters to change their land-side transport arrangements.  For
example, importers might decide to off-load at an earlier port of call and utilise
road freight to guarantee that an essential input arrives when required.
11.3 Indirect costs
The indirect costs incurred by importers and exporters are in effect additional
production costs.  Although intangible, they nevertheless increase the cost of
imported goods and reduce the returns from exports.
Indirect costs include financing and insurance costs.  These costs arise because
the time taken to transport cargo is longer than it should when efficient and
reliable service levels are not achieved.  Also included are inventory costs,
increased production costs and foregone production because of lost export
opportunities.  These costs arise because of uncertainty about the time that a
shipment will take.
These costs are not normally additive.  Trade-offs are usually made between the
use of contingency transport arrangements, holding additional inventories of
stock, incurring production costs or losing sales.
Financing costs
The financing cost of increased transit times can be substantial.  In Section 11.2
it was assumed that shipping lines could reduce transit times in the order of
4 hours (0.17 days) per voyage leg.  It was also estimated that the allowance for
unreliability could be reduced by 1.5 days per voyage leg.  The total saving if
ships reduced their transit times and reduced the slack in their schedules to
accommodate delays in Australian ports could be in the order of 1.7 days.
Assuming that $62 billion of imports and exports are shipped by container into
and out of Australia each year, the interest required to hold these goods for this
period is approximately $28  million at 10  per  cent interest — or $13  per
container.4
                                            
3 With some goods airfreight can be up to three times the amount paid for sea freight.
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For some shippers the cost can be particularly high.  For example, one container
of a high value commodity can be worth up to $200 000.  A 5 day delay in
receiving payment on a container of cargo with this value is approximately
$200, which is equivalent to the terminal handling cost.
Insurance costs
Delays to the transit time of imports and exports emanating from the Australian
waterfront unnecessarily increase the exposure to risk of damage and pilfering.
With increased exposure to risk, insurance premiums can be expected to be
higher than they would otherwise be with shorter time at sea and in stevedoring.
Estimation of this additional cost is difficult, because sea freight insurance is
quoted on a shipment — rather than a daily — basis.  To the extent that they are
affected, additional insurance costs — like financing costs — will be incurred.
Inventory costs
Inventory costs are higher than necessary when additional stocks must be held
here or overseas because of the unreliability of the Australian waterfront.
Importers and exporters’ customers incur additional financing costs because
they have to maintain additional inventories (see Box 11.2 for examples).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box 11.2 Examples of impact of delays on inventory holdings
Shippers have taken a range of measures in response to the unreliability of the Australian
waterfront.  For example:
·  To overcome the uncertainty of potential industrial disputes, a buffer in ordering
goods from the USA and the UK is maintained.  Orders are placed at least a month
earlier than necessary, that is, every 3 instead of every 4 months.
·  The customer of one exporter maintains at least 3 months stock because shipments
are not delivered on time.
·  As a contingency measure against the threat of a 4 to 6 week strike on the
waterfront earlier this year, $20 million of product was shipped off-shore.
In extreme cases, the threat of industrial disputation and delays has caused
exporters to stockpile goods overseas.  This imposes both financial holding and
storage costs.  One exporter reported warehouse storage costs averaged around
$40 per tonne per day.  They estimated that storage costs caused by waterfront
delays accounted for 1.4 per cent of their total value of exports in 1996–97.
Shippers might be expected to make the same allowance as shipping lines for
delays in Australian ports.  This is assumed to be in the order of 10 per cent
across all liner shipping trades (see section above on terminal delays to ships).
This must be reduced by the saving in the time shipping lines could decrease
their transit times with improved reliability, that is, by 5 per cent or 1.5 days per
voyage leg.
The opportunity cost of capital for 1.5 days on Australia’s imports and exports
at 10  per  cent interest is $25  million — or $12 per container.  This is an
underestimate of the inventory cost because it does not include storage costs.
Disruption to production
Delays caused by unreliable waterfront services can disrupt production (see
Box 11.3 for examples).  For example, access to essential inputs from overseas
can be delayed.  This imposes costs on manufacturers and increases the cost of
their products.11   IMPACT OF WATERFRONT SERVICE PERFORMANCE ON IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
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Box 11.3 Examples of disruption to production
Shippers provided some examples of the production problems caused by the unreliability
of shipping schedules:
·  One shipper noted that shipping schedules vary substantially, 90 per cent of ships
do not arrive at Australian ports on the scheduled day.  When ships arrive early it
causes significant problems because production schedules have to be rearranged.
For example, it takes time to plan a new production schedule.  Payment of penalty
rates is usually required when changes are made at short notice and sales can be lost
on the domestic market (stock not available).
·  Another shipper observed that the cut-off times for the receipt of cargo at the
terminal tend to move around significantly, depending on changes to the ship’s
scheduled arrival.  This can cause problems because of tight production runs.  On
some occasions overtime has to be worked to ensure that the product can be
delivered to the wharf before the cut-off date.
Over the longer term, the additional cost may affect the viability of exporting.
Export production in Australia is affected by unreliability when products are
differentiated for overseas markets.  Differentiated products often require
special production runs where a production line has to be shut down and
converted for the export product.  Increases in cost are therefore incurred if a
disruption caused by a waterfront delay involves unscheduled adjustments to
production.  Otherwise, alternative transport arrangements or an inventory of
additional stock holdings is required.
Lost output
There are difficulties in determining the impact of unreliability on potential
export sales.  It is common for overseas buyers to diversify their source of
supply — especially for critical inputs to production — as a risk management
strategy.  The impact depends on the perceptions of reliability by overseas
purchasers of Australian goods and the cost implication of delays.  A further
complication is that substitute goods are rarely identical in quality and price.
Consequently, reliability is only one factor in the decision to purchase
Australian exports.
Australian exporters are already disadvantaged by the remoteness from overseas
markets.  Unreliability further disadvantages them.  The higher the risk to
overseas buyers of disruptions in supply — all other things being equal — the
smaller the market share Australian exporters will be able to gain.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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One delay incident can have lasting consequences.  Overseas buyers who
redirect their business may do so for some time.  Unless they continued to
monitor the performance of the Australian waterfront, it may take some time for
them to discover that reliability has improved.
The lost output may be a long-term phenomenon or result in the loss of seasonal
sales overseas because the product does not reach the market in time (see
Box 11.4).  As the sale of traded goods is involved, any loss of potential output
reduces the opportunity to increase national wealth.
Box 11.4 The importance of reliability to overseas purchasers of
Australian goods
Some comments about the importance of reliable shipments by Australian exporters
follows:
·  The Japanese market is very competitive and reliability of supply is essential.  The
Japanese customer is able to source the same products from other non Australian
suppliers.
·  Japan is a major destination of our products, accounting for 40 per cent of our
exports.  The Japanese are very sensitive to disruptions in the supply chain.  They
undertake a very thorough investigation of companies to establish if they are a
reliable organisation.  We often receive requests for information about our business
from potential customers.
·  The most significant cost with respect to the lack of timeliness and unreliability of
Australian waterfront services is the damage to customer relations.  We estimated
that we have lost 40 per cent of business because of these perceptions.  Indirect
costs associated with loss of sales are estimated at 30 to 35 per cent of the value of
exports.
·  Delays on the wharf with a seasonal product such as ours would probably cause us
to lose $60 000 worth of sales for that month and that would drastically affect the
cash flow and cost us $650 in interest.  If it occurred in January the effect could be
even greater as the sales may then be delayed until the next October which would
increase the cost of interest to $5850.
11.4 Implications
The above rough estimates of indicative service costs are presented in
Table 11.1.  These estimates are not intended to be any more than indicative of
the relative order of magnitude.  They are not comprehensive — insurance, and11   IMPACT OF WATERFRONT SERVICE PERFORMANCE ON IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
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contingency transport costs have not been estimated.  Furthermore, they may
also be conservative because items such as storage costs have been assumed to
have zero economic cost.
Savings may be obtained through service improvement that reduces these direct
and indirect costs.  The savings from faster and more reliable services are
estimated to be in the order of $50 per container.  As a basis for comparison, a
10 per cent reduction in direct charges — requiring in the order of 20 per cent
productivity improvement — would reduce overall cost by approximately
$20 per container.
The broader implication is that performance improvement must come primarily
from greater flexibility in stevedoring work arrangements, better co-ordination
of interface operations and co-ordination of land-side activities with the
waterfront.
In the case of stevedoring, this must involve not only work practices but
industrial harmony and co-operation between the workforce and management.
Improved co-ordination depends on waterfront reliability and requires shipper
discipline and better communication between all those involved in the sea
transport chain.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table 11.1 Indicative estimates of savings from service improvements,
1997
Indicative amount
Cost saving item Direct Indirect Total Assumption
($/TEU) ($/TEU) ($/TEU)
Service time
Ship turnaround 2 2 Saving of 8 hours per voyage
achieved by reducing the net crane
rate gap by half.
Finance cost of
goods in transit
13 13 An average saving of 1.67 days at 10
per cent interest comprising a ship
turnaround and a reduction of delays
by five per cent.
All 2 13 15
Unreliability
Ship delays 20 20 Saving of 1.5 days.
Demurrage 9 9 Half the current demurrage cost of
$50 in Sydney and Port Botany and
$10 elsewhere.
Inventory 12 12 Saving equal to 1.5 days in addition
to the saving in finance costs.
All 29 12 41
All service costs 31 25 56
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant) data.213
A PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY
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B DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
Consultants were engaged to collect much of the data used in this
study.  Actual data was collected for ships trading in each of the
major liner shipping trades servicing Australian ports.  Great care
was exercised to ensure consistency among the data collected by the
consultants.
The brief issued to potential consultants and the data collection methodology
adopted are outlined in this appendix.
B.1 The consultant’s brief
A detailed brief was circulated to prospective consultants outlining the
Commission’s requirements.  The brief was specified in two parts.  Part A
concerned the benchmarking of performance and primarily involved the
collection of numerical data.  Part B concerned the benchmarking of practices
and primarily involved the collection of qualitative information.
The prospective consultants were invited to tender for each part separately and
were able to tender for either or both of these parts.  The main areas of
information to be collected under each part were:
Part A: Benchmarking performance
·  Customer satisfaction
·  Operating efficiency
Part B: Arrangements and practices
·  Government involvement in port provision
·  Stevedoring work organisation
A general requirement of the brief was that the consultant ensure that, as far as
possible, the information collected was consistent and representative.  For
example, where shipping lines provided data it should cover a similar period of
time.  The consultant should nominate the overall period of time for which the
indicators have been quantified.  Furthermore, the data should relate to the same
ships used in the Australian trades.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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This was an important requirement of the brief.  It ensured that data was
collected by tracking the same ship among the Australian and overseas ports
which formed the particular trade.  The ships chosen were typical of those
operating in the particular trade.
Following a rigorous evaluation of the tenders received, Thompson Clarke
Shipping Pty Ltd was selected to undertake both parts of the consultancy.
B.2 Data collection
In consultation with the Commission, Thompson Clarke Shipping adopted a
data collection approach based on Australia’s five major international container
shipping trade lanes:
·  Australia — UK/Europe
·  Australia — North America
·  Australia — North Asia
·  Australia — South East Asia
·  Australia — New Zealand
A major international container operator, or operating consortium, was
identified for each of the liner shipping trades and approached by the consultant
for assistance in the provision of data to reflect actual costs incurred and service
performance in respect of specific ships engaged in the trade.  A particular ship
was tracked on each trade and information collected on the charges levied on
the cargo or the ship itself.
The ships on each trade were generally tracked for one year.  This ensured that
several observations were obtained from each port within the trade.
This approach differed from that adopted in waterfront benchmarking studies
conducted by the Bureau of Industry Economics in two respects — the use of
actual rather than estimated data, and like-with-like comparisons between ports
by tracking a specific ship typical of those operating in each trade.
Charges are reported in Australian dollars at June 1997.  The exchange rates
applying at that time, used for conversion are presented in Table B1.1.  Many of
the rates have changed substantially since the data was collected.  However,
Australia’s relative ranking in levels of charges has not been affected by recent
exchange rate fluctuations.B   DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
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Table B1.1 Currency exchange rates used in the study, June 1997
Currency Exchange rate (AUD$)
Denmark 4.90







United States of America 0.77
Coverage
Pilotage, towage and mooring charges (marine charges) along with government
and port authority charges for port infrastructure were examined for each of the
ports included in the benchmarking of container and bulk shipping stevedoring.
In each case, the selection of ports was based on those which have direct service
to Australia.
The stevedoring of containers was benchmarked at the following ports:
·  Australia: Adelaide, Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney-Port
Botany;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Lyttelton;
·  Asia: Port Klang, Singapore, Nagoya and Pusan;
·  North America: Philadelphia and Los Angeles; and
·  Europe: Tilbury and Hamburg.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Ship size varied among the trades included in the study:
·  ships of 2000 to 3000 TEU class in the Australia UK/Europe trade;
·  ships of 1000 to 2000 TEU class in the Australia North America (East
coast) trade;
·  ships of 500 to 1800 TEU class in the Australia North America (West
coast) trade;
·  ships of 1500 to 3000 TEU class in the Australia North Asia;
·  ships of 1500 to 2500 TEU class in the Australia South–East Asia; and
·  ships of 500 to 1800 TEU class in the Australia New Zealand.
Cruise shipping baggage handling and provedoring charges were benchmarked
across a range of major cruise ports in Australia and overseas.  The cruise ship
ports benchmarked were:
·  Australia: Brisbane, Cairns, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Wellington;
·  Asia: Singapore;
·  North America: Los Angles and Miami; and
·  Europe: Copenhagen and Tilbury.
The cruise ships included in the study were of 900 and 1600 passenger capacity.
The consultant also collected some information on berth availability and the
timeliness and reliability of Australian terminals.  Berth availability was
measured as the proportion of ship arrivals that could access a berth within four
hours of the advised arrival time.
Methodology
The data collection methodology was developed in consultation with the
Commission.  The data collection task comprised:
·  the preparation of data checklists itemising every information component
required to complete the data collection task;
·  the consultant identifying against each information component, the
appropriate source(s) to be approached; and
·  copies of the checklists being circulated to consultancy team members in
their respective countries.B   DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
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The information gathering process was undertaken by means of personal
interviews with key staff in each of the port authorities, container operators, and
service providers — for example towage operators, terminal operators, and pilot
services.
Data collected by the Commission
In addition to the data collected by the consultants, the Commission also
collected data on:
·  break-bulk and bulk stevedoring operations; and
·  the problems associated with poor port–land interface operations.
The break-bulk stevedoring of passenger motor vehicles, pulp and newsprint
paper, timber and hot-rolled steel coil was benchmarked.  The ports covered
across this range of commodities were:
·  Australia: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle, Port
Kembla and Devonport;
·  Europe: Amsterdam, Barking, Grangemouth, and Hull;
·  North America: Philadelphia;
·  New Zealand: Auckland and Tauranga; and
·  South Africa: Durban.
Importers and exporters were approached directly by the Commission for
information on stevedoring costs and information on timeliness, reliability and
cargo integrity (damage).
The cost of stevedoring bulk grain loading and bulk fertiliser unloading was
examined in the following ports:
Grain
·  Australia: Average across all grain ports; and
·  North America: New Orleans, Portland, Prince Rupert
Fertiliser
·  Australia: Adelaide, Albany, Brisbane, Geelong, Hobart, Kwinana,
Newcastle, Townsville; and
·  New Zealand: Lyttelton, Napier, Dunedin.
Data was collected for the bulk cargoes of wheat and fertiliser, as these are the
only bulk cargoes in Australia for which contract stevedores are engaged.  DataINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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on the cost of stevedoring wheat in overseas ports was collected by a consultant
(Asiaworld).  Data on the cost in Australia was obtained from the Australian
Wheat Board.  Data on the cost of fertiliser stevedoring was obtained from
shippers for various Australian and New Zealand ports.  Shippers in countries
other than New Zealand were unwilling to provided data to the Commission.
The Commission also collected qualitative data on the timeliness and reliability
of the port-land interface.  This data was collected by direct discussions with
the various participants on the waterfront.  A list of those consulted in the
preparation of this study is in Appendix A.223
C GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
Government waterfront involvement varies considerably.  Some
engage in providing facilities and services, while others adopt a
landlord role where they own and lease facilities.
The disparate approach to government involvement has significant
implications for benchmark comparisons.
Governments have traditionally been involved in supplying or regulating port
services.  The reasons for this include the public good characteristics of some of
the facilities provided, concerns about the competitive environment where
natural monopoly characteristics can also be present, and a broad public interest
in using ports as a means of encouraging trade and regional development.
Public good characteristics are present where the consumption of a service by
one person or group does not exclude the possibility of consumption by others,
nor does it diminish the value of their consumption.  Where consumers can free
ride, the incentives for private provision are lessened.
To some extent, navigational aids, channels, and breakwaters are examples of
infrastructure which it may be difficult to exclude some people from using, and
hence have some public good characteristics.  However, because control of
navigation and mooring by port authorities would bring most users into the
regulatory net, these characteristics are relatively weak, and by themselves,
probably do not constitute a compelling case for public ownership.
Natural monopoly characteristics are often also present in ports.  This means
that in any one port it can be more efficient to have one services supplier than
two or more.  For example only one set of channels is usually required.
Where inter-port competition is muted or absent, private owners have an
incentive to use their market power to raise prices, and this may justify
regulation.  Alternatively, the adverse effects of market power can be addressed
through public ownership, but this will depend on government objectives and
any controls placed on the authority.  Economic rent may be captured by the
government owners through dividends or levies, or dissipated by the authority
through cost padding and poor work practices, or given back to port users to
facilitate trade.
The use of ports to encourage economic and social development is an important
issue for many governments.  Public ownership and governance structures may
be important means for achieving the broad objectives of government.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Governance is concerned with systems for controlling and directing an
organisation.  In many cases the Minister responsible for the port (the portfolio
minister) may have powers to direct the port’s managers, with implications for
the efficient supply of port services.
C.1 Ownership
Of the ports benchmarked in this study, Government ownership has been the
norm rather than the exception:
·  two of the ports — Los Angeles and Hamburg — are owned and managed
by City governments in their respective countries;
·  one of the ports — Nagoya — is jointly owned and managed by the local
City government and that of the Prefecture adjacent to the port;
·  two of the ports — Port Klang and Singapore — are owned by central
governments and managed by statutory authorities; and
·  the remaining port — Philadelphia — is owned and managed by two
neighbouring State governments (see Table C.1).
All six of the Australian ports are owned by State Governments and have been
set up as statutory corporations or as commercialised statutory authorities (see
Box C.1).1
Only two ports covered in this study are partly or wholly privately owned.
These are Auckland (a publicly listed company but 80 per cent of the stock is
held by a community based trust), and Tilbury (a subsidiary of Forth Ports Plc).
Prior to 1992, the port of Auckland was a government trading enterprise.  In
1992, it was formed into a public company by act of Parliament, and the
Auckland Regional Council’s 80  per  cent holding was transferred to the
Auckland Regional Services Trust (ARST).  The remaining 20 per cent went to
the Waikato Regional Council which subsequently divested its shares.  As a
result, the Ports of Auckland Corporation now has a large number of
shareholders, but is still majority owned by ARST.  ARST is a statutory
authority, the members of which are elected by the people of Auckland during
local body elections.  The Government is not represented on the board of
ARST.
                                            
1  An alternative model is the company corporation model, in which public bodies are governed
by the general rules set out in Corporations Law.  By comparison the statutory models
allows governments to tailor the regulatory framework to their specific needs.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.1 Ownership and business type, 1997
Port Ownership Form
Australian
Adelaide State government. Statutory corporation.
Brisbane State government. Statutory corporation.
Fremantle State government. Commercialised statutory authority
b.
Melbourne State government. Statutory corporation.
Sydney State government. Statutory corporation.
Overseas
Auckland Nominally private, but with the
Auckland Regional Trust owning
80 per cent of shares.
Listed company.
Hamburg City State of Hamburg. City departments (there is no Port
authority as such).
Port Klang Federal government. Statutory corporation.
Los Angeles State government, managed by the
City of Los Angeles.
City department.
Nagoya Jointly owned by Nagoya City and
Aichi prefecture.
Statutory authority.
Philadelphia State governments of New Jersey
and Pennsylvania.
A new entity named Ports of
Philadelphia and Camden Inc (PPC)
has been formed to merge the Port of
Philadelphia with the Port of
Camden.  Formal merger is still
pending, but is operating
administratively.
Singapore National government. Statutory corporation (corporatised
October 1997).
Tilbury Private (wholly owned by Forth
Ports Plc, a quoted company).
Private limited company (Plc).
a Port of Adelaide managed by South Australian Ports Corporation which manages all major South
Australian ports.
b Fremantle Port Authority was commercialised effective 1 July 1996.
c Responsibility for channels vested in Victorian Channels Authority.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Tilbury on the other hand, is fully privately owned.  The owner is Forth Ports
Plc, a listed company specialising in the ownership and operation of ports.
There is no element of Government proprietorship or regulation, beyond the
laws and regulations to which all UK corporations are subject.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box C.1 Corporatisation
Corporatisation is intended to replicate the many commercial incentives which apply to
private firms, and increase the separation between the Government Trading Enterprise
(GTE) and government.  It encompasses administrative reforms to give public enterprises
a more commercial focus and reforms to establish a competitive environment.  The key
features of corporatisation usually include:
·  the government sets clear and non conflicting objectives for the GTE;
·  management is given greater responsibilities and autonomy over day-to-day
decisions on investments, revenue and expenditure and commercial strategy;
·  as a substitute for market-based scrutiny, performance is monitored against a range
of financial and non-financial criteria;
·  rewards and sanctions related to performance are introduced for managers; and
·  competitive neutrality mechanisms are applied to ensure that the GTE does not have
any comparative advantages (or disadvantages) relative to a private organisation
operating in under similar market risks (usually this entails the application of tax
equivalents payments, and a premium to offset the interest rate advantage associated
with government ownership).
Corporatisation can be implemented either through incorporation under the corporations
law as a limited liability company, or as a statutory authority under its own legislation.
The statutory option has been the most common approach for corporatising Australian
port authorities.  It is usually supported through the application of umbrella legislation
which regulates some common aspects of a number of GTEs, and it allows for States to
customise the regulatory environment to include features not required under corporations
legislation.  For example, the Sydney Ports Corporation was constituted by the Ports
Corporatisation and Waterways Management Act  1995, and is subject to the general
governance and corporate rules set out in the  State owned Corporations Act 1989.
Government involvement is probably at its greatest in the case of Philadelphia.
The State government owned ports of Philadelphia and Camden NJ have been
engaged in protracted merger negotiations since 1994.  Although the two ports
are being operated administratively as a single entity, the two governments
involved have not yet finalised the merger.  The embryonic joint corporation has
a board comprising 18 members — nine from each State — with the board
members picked as representatives, and not necessarily on their port
management skills.
A range of institutional forms are present in the benchmarked ports.  At one
extreme are the ports run by government departments which have no separateC   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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legal identity, and are subject to direct government intervention.  At the other
extreme, Tilbury is owned and operated by the private sector.  In between, there
are a range of authorities that have been corporatised in different ways.
All the Australian ports benchmarked are statutory authorities, and all have been
effectively corporatised.  Recent developments include:
·  Adelaide: changed from part of a government department to a statutory
corporation;
·  Fremantle: commercialised along lines that make it almost as corporatised
as other Australian ports benchmarked (for instance, like the corporatised
ports there is a requirement to pay dividends, but less autonomy has been
granted to the board over matters such as appointment of senior staff); and
·  Melbourne: the Victorian State Government has departed somewhat from
the standard model and split the old Port of Melbourne Authority into the
Melbourne Port Corporation (the land-holding entity), and the Victorian
Channels Authority (the entity with responsibility for the channels and
navigation aids of Port Phillip Bay).
Overseas, some ports are still run as departments of city or regional
governments.  These include the ports of Hamburg and Los Angeles.  A recent
development was the corporatisation of the Port of Singapore Authority in
October 1997.
C.2 Institutional arrangements and competition
The ports studied differ markedly in the services offered (see Table C.2).  One
of the key distinctions is between the predominantly landlord-only models of
the Australian ports, with the mixed operations of many overseas ports.  The
landlord model is characterised by the port authority concentrating on supplying
core services only, with the more contestable waterfront services, such as
stevedoring, supplied privately.
The move to a predominantly landlord model the Australian ports is now largely
complete.  Fremantle offers pilotage services and the South Australian Ports
Corporation provides pilotage services for all South Australian ports.  One of
the most recent reforms concerns the sale by the South Australian Ports
Corporation of its bulk handling facilities in November 1997.  By comparison,
only three of the overseas ports are landlord authorities (Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, and Port Klang), and of these, the Philadelphia port authority also
manages the port of Camden NJ, on the other side of the Delaware river, which
is an operating port.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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a Some bulk handling facilities recently sold.
b Pilotage.
c Pilotage services provided by a private company under contract.
d Responsibility for channels vested in Victorian Channels Authority.
e Ports of Auckland manages commercial waterways on subcontract to the Auckland Regional
Council.
f Port authority holds 20 per cent equity in Klang Container Terminals.
g Port of Philadelphia is being merged with Port of Camden.  Former is a landlord port, latter is
primarily an operating port.
h The new Port of Philadelphia and Camden is regarded as an important vehicle for securing and
protecting regional employment.
Source: Thomson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
The remaining overseas ports are vertically integrated in one way or another —
providing landlord services, cargo and other services.  For instance, the Ports of
Auckland Ltd offers users a total service.  The port operates an integrated labour
force where a multi-skilled team works in pilotage, towage, stevedoring and
general port operations.  It is able to provide all port services to customers at
fixed prices, irrespective of time and day of arrival and departure.
Singapore is similarly vertically integrated, offering a suite of waterfront
services.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Both of the private sector ports included in the study are also ‘mixed ports’,
where cargo handling services are operated in competition with independent
stevedores and terminal operators.
Other examples of vertical integration, albeit of a less direct nature, include:
·  the City State of Hamburg owns and operates the Port of Hamburg and is
also the owner and operator of the largest container terminal in the port
(see Box C.2);
·  the Klang Port Authority operates as a landlord authority but has retained
20  per  cent equity in the privatised Klang Container terminal company
(Klang Port Authority 1996, p.26); and
·  the Nagoya Port Authority builds terminals and leases them to private
operators, and thus provides yet another model of industry organisation.
Box C.2 Vertical integration: the Port of Hamburg
The Port of Hamburg provides a different example of integration through common
ownership by the City State of Hamburg of the port and the largest container terminal
operator.
Before 1970, nearly all cargo operations in the port were supplied by the one operator, the
State owned Hamburger Hafen und Lagerhaus AG (HHLA).  Private operators were
required to subcontract from HHLA.  In 1970, HHLA was reorganised along private
company lines but its share capital, was and still is, 100 per cent owned by the City State
of Hamburg.  Private operators were able to contract directly with the Port owner, and
thus compete with HHLA.
The entry of independent container stevedoring companies since that time appears now to
be to be in reverse, with HHLA having taken over smaller operators such as Tollerot
Container Terminal GmbH.  HHLA now operate more than 70  per  cent of the Port’s
container handling capacity.
The mix of services and institutional arrangements can have important
implications for the efficient supply of waterfront services.  The vertical
integration of landlord services — maintenance of channels and navigational
aids — and more contestable services, may be important in reducing costs.  For
example, in Auckland, a labour force which can switch from one activity to
another may be able to cope more effectively with the fluctuations in work load
and hence provide more efficient services.  The ability to smooth workloads and
manage risk by being vertically integrated may be especially important to
smaller ports where there is a high degree of variability in ship visits and hence
work loads.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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That said, the benefits of being vertically integrated need to be weighed against
any possible adverse influences on competition and economic efficiency.
Where problems might arise is in the potential for a conflict of interest between
the port authority in setting waterfront service charges and lease payments
payable by related cargo handling businesses.  In theory, vertical integration
offers port authorities with market power the potential to cross subsidise the
contestable elements of its business with above normal profits from its
monopoly business.
Care is required to ensure that competitive influences are maintained or that
provision is made for prices oversight and possibly regulation.  Care also needs
to be taken that barriers to entry are not created.  Even if vertical integration is
the least cost approach it may not always stay that way.  Availability of land for
development is also an important issue, with an incumbent vertically integrated
authority likely to resist releasing land to would be competitors.
C.3 Port authority objectives and governance
Governance is concerned with systems for controlling and directing
organisations which improve the organisations performance (see Box C.3).
Given that owners and managers of ports may have different objectives, the way
that they are set up can have an important influence in establishing and
achieving those objectives.
Australian statutory authorities may have objectives set out in legislation.
These are often couched in fairly broad terms, for example, the Sydney Ports
Corporation is required to be a successful business, promote and facilitate trade,
and properly carry out its port safety functions.
Within this broad framework — consistent with the corporatisation models
implemented in Australia and elsewhere — the board has some autonomy in
day-to-day decisions regarding investments, revenue and expenditure and
commercial strategy.  In exchange, the board and senior management are made
more accountable, and to compensate for the absence of market-based
sanctions, the performance of the port is usually monitored.
Box C.3 A governance model
The Audit Office of New South Wales has recently suggested a governance model for
GTEs would maximise ‘value added by governing boards’ when:
·  the board is responsible to the Minister for the organisation meeting its goals;C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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·  the board appoints the CEO and is able to set the general policies by which the
Government’s goals can be met;
·  the organisation has a clear commercial focus;
·  the government could not unilaterally, or without offering compensation, impose its
non-commercial policies on the organisation; and
·  the board controls resources either through employing them directly or having a
formal contract with the provider.
Source: Audit Office of New South Wales 1997, pp. 7–8.
There is a fundamental tension in the corporatisation model.  Boards are given a
considerable amount of autonomy relative to other government structures and
are expected to behave in a commercial manner, but are constrained by
ministerial powers of intervention.  Therefore, it is neither possible to fully
replicate the disciplines and commercial autonomy of a publicly traded
company operating in a competitive market place, nor is it necessarily desirable.
For one thing, the public cannot withdraw its capital like private shareholders
can from publicly listed companies.  Moreover, ministerial direction may be
appropriate where the public expect ports to pursue a variety of goals.
Ministerial direction occurs most fundamentally in the development of the
statement of corporate intent or charter, but it may also apply with respect to
non-commercial activities.  For example, the Sydney Ports Corporation is
required under its enabling legislation to negotiate annually with its shareholder
ministers on the content of their statement of corporate intent.  Similar
provisions apply in other States (see Table C.3).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table C.3 Ministerial responsibilities, 1997
Port Portfolio(s) Powers and responsibilities Accountability
Australian
Adelaide Minister for Government
Enterprises and Treasurer.
Annually prepare a charter.




Brisbane Minister for Transport and
Main Roads and the
Treasurer.
Monitor performance. Instructions issued
as directives.














Corporate plan.  Monitor
performance.
Sydney Treasurer and Minister for
Olympics are
shareholders.  Minister for
Ports is portfolio Minister.
Endorse Statement of
corporate intent.  Portfolio









Auckland Minister for Transport. Oversee changes to articles




Hamburg Ministers for Economic
Affairs, and Finance.
Ministry of Economic
Affairs runs port.  Ministry




Port Klang Minister for Transport. Major policy issues referred
to Maritime Division of
Ministry of Transport.
Parliament.












Ministry of Transport issues
directives to NPA.
Table continues over page.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.3 (continued)
Port Portfolio(s) Powers and responsibilities Accountability
Philadelphia In effect the Governors
of Pennsylvania and New
Jersey responsible for
PPC.
State Governments will be







appointments.  Can give
directions.
Parliament.
Tilbury Secretary of State for
Transport.
Some residual controls for
planning and environmental
purposes.  Powers of appeal
concerning statutory charges
payable by Tilbury to Port of
London Authority.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
In the case of some of the overseas ports, managers have even less autonomy.
The city department models of Hamburg and Los Angeles have more or less
direct lines of management from elected officials to port management, and
considerable powers to direct port activities on a day-to-day basis.  The Port of
Hamburg does not have a board.  In the case of Los Angeles, a board of harbour
commissioners exists and nominally has management responsibilities, but the
City Council has the power to review every decision the board makes.
Even the statutory joint model of the Nagoya Port Authority (NPA) contains
numerous requirements for the board to consult with, or gain the approval of,
other organisations, limiting its ability to act unilaterally.  The NPA must, for
instance, develop its plans to conform to the policy and standards of the
Ministry of Transport (MOT), consult with the local Port and Harbour Council
and then obtain the endorsement of the MOT.  The NPA is also obliged to liaise
with the Ministries of Finance (on central funding), and the Ministry of Home
Affairs on organisation and staff.
In the case of Port Klang, all major policy issues are referred to the Maritime
Division of the Ministry of Transport.
An important feature of the corporatisation models chosen by Australian
governments for their port authorities is the provision for the explicit funding of
CSOs (see Table C.4).  Minister’s retain the power to direct their respective
ports to supply non-commercial activities, but typically must make the direction
in writing and provide for explicit funding.  In the case of Sydney Ports
Corporation, the portfolio Minister must give written direction for any non-INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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commercial activity.  In addition, if the activity is categorised as being in the
public interest, the Minister is required to consult with the Board on whether it
is in the Corporation’s interests, with the cost of the activity subject to possible
reimbursement.
Table C.4 Community Service Obligations, 1997
Port Service Government payment Implementation
Australian
Adelaide Nil, but provision for





Brisbane Nil, but provision for
CSOs to be provided.
Reimbursed if required. Ministerial direction in
writing required.




Melbourne Nil. May reimburse if
required.
Sydney Nil, but provision for
CSOs to be provided.




Hamburg Nil. CSO type activities
handled by other city
departments.






















Not reimbursed. As directed by Minister
(prior to October 1997).
Tilbury Nil, but links with
local council though
regeneration project.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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There is a dearth of detail on the formal arrangements that apply to the overseas
ports in this respect.  The general impression gained is that less formal
arrangements are more common than not.  For example, Los Angeles maintains
some relatively minor responsibilities for recreational facilities, and funds these
from its budget without reimbursement.
Trade facilitation is often an important role assigned to port authorities because
of their critical role in state and regional development.  For example the WA
government has stipulated that the Fremantle Port Authority is to facilitate trade
in an efficient and commercial manner (FPA 1996, p. 12).
Box C.4 Representation on the Board of the Ports of Philadelphia
and Camden
There are 18 members on the board of the Ports of Philadelphia and Camden, nine each
from Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  Of the nine Pennsylvania Board members:
·  four are appointed by the Governor of PA one of whom must represent the City of
Philadelphia;
·  one each are appointed by the President of the PA Senate, the Minority Leader of
the PA Senate, the Speaker of the PA House of Representatives, and the Minority
Leader of the PA House of Representatives; and
·  one is a Delaware River Port Authority board member selected by the PA member
of that board.
The nine New Jersey board members are appointed by the Governor of NJ:
·  two representing the Counties of Cape May, Cumberland and Salem;
·  four representing the counties of Camden and Gloucester; and
·  three representing the Counties of Burlington and Mercer.
A further qualification is that no more than five of the NJ board members may be members
of the same political party.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table C.5 Boards, 1997
Port Composition Appointment Term
Australian
Adelaide Up to five. By Governor on





Up to 3 years.
Brisbane Seven. Governor in Council on
recommendation of the State
Minister for Transport and State
Treasurer.  Based on relevant
experience.
Up to 5 years.
Fremantle Five. Governor. Up to 3 years.
Melbourne 3 to 5 members. State government. Not more than 3
years.
Sydney 3 to 7 members. Governor on recommendation of
voting shareholders. Ability to
assist Port to achieve its
principal objective.  One must be
staff director.
Not more than 5
years.
Overseas





Port Klang Chairman plus nine
board members.
King appoints Chairman.






Los Angeles Five members of Board
of Commissioners.
Mayor. 5 years, but
eligible for
reappointment.
Nagoya 30 members of Nagoya
Port Assembly.
15 each from Aichi Prefectural
Assembly and the Nagoya City
Assembly. Appt. along party
lines.
2 years.
Philadelphia New entity of PPC has
18 members, 9
appointed by
Pennsylvania and 9 by
New Jersey.
Most appointments are political,
and complex representation
conditions apply.
Generally 4 years.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table continues over page.
Table C.5 (continued)
Port Composition Appointment Term
Singapore Currently 10 plus
chairman.
Minister for Communications. Up to 5 years for
non executive
members.
Tilbury 9 directors of parent
company, Forth Ports
Plc.






Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Trade facilitation in its various guises is often an objective of many of the
overseas ports benchmarked.  Nagoya, and Port Klang are both examples.  As
part of a thirty year plan developed in 1987, the Nagoya Port Authority has set
the objective of facilitating the development of the nine prefectures of the
Nagoya region as a major centre for sophisticated industrial technology.  A core
function of the Klang Port Authority is to facilitate trade, to be achieved by
providing a commercial environment conducive to enhancing the port’s regional
role (Klang Port Authority, p. 3).  As the Port Klang example illustrates, trade
facilitation need not necessarily imply non-commercial behaviour.2
The objectives of port authorities may be influenced by the selection criteria
used in appointing board members (Table C.5).  The distinction is between
board members appointed for their relevant commercial skills and industry
knowledge and political appointees.  These two approaches are present in the
ports benchmarked.
In the Australian ports board members are usually appointed by the Governor in
Council on the Minister’s recommendation.  Consistent with corporatisation
principles, it is a normal requirement that appointments be based on skills and
experience.  At the other extreme, the membership of the boards of ports such
as Nagoya and Philadelphia and Camden, are required to meet certain political
representation (see Box C.4).
                                            
2  There is potentially a conflict between trade facilitation and commercial management of port
authorities.  For example, port authorities may seek to encourage ship visits by lowering
charges and not fully recovering costs.  The Industry Commission previously expressed the
view that the prime objective of port authorities should be the efficient provision of core
services and activities, and that trade facilitation is best achieved by managing the ports as
efficiently as possible (IC 1993, p. 48).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
238
User representation may be an important issue in designing systems for port
governance.  Shippers want efficient and timely handling of their cargo, and
hence, are concerned with all aspects of performance on the waterfront.  Yet in
many cases, shippers do not deal directly with port authorities.  Where landlord
ports are concerned, shippers are affected indirectly through intermediate agents
such as shipping lines and stevedores.
There are different approaches to consulting with users present among the
benchmarked ports (see Table C.6).  Some such as Singapore have user
representation on the board, and being a mixed port, deal directly with shippers.
Port Klang, which is a landlord port, must consult with a Port Consultative
Committee set up under the Port Authorities Act  1963.  The Committee
comprises representatives from government, terminal operators and port users.
In the main though, user consultation is largely through less formal means.  For
example, the Sydney Ports Corporation liaises with a port user group.
In a previous study, the Commission has concluded that board members should
be appointed on their experience, knowledge and skills relevant to port
management, and not as representatives of interest groups (IC 1993).  This need
not exclude someone from the industry being appointed, but there is the
potential for conflict of interest where  board members are major users of port
services.  However, to the extent that ports are restricted to the landlord model
of management the potential for conflict of interest is lessened.
The way in which CEOs are appointed is an important indication of the
autonomy boards have in managing their affairs (Table C.7).  Accountability
can be blurred if the CEO has his or her contract with the minister and not the
board (NSW Audit Office, p.32).  Some examples of the arrangements in the
ports studied include:
·  most of the boards of Australian Ports are able to appoint the CEO and
other senior staff, and negotiate their contracts (the exception is Fremantle
where approval from the Governor is required for the appointment and
dismissal of the CEO);
·  in Port Klang senior staff appointments must be submitted to the Public
Service Commission and the Maritime Division of the MOT; and
·  in Nagoya the Executive Vice President is appointed by the President of
the Nagoya Port Assembly on the recommendation of the Mayor of
Nagoya City and the Governor of Aichi Prefecture (one of whom is the
President), but the appointment must also have the approval of the Port
Assembly.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.6 Requirement to Consult, 1997
Port With governments With users
Australian
Adelaide State government. Recommended port charges published
in Gazette.  Consults with SA Chamber
of Commerce shipper group and
directly with customers.
Brisbane With Commonwealth on environmental
issues.  State on various issues inc.
investments over $5M.  Local on
planning and environmental issues.
Port of Brisbane Corporation is
member of Gateway Port Strategy sub
committee.  Current SCI emphasises
better client focus.
Fremantle State government. On port charges.  Other consultation
not mandatory but does occur.
Melbourne Complex reporting to and consultation
with State government.
Customer satisfaction measured and
reported to Government.  Cargo
facilitation committee.
Sydney State government. Voluntary consultation with Port User
Group.
Overseas
Auckland Twice yearly reports to Minister and
shareholders.
No statutory requirement.
Hamburg Port is part of City government. Extensive consultation with user
groups (port associations and private
companies).
Port Klang State and federal governments.
Statutory Port Consultative Committee
has govt. representatives.
Statutory Port Consultative Committee
has user representatives.
Los Angeles Part of City of Los Angeles.  Extensive
consultation with all levels Government
(City, County, State, Federal).
Not mandated, but extensive
consultation occurs with port
customers, users, and tenants.
Nagoya Extensive consultation required with
Japanese Government agencies and
with City/Prefecture.
Via Port and Harbour Council.
Philadelphia The PPC must consult with state govts.
but they are strongly represented on the
board.
Singapore Ministerial requests.  Annual report and
budget.
Representatives of shipping industry on
board.
Tilbury Nil, but member of UK Major Ports
Group.
Nil, but several user groups
established.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table C.7 Board functions, 1997







Port pricing and budgets
Capital expenditure
Appointment of CEO and
executive staff.
Contracts to be signed
under seal.
Report to Minister.
Brisbane Prepare Statement of
Corporate intent.
Appointment of CEO and
other executive staff.
Report quarterly to the
shareholding Ministers.






and conditions of long
term leases.
Appointment of executive






Melbourne Prepare Corporate Plan
for Treasurer’s approval.
Sets internal rate of
return hurdle.
Appointment of CEO and
other executive staff.
Sydney Prepare SCI. Recommends appointment
and employment
conditions for CEO with
approval of portfolio
minister.
Report twice yearly to
shareholder ministers.




Auckland Commercial.  Act
requires that POAL




Twice yearly reports to
shareholders and
Minister.  Abides by
stock exchange rules.
Hamburg Not applicable.






apply, but some decisions




Table continues over page.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.7 (continued)
Port Responsibilities Approvals Accountability
Los Angeles Board promotes,
supports and regulates

































Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
C.4 Financial arrangements
The financial arrangements applying to port authorities influences their ability
to act in a commercial manner.  The degree of control the benchmarked ports
have over the assets they use, investment policy and recurrent expenditure
varies considerably, as does government funding (see Table C.8).
Sources of finance
At one extreme, Tilbury has no direct government involvement in its financial
affairs.  Forth Ports Plc, the owner of the port of Tilbury, is subject to the same
commercial pressures, and financial regulation as other publicly traded
companies in the UK.  Capital must be raised through debt and equity markets,
and, in order to maximise shareholder value, the company must adopt a
commercial approach to investment and its day-to-day business.
At the other extreme, city or State departments compete for investment and
recurrent expenditure within the structure of their parent, and this need notINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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occur on a commercial basis.  For example, the Port of Hamburg does not have
a separate capital structure, and its budget is subject to approval by Parliament,
as part of the wider City State budget.  With access to revenues arising from
non-port taxes, fees and charges, city or State departments may subsidise their
port operations.
In between, corporatised entities have a greater degree of control over their
financial affairs than city or State departments, but are almost invariably subject
to some government directions on raising capital, undertaking investment, and
payment of dividends.
In the main, Australian port authorities have strong balance sheets, Sydney for
example, has an effective debt to equity ratio of one to one.  Among the
overseas ports, Los Angeles has a debt to equity ratio of one to two, and Port
Klang and Singapore, both statutory bodies, are effectively debt free and able to
fund development from internal resources.
No Australian port receives any direct or indirect government funding for
capital projects, though State governments can clearly contribute equity if they
wish.  The South Australian Government converted some debt ($6.6 million) to
equity when the South Australian Ports Corporation was created.
Overseas, the private sector port of Tilbury, and the partially privatised port of
Auckland, receive no government funding.  Nor, would it appear, do the
publicly owned ports of Singapore, and Port Klang.  Los Angeles is a recipient
of limited funding for major dredging — the US Corps of Engineers contribute
to dredging costs where it is in the national strategic interest — and debt capital
may be provided by Federal or State Governments.  The remaining three ports
— Hamburg, Nagoya and Philadelphia — are directly funded by the relevant
government departments at least to the level of their operating deficit (over
50  per  cent in the case of Nagoya), while all infrastructure development in
Hamburg is government funded, and only partially recovered in user fees.
Despite the corporatisation of most Australian ports, some restrictions apply to
raising debt capital.  Some of the Australian ports such as Melbourne and
Adelaide are restricted to borrowing from the respective State treasuries, while
others have more freedom to raise debt capital in external markets.  For
example, the Port of Brisbane must give the Queensland Treasury the chance to
supply debt capital, but is able to borrow more widely.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Adelaide Balance sheet recently restructured with
some Govt. debt converted to equity.
Self funding. Nil.
Brisbane Government may supply equity.  Qld.
Treasury Corp. must be given chance to
supply debt capital.
Self funding. Nil.
Fremantle Port to use Treasury Corp. for funding
provided this is competitive.




Melbourne Required to borrow from Treasury Corp.
Victoria.
Self funding. Nil.
Sydney Generally would borrow from NSW
Treasury Corporation.  May with
written approval of the Minister borrow
within or outside Australia.
Self funding. Nil.
Overseas
Auckland Nil. Nil. Nil.






Port Klang Self funding. Self funding. Nil.
Los Angeles US Corps of engineers contribute to
dredging projects of national strategic
interest.





























Singapore Nil. Nil. Nil.
Tilbury Not applicable.
a In 1995 the Board resolved to pay the City for debts outstanding including an annual recurring
charge of $US 11.7 million.  The Board entered a memorandum of understanding with the City.
However, the State Attorney General and the California State Lands Commission are reviewing
the board’s decision, and it is also the subject of litigation by the shipping industry.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Investment practices
The ability of Australian ports to independently set target rates of returns is also
limited.  The development of an annual charter or business plan may involve
negotiation with the Minister over a target rate of return.  For example, in WA
the Minister sets a target rate of return for written down current cost of assets in
Fremantle.  This is 6 per cent in 1997–98, and the FPA achieved 6.9 per cent in
1996-97.  Similarly the SA Ports Corporation must negotiate a medium to long
term rate of return target with the Ministers each year with annual targets
identified in the Performance Statement.
Furthermore, the corporatised Australian ports are not entirely free to determine
their own investment programs.  Typically Ministerial approval is required in
writing for the purchase and disposal of assets over prescribed value limits.  In
NSW, the Sydney Ports Corporation must obtain written approval for the sale or
acquisition of assets or investments where they exceed a prescribed value.
Currently this is 10 per cent of the consolidated fixed assets and investments as
disclosed in its last audited accounts.
Within these constraints, the boards reportedly use quite different hurdle rates:C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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·  Brisbane has developed its own investment guidelines with the discount
rate varying between 8 to 12 per cent depending upon the project;
·  Sydney uses an estimate of the weighted average cost of capital in line
with NSW Treasury Financial Appraisal Guidelines;
·  Fremantle uses a discount rate based on the cost of capital; and
·  the Board of the Melbourne Port Corporation is understood to be using an
internal rate of return of 12 to 14 per cent.
Among the overseas ports, Los Angeles (10  per  cent return), Tilbury and
Auckland use commercially based approaches to investment appraisal.  Klang
Port Authority assesses the impact of projects on the basis of the social and
economic needs of the community, and their own commercial return
(see Table C.9).
Appendix D provides further information on financial management practices of
the ports studied.
Taxation and dividends
All the Australian ports studied pay State government taxes, and most are or
will be making tax-equivalent payments to their State government owners as if
they were paying Commonwealth income and sales taxes.  This practice is
justified on the competitive neutrality grounds of making government
authorities operate under comparable conditions to the private sector (see
Table C.10).  Despite this, some Australian ports do not pay local government
rates on land not leased to tenants (land leased is subject to rates, but these are
payable by the tenant).
Some overseas ports do not pay income tax.  The exceptions among the
benchmark group are the two private sector ports of Tilbury and Auckland, and
the government owned Port Klang.  The Singapore Port Authority used to pay
income tax only on the relatively minor surpluses of some of its subsidiaries,
but now that it has been corporatised it will be taxable on all of its operations.
In addition to income and sales tax-equivalents, Australian States require their
port authorities to pay a dividend which is often justified as a return on
shareholder equity.  The method for calculating dividends differs, with
Fremantle required to pay at different rates of after-tax profit according to their
debt to equity ratio, and most others paying a fixed percentage of after tax
profit.  The South Australian Ports Corporation policy is 60  per  cent of net
profit after tax on 75 per cent of pre-tax operating profit.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table C.9 Financial management, 1997
Port Target rate of return Cost recovery Performance measurement
Australian
Adelaide 13.7 per cent based on
weighted average cost
of capital used for asset
valuation purposes.
Full. Monitoring.
Brisbane Depends upon project. Full. Monitoring.
Fremantle Set by the Minister
(currently 6 per cent).
Full. Monitoring.
Melbourne Set by board (currently
12 to 14 per cent).
Full. Monitoring.
Sydney Weighted Average
Cost of Capital to SPC.
Full. Monitoring.
Overseas
Auckland Set by the Board. Full. Share price, customer
retention.







Port Klang IRR determined on a





Los Angeles Currently 10 per cent. Full.
Nagoya n.a. Approx. 50 per cent. Ongoing utilisation
reviews.
Philadelphia n.a.
Singapore Currently 9.6 per cent
on historical cost.
Full. Performance generally is
monitored by the
Maritime and Port
Authority as part of
licence.
Tilbury As set by the board of
parent company.




Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.10 Payments to government, 1997
Port Levies Dividends Taxation
Australian
Adelaide Nil. Dividend of $3.37 million paid
for 1995–96.  This was over 56
per cent of after tax profit before
abnormal and extraordinary
items.
Income and sales tax
equivalents applied since
July 1995. Local Govt.
equivalents to apply
from 1998-99. Liability
to pay land tax
introduced at same time.
Brisbane Nil. Set in consultation with
shareholder ministers (currently
40 per cent of after tax profit).
Tax equivalent regime.
Fremantle Statutory levy of




Dividend calculation changed 1
July 1996 to reflect debt ratio,
with a maximum 30 per cent
dividend where debt ratio is less
than 0.2.
Tax equivalent regime
introduced 1 July 1996.
Melbourne Nil. 50 per cent of profit after tax, or
65 per cent of profit before tax.
Tax equivalent regime.
Sydney Nil. Negotiated with NSW Treasury,




Auckland Nil. Nil. Normal taxation
arrangements apply.
Hamburg n.a. n.a. n.a.
Port Klang Nil. Nil. Income tax at standard
rate (31%).
Los Angeles City, for services
provided.
Not applicable. POLA not liable for any
property taxes.
Nagoya Nil. Nil.
Philadelphia Nil. Nil. Port of Philadelphia
exempt from federal
taxes.
Singapore Contribution to consolidated fund
set at 20 per cent of net surplus.
All operations taxable
now that it has been
corporatised.
Tilbury Nil. Nil. Normal corporate taxes.
a In September 1995 the Government agreed to the FPA’s request for an extension of the statutory
levy arrangement to 1996.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Of the overseas ports, Singapore is the only publicly owned port to pay a
dividend.  The dividend is set at 20 per cent of net surplus.  Los Angeles pays
the City Government for services rendered (such as fire protection) but not a
dividend per se.  It is also in the middle of a review and separate litigation
concerning payment for other city services not previously charged for.
C.5 Regulation and competition
As part of port reform in many countries, governments typically separate the
regulatory and operational responsibilities of their ports.  This action is justified
on the grounds that there is a potential conflict of interest in port authorities
regulating activities in which they are, or might become, involved.3
In general terms, the regulation of waterfront services in Australia is undertaken
by organisations other than the port authorities.  Regulation of port safety,
environmental and other non-competitive issues has typically also been
transferred to the department or agency concerned with these issues on a
generic basis.  The consequence of these institutional changes is that few ports
now have regulatory powers.  Some exceptions occur.
In recent years Malaysia and Singapore have moved in similar directions to
Australia in separating regulatory and operational responsibilities.  In Malaysia
responsibility now lies with the Ministry of Transport, and in Singapore they
rest with the new Marine and Port Authority (MPA).
Price and competition regulation
By virtue of the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) and associated
agreements signed by the States, Territories and the Commonwealth
governments, port authorities and other Government Trading Enterprises
(GTEs), are no longer exempted from the application of the Trade Practices Act
1974, or the Prices Surveillance Act 1983 (COAG 1995).  As a consequence,
port authorities are more or less subject to the same competition principles —
such as the prohibition on restrictive trade practices, and prices surveillance —
as private businesses.
                                            
3  The Commission has recognised that it might be more efficient for very small ports to retain
some regulation of non core activities such as pilotage  (IC 1993).C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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Table C.11 Regulatory powers, 1997
Port Regulation Comment
Australian












Part of SPC’s Port Safety Operating Licence conditions.
Overseas
Auckland Nil.




KPA acts as agent for Ministry in enforcing waterfront
services regulations.  KPA acts as regulator of Malacca
port.




Fees and charges reviewed by local Port and Harbour
Council, and authorised by Port Assembly.
Philadelphia Nil. Pilotage rates set by state governments.
Singapore Nil. Marine and Port Authority took over regulatory





Port can appoint its own police force to enforce bylaws
within its premises.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
In the CPA, the States and Territories also agreed to consider establishing
independent sources of prices oversight where they did not currently exist.  In
practice, most have complied, with only South Australia and Western Australia
not having established independent regulators or practices with the potential to
review port fees and charges.  However, even in those cases the ACCC could
step into oversee prices if certain conditions were met.  Currently in SouthINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Australia, the Minister for Government Enterprises must approve the SA Ports
Corporation’s fees and charges, and in WA the Minister for Transport must
approve the fees and charges of the Fremantle Port Authority (see Table C.12).
There are both similarities and some differences between the States in the way
they have set up their independent price oversight bodies.  For instance, in all
cases, a GTE must be declared by the government before the respective
authorities can investigate prices.  And while all use public interest criterion of
one sort or another to guide the regulator in price determination, they have
different powers over implementation.  For example, in Victoria the ports
industry has been declared to be a regulated industry under the Office of
Regulator General Act 1994, and specific services are also defined as regulated
services under the Port Services Act  1995.4  Currently a port pricing order
requires the Port of Melbourne Corporation to reduce charges for prescribed
services by 10 minus the CPI until 2000.
Similar independent regulators now exist in Tasmania, Queensland and NSW.
In NSW, the Sydney Port Corporation’s fees are approved by the portfolio
Minister, but the Independent Price and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) has the
power to set maximum prices.  If IPART made a recommendation, the Sydney
Port Corporation would be obliged to charge the fees prescribed unless it had
the Treasurer’s approval to levy lower charges.
Queensland has adopted the more advisory role for the recently created
Queensland Competition Authority (QCA).  It has the power to undertake
investigations into fees and charges of declared GTEs, but performs an advisory
role only.  Currently the Port of Brisbane is not a declared ‘government
monopoly business activity’.  Should it be declared, the Minister for Transport
and Main Roads would be required to publish reasons for not implementing the
QCA’s recommendation.
                                            
4  This gives the Office of the Regulator General the power to investigate and recommend fees
and charges.  This advice is considered by the Government, and a port pricing order is
subsequently issued by the Governor in Council.C   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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a Currently Minister for Government Enterprises
approval is required.  No independent state




Currently approval of Minister for Transport and
Main Roads is required.  QCA can recommend
prices to Minister if port is declared.  Minister
would have to publish reasons for not
implementing recommendation.
Fremantle No.
a WA does not currently have an independent price
oversight body, but the Minister must approve
port fees and charges.
Melbourne Yes. Office of Regulator
General (ORG).
Ports industry has been declared.  Port pricing
orders — issued by Governor in Council on
recommendation of ORG — apply to services
defined in Port Services Act 1995.
Sydney Yes. Independent Pricing
and Regulatory
Tribunal (IPART).
Currently Minister for Ports approval is required.
IPART can set maximum prices which must be
charged unless port has Treasurer’s approval to
charge lower prices.
Overseas
Auckland No. n.a General trade practices laws apply.
Hamburg No. n.a Approval of City Department of Economic Affairs
for port dues and pilotage.  General trade
practices laws apply.
Port Klang No. n.a Approval of Ministry of Transport and review by
Port Consultative Committee.  Price caps set for
tariffs.
Los Angeles No. n.a Council approval required.
Nagoya No. n.a Approval of Port and Harbour Council and
Ministry of Transport required.
Philadelphia No. n.a General trade practices laws apply.
Singapore No. n.a Marine and Ports Authority approval required.
Tilbury No. n.a Port of London Authority monitors waterfront
services.  General trade practices laws apply.
a All Australian ports could be subjected to prices oversight by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission where appropriate state arrangements are absent.  Other conditions apply .
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
The use of an independent regulator is superior to the normal ministerial
approval models on the grounds of impartiality and transparency.  Ministers
who are both shareholder and regulator, may be unduly influenced by budgetaryINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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considerations to set fees and charges which provide a greater dividend return to
the government.  There can also be conflicting views between shareholding
ministers.  And the processes they follow are not as transparent as the public
inquiry processes now required of the independent regulators.
Overseas, the pattern is more varied.  With the information available to the
Commission, it appears that none of the overseas ports are subject to quite the
same regulatory attention as some of the Australian ports.  In the case of the
private port of Tilbury and the partially privatised port of Auckland, there are
no overriding regulatory bodies, other than for monitoring purposes.  For
example, the Port of London Authority monitors waterfront services at Tilbury,
but does not have powers to intervene.
Almost invariably the government owned overseas ports are subject to approval
processes for setting port fees and charges, but these are through agencies that
do not appear to operate at arms length to either the port authority, or the
government.  However, in most cases, the operations of the ports are subject to
general trade practices laws which outlaw restrictive practices, and provide for
prices oversight of firms in dominant market positions.  For example, US and
European ports are subject to similar (Federal and European Commission) anti-
trust legislation as the Australian ports.  By comparison, port pricing issues in
Asia are not normally a matter of specific legislation, and are left to market
forces, and the respective Boards and industry ministries to determine.
The general impression is that the reasonably competitive nature of the industry
in most other countries means that anti-competitive conduct is less of an issue
than it is in Australia where some ports enjoy a strong regional monopoly.
Safety, quarantine and environmental regulation
On the question of safety, all the Australian ports have to comply with specific
State legislation, combined where appropriate with Federal regulations.
Elsewhere, in Singapore and Malaysia the situation is similar, with specific
authority being vested in the MPA and Maritime Division of the Ministry of
Transport respectively.  For Hamburg and Nagoya, the responsibility lies with
dedicated organisations, in the case of the former, the State River Police, and
the latter the regional office of the National Maritime Safety Authority.
Quarantine matters in Australia are a Federal responsibility handled by the
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS).  In nearly all overseasC   GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
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cases there is a similar responsibility residing with the relevant central or local
government authority.5
The situation in respect of environmental issues is similar to that for safety.  In
Australia, responsibility for regulating these areas lies primarily with the State
Department of Environment (which in Queensland issues an environmental
licence to ports) or the State Environmental Protection Authority (EPA).
Specifically in respect of ships, the Federal government takes a very active role
via the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), and port activities have
to comply with international regulations in respect of marine pollution (Marpol)
and be consistent with the relatively new ANZECC Maritime Accidents and
Pollution Strategy.
Overseas, environmental issues are a matter of both central and local
government regulation (for example, US National Environmental Policy Act,
Malaysian Environmental Quality Act) and normally handled by the relevant
Ministry of Environment (Hamburg & Singapore).  Responsible environmental
behaviour and policies are a statutory duty for the ports of Tilbury and Nagoya,
which are enforced in the case of the latter by the Coast Guard.
C.6 Conclusion: service and charge implications
Government involvement in the provision of port services in Australia is an
important issue, and has implications for port fees and charges.  For the most
part competition between the major ports is limited, making it appropriate for
governments to develop institutional arrangements which encourage efficiency.
For this reason, the presence of the facility in all States to subject port
authorities and other GTEs to prices oversight is important.
In addition, many governments have used their ownership of ports to encourage
trade and regional development.  However, with a strong focus on
corporatisation (or commercialisation) regional and trade development
imperatives do not appear to have unduly compromised the commercial
integrity of the ports.  All are operating with full cost recovery, and all are, or
shortly will be, paying tax-equivalents and dividends as if they were private
sector organisations.
                                            
5  Respectively these are: US Department of Agriculture; Japanese Ministry of Health &
Welfare; Hamburg Ministry of Labour Health & Welfare; London Port Health Authority;
and the respective Port Health offices of Customs, Immigration and Quarantine in Singapore
and Port Klang).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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If anything, there is the danger that Australian governments may go too far in
the other direction, and impose excessive burdens on their authorities’ balance
sheets.  This concern is based on the perception that State governments use
dividends as a revenue source.  Ideally dividends should be set recognising the
authorities own capital requirements and the reasonable expectations of the
government for a return on public equity.  The dividend should be
recommended by the board to government for decision in line with the agreed
Statements of Corporate Intent.
Where problems can arise is in the valuation of assets, and the determination of
an appropriate rate of return.  Consequently, it is relevant who values the assets
and the approaches used.  State Governments are in a position to generate extra
revenue from their port authorities by imposing high capital values and rates of
return.  The issue of asset valuations is considered further in Appendix D.
While governments own ports they have the ability to influence outcomes for
shippers and promote economic efficiency.  For example, share-holder State
governments can promote contestability by directing their port authorities to
encourage new entry into stevedoring by removing barriers to competition.  This
broader perspective is consistent with government objectives of promoting
trade.  However, there may be some tensions between such an approach and
maximising the return to the community as shareholders.  If the broader
objective of economic efficiency is pursued and it results in some lessening of
the focus on shareholder return, the community will be better off.  At the very
least, Governments can make their dividend and payment policies transparent to
demonstrate that they are consistent with economic efficiency.
The promotion of rail reforms has the potential to increase Australian inter-port
competition and hence competitive discipline.  The current reforms may also
open the way for freight forwarders providing door-to-door service to become
more prominent in shipping.  With competition between freight forwarders who
have sufficient market power to demand improved services from waterfront
providers, shippers are likely to benefit from more timely cargo movements.255
D PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND
POLICIES
Port management practices and policies vary widely among the ports
benchmarked in this report.  Differences occur both among ports
within Australia and between Australian and overseas ports.  These
differences impact directly on port charges and performance and
hence affect benchmarking measures.
Australian and overseas port management practices and policies are described in
this appendix.
D.1 Infrastructure provision and investment
Infrastructure provision and investment policies and practices of port authorities
directly impact on waterfront services and infrastructure investment.  For
example, substantial investment in new facilities increases potential throughput
and productivity improving ship turnaround times.  At the same time, however,
the cost of the investment must be recovered and this may result in port charges
for stevedoring services being higher in the port undertaking the investment
relative to others.
The investment assessment methods for Australian and overseas ports are
presented in Table D.1.
The approach to asset valuation has major implications for charges.  The
valuation of port assets affects the cost of services.  The extent to which these
costs are recovered depends on the port’s policies with respect to cost recovery.
Asset valuation practices are presented in Table D.2.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table D.1 Investment assessment methods, 1997
Port Rate of return Other considerations
Australian
Adelaide Board applies commercial criteria
in its investment assessment
methods.
Financial targets are set in the light of the
annual Performance Statement under
SAPC’s Charter.
Brisbane NPV method.  With own
guidelines that an appropriate
business case exists.
Treasury Guidelines require all projects to be
analysed according to economic, social,
environmental and budget criteria.
Fremantle The Minister sets a target
financial rate of return on the
written down current cost of
assets each year.
All projects are analysed in terms of their
financial impact using NPV and impact on
trade facilitation.
Melbourne Internal rate of return hurdle set
by the Board.
Sydney NPV method. Discount rate determined by the WACC of
the SPC.
Overseas
Auckland Investment rates of return
determined in accordance with
normal commercial criteria.
Investment must be consistent with the
company’s status as a listed public
corporation in New Zealand.
Hamburg Not a specified investment
criteria
Based on non-financial criteria, such as port
capacity, cargo and service demand and
safety.
Los Angeles Determined by the Board in the
context of the Port’s strategic and
financial objectives.
The major consideration being the
preservation of the Port’s standing as a bond
issuer as determined by the ratings agencies.
Nagoya Not a specified investment
criteria
The prime criterion for investment
assessment is the perceived level of use and
degree of need of the user(s).
Philadelphia No information available Investment criteria are probably related to
political and trade facilitation
considerations.
Port Klang Individual IRR criteria
established for each major
project.
In setting IRR, the KPA takes account of
social needs, economic needs of the
country/region and commercial return for
the Authority.
Singapore Use varying IRR on different
projects.
IRR must be sufficient to ensure satisfactory
Economic Value Added achieved.
Tilbury As determined by the Board of
Forth Ports Plc.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Table D.2 Asset valuation and depreciation, 1997
Port Asset valuation Asset revaluation Depreciation
Australian








Indexed annually.  All





Fremantle At cost or by valuation. Regular re-valuation of
assets is required.
Depreciation charges reflect the
estimated useful life of the
asset.
Melbourne Re-values non-current
assets every three years.
Sydney Valued at cost or by
deprival value.
Revaluation of current
assets at least every 5
years.
Straight line method. Land is
not depreciated.
Overseas





Hamburg Not applicable — no
port legal entity
No asset revaluation. Does not apply.
Los Angeles Valuations on
commercial criteria.
No policy for regular
asset revaluations.
Straight line method.
Nagoya Cost of construction or
acquisition.
No asset revaluation. Straight line method. Land is
not depreciated.
Philadelphia Cost less accumulated
depreciation.
n.a. Straight-line method.
Port Klang Cost less accumulated
depreciation.
No asset revaluation. Straight-line method. Except
freehold land.
Singapore Assets acquired since
1964 are valued at cost
less accumulated
depreciation
No asset revaluation. Straight-line method.
Tilbury Historical cost basis.
Tangible fixed assets




by the Directors (and
every five years by
independent valuers).
Straight-line method. Except
land and capital works in
progress.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).
Investment assessment
The ports reviewed in this study adopt a range of methods to assess new
investment projects.  Two broad approaches to investment assessment can be
identified:
·  the use of objective rate-of-return criteria; and
·  the use of a wider range of social, economic and financial criteria when
assessing competing investment projects.
The port authorities that adopt an objective investment criteria are Brisbane,
Sydney, Melbourne, Fremantle, Los Angeles, Auckland and Tilbury.  Brisbane,
Fremantle and Sydney examine the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project to
decide whether the investment should proceed.  In Brisbane, an appropriate
business case must exist and a hurdle rate will be set depending on the nature of
the project using CAPM and the weighted average cost of capital.  The Board of
the Melbourne Port Corporation (MPC) sets an internal rate-of-return (IRR)
hurdle which must be exceeded if the investment is to proceed.
In the overseas ports of Los Angeles, Auckland and Tilbury, commercial criteria
determine the setting of appropriate rates of return for new investment projects.1
Wider social, economic and financial criteria are used in Hamburg, Nagoya,
Port Klang and Singapore.  No information was available for Philadelphia but
the Commission’s consultants indicated that investment criteria are probably
partly, at least, related to political and trade facilitation considerations.
In Hamburg the appropriateness of new investment is determined on the basis of
port capacity, cargo and service demand and safety.  There is no specified rate-
of-return for new investment projects.  Similarly, Nagoya has no pre-specified
hurdle rate-of-return — the prime criteria for new investment being the
perceived level of use and degree of need by users.
The Klang Port Authority (KPA) establishes individual IRR criteria for each
major project, which take into account the following factors and their impact on
the project:
·  social needs of the community;
·  economic needs of the country and, often, a region; and
                                            
1  Interestingly, the major consideration for Los Angeles in setting the rate of return for new
investment projects is the preservation of the ports standing as a bond issuer as determined
by credit rating agencies.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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·  commercial return for the Authority.
Singapore adopts varying IRRs on different projects, but must be sufficient to
ensure satisfactory Economic Value Added (EVA) to monetary value of all
resources used.
There may be less incentive to maximise price, or minimise cost, in order to
achieve a high rate-of-return in ports where investment appraisal is made on the
basis of wider social, economic and financial criteria.  Some port authority
objectives may be facilitated by minimising prices.  For example, an investment
project may be approved if it facilitates an increase in trade through the port and
so prices are held low to achieve this objective.  This would impact directly on
observed port service charges benchmarked in this report.
Objective rate-of-return hurdles for new investment have the advantage of being
set in advance and hence providing some certainty to potential investors,
including shareholder governments.  However, where the provision of a
particular service is by a natural monopoly, high rates-of-return may be
achieved on new investment through the exercise of market power.
High rates-of-return may be achieved on new investment through lower service
quality when port services are a natural monopoly.  Timeliness measures of
performance may be affected when service quality is reduced.
Valuation of assets
Asset valuation approaches will have implications for the level of port authority
charges.  For example, if charges are intended to recover costs and assets are
valued highly in one port compared with another, port charges are likely to be
correspondingly higher in the port which values the assets more highly.  See
Box D.1 for a discussion of economic and financial approaches to the valuation
of assets.
The approach adopted by the various port authorities to valuing their assets
varies across Australia and overseas.  One of two major approaches to asset
valuation are adopted.  The first approach, values fixed assets at cost (less
depreciation) this is also known as the historical cost (accounting) approach to
asset valuation.  The second approach values assets at their current (accounting)
value or fair market value, sometimes referred to as the economic approach.
The valuation of assets on the basis of cost less depreciation is not adopted by
any of the Australian ports.  Among the overseas ports it is the port authorities
with strong government involvement such as Hamburg, Nagoya, Philadelphia,
Singapore and Port Klang which value fixed assets at cost less the applicable
depreciation.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Box D.1 Economic and Financial Valuation of Assets
Non-current assets (that is assets held in the business for more than twelve months) may
be valued according to financial or economic criteria.  The two approaches may value the
same asset differently.
The financial approach values assets on the basis of the cost of acquisition less, in the case
of assets having limited useful lives, accumulated depreciation.  The weakness of this
approach is that a range of factors including, inflation, technological change, and changes
in demand and supply conditions cause the value of assets to change overtime.  These
influences may not be appropriately taken into account.
The economic approach to the valuation of assets focuses on the economic benefits which
are expected to flow from the asset.  Under perfectly competitive market conditions, the
discounted future cash flow of the asset will equate to the assets market value.  In a
perfectly competitive environment the assets market buying, market selling price and the
net present value of future cash flows would all be the same.
However, Australian ports operate in less than competitive markets and the market for port
assets is unlikely to be perfectly competitive.  The value of the asset to the entity may
differ from its net selling price because of market imperfections.  Under these
circumstances it has been suggested that assets should be valued on the basis of their
‘current value to the entity’, where the current value is to be determined according to the
deprival value approach (SCNPMGTE 1994).
Under the deprival method, assets are valued at an amount that represents the entire loss
that might be expected to be incurred by an entity if that entity were deprived of the service
potential or future economic benefits of the assets at the reporting date.
Source: SCNPMGTE 1994.
Valuing assets on the basis of their historical cost less depreciation will
overstate the value of assets with little or no alternative commercial use.  For
example, assets using out-dated or inefficient technology.
In other cases, the historical cost approach may undervalue some assets.  This
may be the case for long-lived assets which are depreciated too quickly.  The
resulting historical value may be lower than the current market value of the
asset based on its opportunity cost.
Depreciation arrangements have a significant impact on asset valuations when
the historical cost approach is used.  The straight line method based on the
estimated useful life of the asset is the most widely adopted approach (see
Table D.2).D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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The second group of port authorities adopt the current or fair market value
approach to valuing their assets.  This group of port authorities includes the
Australian ports of Brisbane and Sydney and the overseas ports of Los Angeles,
Tilbury and Auckland.
It is not clear how many of the ports calculate the current or market value of
their assets.  Several approaches could be used.  One option is to use the current
market value or selling price of the asset.  Alternatively, the current value could
be determined on the basis of the net present value of the expected future net
cash inflows.
D.2 Leasing arrangements
Leases confer the right to use the physical assets of a port.  Two issues arise in
considering the impact of leasing arrangements on port performance — the
extent to which competitive bidding is used to award leases and the nature of
conditions imposed on lessees.
However, a more fundamental issue is the period for which the lease is
awarded.  The lease period has implications for the potential for effective ‘serial
competition’ generated by the leasing arrangements.  Serial competition in
stevedoring occurs when there is competition for the right to provide
stevedoring services when the incumbent’s lease expires over the physical
assets on the wharf.  In this way, competitive pressures can be generated even
when the service is most efficiently provided by a single supplier at any given
time.  Leasing arrangements are summarised in Table D.3.
Competitive tendering
The information presented in Table D.3 indicates that competitive bidding for
leases is not general practice amongst the ports surveyed.  The Commission’s
consultants concluded that most leases in the ports under study are negotiated
on a bilateral basis.  These negotiations occur between the port authority and a
particular lease holder.
In the case of the Australian ports, it appears that bilateral negotiations are
widely used.  Some ports, for example, Sydney and Melbourne, indicate that
some form of competitive bidding may be used to allocate leases.  In Melbourne
whether competitive bidding is to be used or not depends, in part, on the size of
the asset being leased.  For minor assets direct negotiation is more likely, but as
the size of the asset increases competitive tendering is more probable.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table D.3 Leasing arrangements, 1997
Port Policy Competitive bidding Terms and conditions
Australian





Land cannot be sold
nor leased for longer
than 21 years without
the consent of the
Minister.





Leases are established by
commercial negotiation.
Charges have been
based on achieving a
commercial return on
an assets value.
Fremantle The FPA has authority
to lease land.
Leases are established by
a mixture of competitive
bidding and negotiation.
Lease terms must be
approved by the
Minister, other than for
short term leases.
Generally, a 21 year
maximum applies.
Melbourne Leasing of assets is
MPC major business.
For minor assets, a first
in basis might apply.
For major assets
Expressions of Interest




Sydney Must be consistent with
the commercial
objectives of the SPC
as a successful business
promoting trade.
Normal, but private
treaty and negotiation of
extensions also used.
Duration will depend
time to permit recovery
of investment, as well
as any strategic
considerations for SPC.
Table continues over page.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Table D.3 (continued)
Port Policy Competitive bidding Terms and conditions
Overseas
Auckland No terminals leased to
stevedoring companies
Hamburg The City State leases
port land to terminal
operators via
negotiated agreements
Rental is not a factor in
the bidding process, —
rentals fixed by the
Ministry of Finance,
subject to review every 5
years.
Maximum period of
lease 30 years. Range
of obligations on lessee
eg maintenance of
facilities.













Nagoya Terminal land can be
leased by the NPA to
private sector
operators, or purchased
by users if reclaimed.
Lessee selected after an
evaluation of
Expressions of Interest &
subsequent open Public
tenders.
Terms are dictated by
the Port Strategic Plan
and lease rates may not
reflect market value of
land.
Philadelphia Earns an undisclosed
proportion of its
revenue from leasing.
Port Klang Maximisation of
returns on the leased





Site must be returned
in a comparable
condition to that at the
start of the lease.
Longest lease period
issued is 30 years.
Singapore A system of dedicated












Tilbury Market driven Some berths are leased
on long term basis but
provision of warehouses
is open to either Tilbury
or lessees by
arrangement.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
264
Similarly, some overseas ports competitively tender leases while others adopt
bilateral negotiation.  Competitive tendering is widely used in Nagoya and Port
Klang.  However, in the majority of ports bilateral negotiation appears to be the
usual method of awarding leases.
Price is not always the criteria used to select lessees when bilateral negotiation
is used.  For example, in Hamburg all leases are priced on a common basis,
determined by the Ministry of Finance and subject to revision every five years.
The selection of lessee is based on commercial, value added and qualitative
criteria.
The extent to which competition is weakened by bilateral negotiation depends
upon whether a credible threat to re-allocate the lease to another operator exists.
If leases are renewed on the basis of bilateral negotiation and there is no
possibility of a new entrant winning the lease and providing the service, then in
effect, short term-leases could become defacto long-term leases.
However, the outcome may be different if bilateral negotiation is only the
starting point for discussions regarding the renewal of a lease.  This is
especially true if the incumbent knows that there is a possibility that other firms
may be invited into the discussion.  The threat of entry, even when bilateral
negotiation is the nominated method of renewing leases, may constrain the
exercise of market power by the incumbent during the period it operates the
lease.
Lease terms and conditions
The terms and conditions imposed on lease holders can impact significantly on
port performance.  Of particular interest is the duration of the leases — regular
revision of leases provides scope to generate ‘serial competition’.
In Australian ports leases may be offered for substantial periods.  For example,
in Adelaide leases may be offered for up to 21 years without the need for
ministerial approval.  In the case of Fremantle, the Minister may approve lease
periods in excess of 21 years, up to a maximum period of 50 years.
Among the overseas ports, the maximum lease period is 30 years in Hamburg.
Port Klang has leases for terminals to 3 different operators, the duration of these
leases ranges from 21 to 30 years.  In addition, Port Klang has 41 other less
critical leases for periods from 3 years and up.  Nagoya leases land for periods
of 10 years.
Information on the maximum lease period gives no indication of the actual
period for which leases are awarded.  It is possible that leases may be awarded
for periods substantially less than the maximum permitted.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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There are advantages and disadvantages for both short-term and long-term
leases.  Relatively short-term leases have the advantage of ensuring that the
lease is regularly subject to tender.  Regular tenders increase the contestability
of the market for leases and provides greater opportunity for new entrants if the
incumbent does not perform efficiently.
However, short-term leases may not provide incentives for lessees to invest in
new equipment because there is insufficient time to earn a return on major
investments.  In addition, short leases may provide insufficient time for the
lessees to become proficient with operating equipment.  The cost of acquiring
this experience must then be recovered over a relatively short lease period and
hence charges for the service may be higher than if longer lease periods were
available.
Long-term leases provide a greater degree of security for the incumbent
operator.  Security of tenure may make lessees more likely to undertake
improvements to equipment and processes because they have time in which to
reap the benefits of such investment.  The lessees are also able to spread any
‘start up’ capital and learning costs over a longer period.
However, there are also disadvantages associated with the security of tenure
offered to the incumbent operator by long-term leases.  Security of tenure
severely limits contestability and hence removes a significant discipline on the
operation of the incumbent firm.
Each port authority must assess the trade-offs to be made when determining the
period for which leases will be issued.
D.3 Licensing provisions
Licensing arrangements confer the right to provide a particular service within
the port.  They are often used to ensure that safety standards are maintained, for
example, licensing arrangements may require that those wishing to provide
pilotage services hold appropriate qualifications.  However, licensing
arrangements can also be used by port authorities to influence entry into the
service market — so called economic regulation.
Port authorities may license service providers.  For example, the Sydney Ports
Corporation under delegation from the portfolio Minister enters into a three year
contract for the provision of pilotage services.  In other cases, licences
controlling activities or services vital to the port may be granted by a third
party.  For example, in Brisbane marine pilots are licensed by the Queensland
Department of Transport and the service is provided under contract by a private
company.  This situation also arises in some overseas ports, for example, inINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Nagoya, pilots towage services and stevedoring are all licensed by the Japanese
Ministry of Transport.
Market entry may be regulated depending upon whether an exclusive or non-
exclusive licence is issued to provide a service.  An exclusive licence allows
only one operator to provide the service until the term of the licence has
expired.  Non-exclusive licences do not limit the number of operators who may
provide a particular services provided the basic requirements for the licence are
met.
It is appropriate that licence arrangements are used to ensure that safety
standards are maintained and services are provided by properly qualified staff.
However, once minimum safety standards have been met licences should, in
general, be issued on a non-exclusive basis.  This would ensure that the
licensing arrangements do not impede the entry of new (appropriately qualified)
operators into the industry.
D.4 Competitive tendering and contracting out
The degree of competitive tendering and contracting out (CTC) of services
varies widely between the ports under examination (see Table D.4).  A clear
difference of approach can be identified between the Australian ports and many
of the overseas ports.
Different approaches to competitive tendering and contracting out affect the
degree of competitive pressure faced by service suppliers.  The strength of
competitive pressures will depend upon whether contracting out occurs and the
process by which the successful tender is chosen.  In turn, the nature of
competitive pressure on suppliers influences incentives to provide efficient and
timely services to port users and hence may assist in explaining differences in
measures of port performance.
Contracting out
Contracting out is not a major activity of landlord Australian ports.  Under the
landlord model the port authorities tend to focus on the provision of core
services, such as channel maintenance, while leasing facilities to others who
provide direct services to port users.
Among the Australian ports Adelaide adopts competitive tendering when
contracting out activities.  In the Port of Brisbane each case is considered on a
case-by-case basis with a range of qualitative and quantitative criteria used to
select the successful party.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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The diversity of approaches was most evident amongst the overseas ports.
Hamburg and Tilbury contract out a wide range of services to the private sector.
Nagoya and Port Klang contract out some or all of their stevedoring, towage
and pilotage.  Los Angeles contracts out a range of services and is required by
City legislation to maintain a policy of equal opportunity with 18 per cent of
contracts allocated to minority group businesses and 4 per cent to businesses
owned by women.
Singapore differs from the other overseas ports in that there is little contracting
out.  The Port of Singapore has tended to remain an integrated port (some
towage being the exception).
Competitive tendering
In general, a system of competitive tendering for services is most likely to
generate incentives for contractors to minimise the cost of providing the
contracted out services.
Los Angeles generally adopts a system of competitive selection of contracts.
This is operated in the context of a policy to favour women’s owned and
minority owned businesses in awarding contracts.  Tilbury appears to have a
wider policy of competitive tendering for all contracts with minimum contract
periods of one year.  Port Klang espouse a system of public tenders for
contracted out work.
Singapore adopts a more limited form of competitive tendering.  Selected
potential suppliers of the contracted out service are invited to tender for the
contract.  It is competition between the selected pool of potential suppliers
which determines the successful bidder.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Table D.4 Competitive tendering and contracting out, 1997










Each case is considered on
its individual merits.
Uses both qualitative and
quantitative criteria.




bidding where services are
contracted out.
Ensures continuity of
service is a criteria.
Melbourne Very little contracting out








contracted out for a
period of 3 years
Overseas




Hamburg Range of activities fully
or partially contracted
out.
Not used. Contracting out by
negotiation with
established franchisee.
Los Angeles Contracting out occurs. Generally, competitive
bidding for contracts.













licensed by the Ministry
of Transport.
Philadelphia No information available.
Port Klang Most port services,
contracted out.
Public Tenders. Objective is to maximise
revenue.
Singapore Few PSA services have
been contracted out.
Tenders by invitation. None identified.




periods of one year
Contractors have to agree
to abide by all health &
safety/environmental
requirements.
Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Nagoya and Hamburg do not use competitive public tenders to award contracts.
In both cases, direct negotiation is employed, in the case of Nagoya with invited
parties and for Hamburg with existing franchisees.
As noted in the discussion of leases, the period for which the contract is
awarded has significant implications for the degree of competitive processes
generated by the decision to contract out services.
D.5 Pricing practices
Pricing practices of the ports are outlined in Table D.5.  Two key issues arise —
the extent of cost recovery pursued by the port authorities through their pricing
practices, and the extent to which port authorities price discriminate between
different users.  These factors will, in part, determine charges levied by port
authorities and will therefore influence benchmarking results.
Pricing to recover costs
The extent to which costs are recovered from users has a direct impact on the
pattern of observed charges at different ports.  It may be that certain charges are
lower at one port compared with another simply due to differing pricing
practices.
Most Australian ports and many of the overseas ports studied aim to recover
direct costs and overheads, although little information was made available on
how the costs are determined.  It also appears that when cost recovery is
nominated as the central aspect of pricing policy other objectives are also
pursued.
Adelaide, Brisbane, Fremantle and Melbourne aim to fully recover costs and
generate profits according to normal commercial business principles.
Moreover, Melbourne is required by legislation to recover costs and at the same
time to reduce charges in real terms for the three years from 1997.  In the case
of Adelaide, there is a statutory requirement that all costs be recovered from
users.
Sydney adopts a uniform port-wide pricing policy but also uses its statutory
powers to negotiate on contractual charges where there are strategic advantages
for both the Corporation and the customer.
Ports specifying cost recovery as the primary focus for setting port charges
often include other price setting criteria.  The Queensland Port Pricing Policy,INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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which covers all State ports including the Port of Brisbane, applies the
following general principles:
·  pricing must be linked to port performance targets;
·  monopoly or near monopoly pricing will be subject to Ministerial reserve
powers;
·  costs must be reflected in prices; and
·  cross-subsidisation must be transparent and agreed by the share holding
Ministers.
However, in Brisbane pricing is fundamentally set by executives and the Board
based on commercial criteria.
In Sydney full cost recovery is only one of a range of criteria upon which
charges are based.  The Sydney Ports Corporation bases its charges on the
following general principles:
·  trade maximisation;
·  efficient port usage;
·  cost reduction;
·  competitive rates;
·  return on assets;
·  full cost recovery;
·  user pays;
·  simplicity; and
·  port user satisfaction.
There is no indication, however, of the relative importance of these criteria in
determining port authority charges.  It would therefore appear that the Sydney
Ports Corporation has a substantial degree of flexibility in setting port charges.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Table D.5 Pricing practices, 1997
Pricing process
Port Pricing policy Negotiation Approval
Australian










to Minister for fixing
and publishing in the
Gazette.
Brisbane Determined by the
executive and Board
based on commercial
criteria subject to broad
government guidelines.
Certain tariffs such as
harbour dues and
wharfage rates have not
been increased for at least
10 years.
No formal approval is
required beyond the PBC
Board.
Fremantle Board establishes port
pricing policy.
Extensive consultation
with users to define agreed
pricing targets and
changes in prices levels.
Changes to Gazetted
fees and charges are
approved by the
Minister.
Melbourne For leased assets, the
MPC look at individual






Changes to gazetted fees
and charges approved by
the Office of the
Regulator General.
Sydney Generally, uniform port
wide. Cost recovery has







SPC to the Minister for
approval.  They may be
subject to IPART.




Port Pricing policy Negotiation Approval
Overseas
Auckland Market driven.  Aim to
recover all costs and









Hamburg The City State sets
pricing for harbour dues,
rents for leased land and
quay walls and pilotage
dues.





Approval by City State
Department of Economic
Affairs.
Los Angeles To stay competitive and
maintain compensatory





the shipping lines who are
the Port’s major
customers.
Price approvals have to
be obtained from one or
more of the Harbour
Commission, City
Administration Office,
full City Council or the
Federal Maritime
Commission.
Nagoya Pricing based on historic
cost recovery, and is
reviewed every 2 - 3
years taking into account






Port tariffs have to be
reviewed by the local
Port & Harbour Council
and approved by the Port
Assembly.  Authorised
tariffs have to be
approved by the Ministry
of Transport
Philadelphia Not available. Not available. Not available.
Port Klang Tariffs set by the
Maritime Division of the
Ministry of Transport.
Tariffs set having regard
to economic impact and
commercially acceptable
levels for port services.
Major changes to KPA
charges must be
reviewed by the Port
Consultative Committee.
Singapore Traditionally what the
market will bear. Under
the new MPA Act 1996,
price changes have to be
related to stated criteria
eg a price index.
Traditionally, PSA port
pricing was a matter of
unilateral announcement
geared to achievement of
financial goals. It is now a
matter for bilateral
negotiation.









Source: Thompson Clarke Shipping (consultant).D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Outside Australia, pricing policies also vary widely between ports.  All ports
except Hamburg, Nagoya and Philadelphia aim for full cost recovery, and all
indicated that pricing took into account competitive and market requirements.
In the case of Tilbury and Auckland, prices are largely determined by market
forces and are therefore determined on a commercial basis by the port authority.
Pricing in these two ports is therefore less subject to government intervention or
determination than in other non-privatised ports.
Pricing arrangements are particularly complex in Hamburg.  The Hamburg City
State sets three categories of prices: harbour dues; rents on leased land and quay
walls; and port pilotage dues.  Harbour dues are established by the Ministry of
Economic Development in relation to budget needs and competitive pressure
from other north European ports (Bremerhaven, Rotterdam, Antwerp,
Zeebrugge).  Rents for leased land and quay walls are determined in
conjunction with port users and the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce.  Port (as
opposed to river) pilotage dues are determined in order to fund the income of
the members of the local Pilots’ Association.
The KPA tariff is set by the Maritime Division of the Ministry of Transport
having regard to the economic impact and commercial acceptability of the
pricing.  The tariff set by the KPA is a tariff ceiling, which operators cannot
exceed, but may be discounted via a rebate at the end of the year, on condition
container or volume throughput exceeds agreed terms.
In Singapore, pricing has traditionally been geared to what the market will bear
— where services were not remunerative, they were either disposed of or
withdrawn.  Under new legislation introduced in 1996, price changes at the Port
of Singapore have to be related to stated criteria such as the price index, the cost
of providing services or goods, or an acceptable rate of return.
Price discrimination
Price discrimination occurs when different users are charged different prices for
the same service or facility, that is, price differences between customers are on
based on cost differences.  It can be an efficient method of pricing services and
may be a desirable practice for port authorities to adopt.  However, the
existence of price discrimination among port authority charges may impact on
the interpretation of data presented as part of the benchmarking report.
Approaches to efficient port pricing are outlined in Box D.2.
Direct evidence on price discrimination is difficult to obtain because such
information is commercially sensitive.  Price discrimination is possible whereINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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prices are determined in markets where some players have market power or the
port authorities are able to negotiate deals with particular customers.
Box D.2 Efficient Port Pricing
In economic terms, in competitive markets, efficient pricing generally implies that services
are priced at the marginal cost of producing them for each user.
However, in order to supply many port services large up-front investments in equipment
are required.  For example expensive cranes are required to supply stevedoring services.
Once the up-front cost is incurred, the marginal cost of supplying the service to an
additional user is relatively low.  The average cost of supplying the service therefore
declines as the fixed cost is spread over a greater number of users.
Setting prices at marginal cost in these circumstances does not cover the fixed costs
involved in investing in the cranes and other equipment required.  Marginal cost pricing is
therefore not sustainable in the absence of government support.
Several pricing structures may be adopted in such situations.  A common feature is that
each user should at least pay the marginal cost of supplying them with the services.  Any
user supplied at less than their marginal cost is being cross-subsidised.  Different
approaches can be taken to recover the fixed costs.
One approach is to price discriminate between users on the basis of their sensitivity to
changes in prices.  Each user pays the marginal cost of their provision but the fixed cost is
allocated predominantly to those users who are least sensitive to price changes.  This
approach is second best efficient in the sense that it minimises distortions in users
behaviour.
An alternative approach is to adopt a two-part pricing tariff.  Users would be charged a
‘usage’ charge which directly reflects their marginal cost of using the service.  In addition,
they would also pay an ‘access’ charge which is intended to cover the fixed costs of
supplying the service.  This charge may be common to all users or it may vary between
different classes of users.  This approach may not minimise the distortions in user
behaviour but it may be less administratively costly to implement because detailed
information on each customer’s sensitivity to price changes is not required.
It is evident from Table D.5 that price discrimination is likely to be widespread
amongst the ports included in this study.  The majority of Australian and
overseas ports negotiate prices with individual customers.  These may represent
discounts on scheduled charges for large volume customers to full autonomy to
negotiate ‘pricing packages’ for individual customers.  For example, the Port of
Adelaide has legislated authority to negotiate prices with customers.D   PORT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES
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Direct negotiation with individual customers is the primary method of price
setting among the overseas ports.  For example, Auckland and Tilbury negotiate
packages directly with customers.  Singapore is moving towards increased
reliance on bilateral negotiation with customers in setting prices.
Ship versus cargo based charges
Pricing structures vary between ports depending upon the extent to which
various government and port authority charges are levied against the ship or the
cargo.  Different pricing structures have implications for efficiency and the
interpretation of many results in this benchmarking study.  The approach
adopted in dealing with a mix of ship-based and cargo-based charges when
benchmarking port authority charges is discussed in Chapter 5.
A key consideration is that the costs of supplying services must be recovered
(unless the operations of the port are subsidised) through the charging structure.
This implies that, other things being equal, lower ship-based charges means that
cargo based charges must be higher and vice versa.
In practice, port authorities may use the structure of charges to achieve
objectives other than simply recovering the cost of supplying services.  For
example, the port authority in Brisbane has decided not to levy ship-based
charges in order to encourage ship visits to that port.  Tilbury and Port Klang
have also chosen not to levy ship-based charges.  To the extent that port
authorities adopt different charging structures benchmarking measures will be
affected.
In other cases, port authorities may wish to recover costs largely through ship-
based charges and minimise charges on cargo.  For example, the port authorities
of Nagoya and Hamburg do not levy any cargo-based charges.
Efficient prices should reflect the cost of providing particular goods or services.
Some of the costs incurred by port authorities are specifically for ships and
depend upon characteristics, for example, berth requirements may be related to
the ship’s length.  Other costs will depend upon the nature and volume of the
cargo, for example, additional costs may be incurred where special handling is
required to load or unload particular cargoes.
Variations between the charging structures of competing ports also have
efficiency implications.  The absence of ship-based charges in some ports will
encourage ships which may not have otherwise visited the port to do so.  For
example, the absence (or subsidised) ship-based charges may encourage ships
with low volumes of cargo to visit that port.  Several efficiency implications
arise in this situation.  Increased ship visits may result in congestion within the
port and hence increased delays and disruption to scheduled services.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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In addition, extra infrastructure to accommodate these ships may have to be
provided.  For example, extra wharf space may need to be constructed or
additional towage services provided.  This additional infrastructure would not
be justified if the charges accurately reflected the marginal cost of providing the
additional infrastructure.
Conversely, a charging structure with high ship-based charges discourages ships
from visiting the port which would otherwise have done so if ship-based
charges had been lower.  Some ships may be less sensitive to changes in ship-
based charges and continue to visit these ports.
Alternatively, depending upon the basis for charging, such a charging structure
may result in fewer visits by larger ships.  In this case, the lower cargo-based
charges will encourage more cargo exchanges to occur.  This may exacerbate
port-land interface problems at the port (see Chapter 10) and create additional
delays.  Fewer ship visits represents a loss in service quality as importers and
exporters may loose some flexibility in determining their shipment times.277
GLOSSARY
Bill  of  lading Document given on behalf of a ship
operator, providing details of the goods
received for shipment.  It includes terms
and conditions for carriage, the condition of
the goods at the time of shipment and acts
as a document of title.
‘Blue  water’  freight  rate Charge by shipping line for carriage of
cargo and lifting it on and off the ship.
Break-bulk cargo Non-bulk cargo that is not containerised. It
can include unitised cargoes as well as
miscellaneous goods in boxes, bales, cases
or drums. For example assembled cars, steel
coil and pallets of timber.
Bulk cargo Cargo (such as coal, ore, sand or oil) that is
carried loose, takes up the shape of the
ship’s hold and is handled by direct
application of conveyors, grabs, pumps,
elevators, and so on.
Common-user Port facilities owned by the port authority
to serve all port users and not restricted to
particular operators.
Conference An association of liner shipping lines which
act together to offer common prices for
scheduled sailings over defined routes.
Conservancy  dues Charges levied on the ship operator and
collected by the port authority to cover a
range of services such as navigation aids,
dredging and channel markings.
Consolidation The aggregation of two or more lots of
cargo from different sources into oneINTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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container or unitised load; includes the
acceptance, documentation, sorting and
stowing of goods into containers or unitised
loads.
Container International Standards Organisation (ISO)
shipping container.
Container  depot A facility at which goods belonging to
different shippers making up less than a full
container load are consolidated and packed
into, or separated and unpacked from,
shipping containers.
Container  terminal A facility at which containers are loaded
onto or discharged from ships.
Contestability The degree of ease with which firms can
enter or leave a market.
Conventional stevedoring Stevedoring of non-containerised cargo.
‘Core’ port activities Activities such as planning, providing and
allocating port infrastructure such as
channels, breakwaters, navigation aids and
berths.
Crane rate Hourly rate at which a single crane moves
cargo onto or off the ship.
Cross-subsidisation The use of revenue from one source to




A government requirement on a public body
to carry out activities which it would not do
on a commercial basis or at the required
price.
Deadweight tonnage (dwt) Total load of cargo, fuel, stores and ballast
that a ship can carry.
Depot See Container depot.
Door-to-door Term used to describe a service that moves
goods from the premises of the consignor to
those of the consignee.GLOSSARY
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Economies  of  scale Factors which cause the average cost of
producing a commodity or service to fall as
output increases.  For example, economies
of scale would result in a less than doubling
of costs as output is doubled.
Economies of scope Factors which make it cheaper to produce a
range of related products than to produce
each of the individual products on their
own.
Ex-spout That stage of the transportation and
handling chain when bulk product has been
released from shore-based loading
infrastructure into the ship.
Freight forwarder Enterprise engaged in the consolidation and
movement of freight.
Full container load or lot (FCL) A  container  that  holds  the  goods  of  one
consignor or consignee.
General cargo Break-bulk or container cargo.
Gross registered tonnes (grt) The cubic foot capacity of a ship’s hull
below the upper deck, divided by 100.
Harbour  dues Charges levied by the port authority to
cover the cost of providing certain port
facilities and services.
Integrated port A port where services such as stevedoring,
pilotage, towage and mooring are provided
by the one operator.
Landbridging Substitution of a sea transport link with a
land transport link.
Landlord  port  authority An authority that limits its activities to
‘core’ port activities.
Less than container load or lot
(LCL)
A container that holds the goods of more
than one consignee or consignor.
Mooring Securing a ship in a particular place by
means of chains or ropes.INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN WATERFRONT
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Natural  monopoly Occurs when economies make it possible
for one business to supply the entire market
more cheaply than a number of enterprises.
Net crane rate Hourly rate at which a single crane moves
containers while a ship is actually being
worked.
Net registered tonnage (nrt) The cubic foot capacity of a ship’s hull
below the upper deck, excluding space set
aside for crew quarters, stores, fuel,
machinery and so on, divided by 100.
Pan-Australian rates Rates that are the same at each Australian
port of call.
Panamax The term given to a ship that is just able to
navigate the Panama Canal.  Typically a
bulk ship of between 40 000 and 80  000
dwt.
Pilotage Navigation of a ship within ports and their
approaches by a licensed pilot.  Also,
sometimes the name given to a pilot’s
charge.
Port  authority Public agency responsible for control and
management of a port and its facilities.
Price discrimination The practice of charging different prices to
different users for the same service or
facility.
Private ports Ports operated by private companies.
Provedoring Supplying ships’ crew and passenger
provisions.
Revenue  tonnes The greater of mass or the volume of a
cargo.
Roll-on Roll-off (ro-ro) A type of ship for which cargo is driven on
and off.
Ship rate Hourly rate at which cargo is moved onto or
off the ship.  In the case of containers, this
is equivalent to the crane rate multiplied by
the number of cranes working the ship.GLOSSARY
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Shipper The sender or final receiver of sea cargo.
Shipping agent (or ship’s agent) A licensed agent who transacts business for
a ship owner.
Shipping conference Any type of formal or informal agreement
between shipping companies, usually in the
liner trades, that is designed to secure
regularity and frequency of service and
stability of rates.
Stevedoring The process of loading and unloading ships.
Stevedore A business that engages in stevedoring.
Stow and trim The process of loading bulk wheat (or other
dry bulk products) into all corners of a
ship’s hold and smoothing it so that it sits
level.
Tonnage charges Charges levied by the port authority based
on the tonnage of the ship for the provision
of certain port facilities.
Towage Tug operations assisting the movement of
ships.




A container counting unit based on the
International Standards Organisation 20ft
by 8.5ft by 8.5ft container.
Vertical  integration Occurs where successive stages in
production and distribution are placed
under the control of a single enterprise.
Wharfage Port authority charge on shippers based on
the volume or weight of cargo that is loaded
or unloaded in the port.283
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